

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

25 April 2019

Mr. Michael Best
MuckRock News
DEPT MR 24737
411A Highland Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144-2516

Reference: F-2017-01460 / FBI 1348075-000

Dear Mr. Best:

In the course of processing your 1 April 2016 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for information on the **Covert Action Quarterly**, the Federal Bureau of Investigation located CIA material and referred it to us on 12 April 2017 for review and direct response to you.

We have determined that four documents can be released to you in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7c), and (b)(7e). Copies of the documents are enclosed. Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statutes are Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

If you have any questions regarding our response, you may contact us at:

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Information and Privacy Coordinator
703-613-3007 (Fax)

Please be advised that you may seek dispute resolution services from the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or from the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) of the National Archives and Records Administration. OGIS offers mediation services to help resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies. You may reach CIA's FOIA Public Liaison at:

703-613-1287 (FOIA Hotline)

The contact information for OGIS is:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road – OGIS
College Park, MD 20740-6001
202-741-5770
877-864-6448
202-741-5769 (fax)
ogis@nara.gov

Contacting the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or OGIS does not affect your right to pursue an administrative appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Riggs Monfort".

Riggs Monfort
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

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FM CIA/DDO

TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTEL DIV

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S E C R E T . CITE CIA/DDO 780453.

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 Pub. Rel. _____
 Rec. Inv. _____
 Tech. Servs. _____
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 & Fed. A/c _____
 Weather For. _____

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b7C

SECRET

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INV

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
CIA PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING:

SUBJECT: ELLEN RAY, WILLIAM SCHAAP, LOUIS WOLF/COVERT ACTION

INFORMATION BULLETIN, FCI-CUBA

(S)

REF: A. [REDACTED], 16 APRIL 1980

(S)

(b)(3)

B. [REDACTED] 6 OCTOBER 1980

(b)(3)

1. REFERENCE A PROVIDED THE BUREAU WITH BACKGROUND INFORMATION
ON THE "COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN" (CAIB) AND ITS STAFF,
ELLEN RAY, WILLIAM SCHAAP, AND LOUIS WOLF. THE FOLLOWING INFOR-
MATION UPDATES THAT PROVIDED IN THE REFERENCE A MEMORANDUM. (S)(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)b6
b7C2. AS YOU ARE AWARE, LOUIS WOLF OF CAIB GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE
(ATTENDED BY SCHAAP AND RAY) IN KINGSTON, JAMAICA, ON 2 JULY 1980,
DURING WHICH HE REVEALED THE NAMES OF 17 INDIVIDUALS WHOM HE ALLEGED
[REDACTED] TO BE EMPLOYEES OF THIS AGENCY. LESS THAN 48 HOURS (S) (b)(3)

SECRET

~~PAGE 2 RUEAIIA 2227 S E C R E T~~~~SECRET~~

LATER, THE HOME OF ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS NAMED BY WOLF WAS FIRED UPON BY UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS USING AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, AND A SMALL BOMB OR GRENADE WAS DETONATED ON THE FRONT LAWN OF THE HOME. (S)

3. FROM SENSITIVE SOURCES WE HAVE LEARNED THAT SINCE THAT PRESS CONFERENCE, MEMBERS OF THE CAIB STAFF AND THEIR ASSOCIATE JOHN STOCKWELL (SUBJECT OF REFERENCE B) HAVE TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY IN THE CARIBBEAN. ON 16 JULY 1980, ELLEN RAY TRAVELED TO KINGSTON, JAMAICA, FROM HAVANA, CUBA. ON 28 JULY, RAY AND WOLF AGAIN TRAVELED TO KINGSTON (ORIGIN OF THIS FLIGHT NOT KNOWN), FROM WHERE RAY DEPARTED TO HAVANA, CUBA, ON 30 JULY, TRAVELING ON AN AIRLINE TICKET PROVIDED BY THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN KINGSTON. ON 26 AUGUST 1980 RAY AND SCHAAP WERE AGAIN IN JAMAICA AND ATTENDED A STOCKWELL PRESS CONFERENCE. ON 27 AUGUST THEY DEPARTED FOR HAVANA, ACCCOMPANIED BY TREVOR MUNROE, THE COMMUNIST LEADER OF THE WORKER'S PARTY OF JAMAICA (WPJ). (S)

4. CAIB HAS BEEN OPENLY PROMOTING THE GOVERNMENT OF MICHAEL MANLEY IN JAMAICA, WHILE (FALSELY) ACCUSING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND, IN PARTICULAR, THIS AGENCY OF MOUNTING A CAMPAIGN TO DESTABILIZE THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE CARIBBEAN AREA, PARTICULARLY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAMAICA. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUEAIIA 2227 S E C R E T

5. IN ADDITION TO THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH REGARD TO THE CARIBBEAN,
THE CAIB STAFF CONTINUES

(b)(3)

CLAIMING TO HAVE RECEIVED THE ARTICLE ANONYMOUSLY. (S)

6.

(b)(3)

(S)

7. RUEW 38 SEPT 18 DRV D9B ALL SECRET BY ORIGINATOR. ALL
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. (S)

BT Recipients are requested to be alert for information
which would be of help to CIA in this matter. Note
dissemination restrictions (S)

C4 E 5170 ; Reason 2 ; XDRD 10/9/00

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FM CIA/DDO

TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTEL DIV

BT
~~SECRET~~ CIA Publications, Inc.
S E C R E T. CITE CIA/DDO 780453. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
SUBJECT: ELLEN RAY, WILLIAM SCHAAP, LOUIS WOLF/COVERT ACTION

INFORMATION BULLETIN, FCI-CUBA

REF: A. 16 APRIL 1980 DE-78

B. 6 OCTOBER 1981

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Per [redacted] 10181898 GIA
SAYS OK TO DISSEMINATE TO
NY, WFO, NM, S.A. T.H.

7 OCT 15 1980

(b)(6) b6
(b)(7)(c) b7c

~~PAGE 2 RUEAIIA 2227 S E C A E I~~

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CAIB IN JAMAICA

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PAGE 3 RUEAIIA 2227 S E C R E T

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6.

(b)(3)

7. RVW 30 SEPT 10 DRV D9B ALL ~~SECRET~~ BY ORIGINATOR. ALL
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

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Series 7
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 102-21-2017 BY 386343730 ADC

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

~~PIGS~~~~FALSE~~

16 July 1979

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

(b)(3)
(b)(7)(e)

Dear Bill,

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

me
DCI Publications, Inc.
This is in response to your letter of 12 February 1979, which requested an assessment of the damage caused by the unauthorized disclosure by Philip Burnett Franklin Agee [redacted]

The reason for our delay in answering your letter is that, until recently, we believed there was no way to narrowly focus any criminal proceedings against Mr. Agee and avoid the disclosure of certain especially sensitive intelligence information during the course of Mr. Agee's prosecution. However, after discussing this concern with Deputy Assistant Attorney General [redacted] we now believe that we may be able to overcome the legal problems regarding the disclosure of this information in such a prosecution. Your letter also requested that we furnish the FBI with any information in our possession regarding Mr. Agee's activities that might be relevant to the FBI's full foreign counterintelligence investigation of Mr. Agee. All such information has been provided to the FBI special agents handling the counterintelligence investigation, and it is my understanding that an internal FBI report was prepared concerning Mr. Agee which reflects the FBI's review of the information that we provided.

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JUN 26 1980

Dirty Work: The CIA In Western Europe and the Cover Action
Information Bulletin

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ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE SECRET

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

ORIGINATING OFFICE: [redacted] RECORDED
DATE: 16 JULY 1991 BY: [redacted]
EXT BY NDG YRS BY: [redacted] SICKLE, [redacted]
REASON: 3a (3), (5)

53 ALL 82 3988 [redacted]
Document from 7/17/79 21a

4-787 (Rev. 11-18-83)

NOTICE OF
CLASSIFICATION ACTION

File #

Serial NR 7-16-79b3
b7E(b)(3)
(b)(7)(e)Classified by SP6 BJA (08) 4-10-84

Reason For Classification:

EO 12356 Sec. 1.3 (a) 4.5Declassify on 0ADR246055

FBI/DOJ

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

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O
CIA Publication Incorporated

1. E.O. 12865: NM
SUBJ: GRANMA ON COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN (CAIB)
1. CCP DAILY GRANMA, MARCH 12 EDITION, CARRIED
ONE-THIRD PAGE BLOCKED ITEM RE COVERT ACTION
INFORMATION BULLETIN (CAIB) AND INTERVIEWS HELD
RECENTLY IN CUBA WITH HELEN RAY, WILLIAM SHAAP
AND LOUIS WOLF, DESCRIBED AS "THREE U.S. JOURNALISTS
AND INVESTIGATORS".

2. ARTICLE, WRITTEN BY GABRIEL MOLINA, CLAIMS THE
THREE "STRUGGLE FOR THE RIGHT TO OPPOSE 'THE AGENCY'S
PURPOSE, WHICH IS TO COMMIT CRIMES WORLD-WIDE, BLOW
UP INSTITUTIONS, AND CORRUPT PEOPLE'". MOLINA SAYS
CAIB HAS BECOME A "KIND OF GHOST" FOR THE CIA WHICH
"ATTEMPTS EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAKE CAIB PUBLICATIONS
ILLEGAL" AND HE CITES TESTIMONY REPORTEDLY GIVEN
BY FORMER AND PRESENT CIA LEADERS AND REMARKS
BY CONGRESSMEN ON THE NEED TO ERADICATE LEGISLATION
TO BAN CAIB PRONOUNCEMENTS.

3. THE THREE ARE QUOTED AS APPEARING UNDAUNTED
BY ATTEMPTS TO SQUELCH THEIR BULLETIN EVEN
THOUGH THEY "PERSONALLY LEAD FISH BOWL" LIVES,
ALLEGING THAT ALL THEIR MOVEMENTS ARE MONITORED.

4. SECTION OF ARTICLE RELATING TO CUBA IS AS
FOLLOWS:

—QUOTE SHAAP SAID THAT PART OF HIS INVESTIGATIONS
DEALT WITH "EXILES IN FLORIDA AND THEIR RELATIONS
WITH THE CIA".
— IN A TRIAL IN MIAMI AGAINST LOPEZ ESTRADA AND
HIS GROUP, THE STATE'S ATTORNEY ATTEMPTED TO PROVE
THAT THEY WERE ACTING ON THEIR OWN, LOPEZ REPLIED
"NO, NO, EVERYTHING WAS DONE WITH THE CIA'S OK".
THE ATTORNEY SAID THAT THAT WAS A THING OF THE
PAST, THE TIME OF THE BAY OF PIGS (GIRO) INVASION.
THEY THEN CALLED THE CIA AND THE AGENCY SENT ONE OF
ITS OFFICERS TO TESTIFY THAT THEY WERE WORKING FOR
THE CIA, AND SO IT WAS THAT THEY (LOPEZ ESTRADA
AND GROUP) WENT FREE.

— THAT CLOSE RELATION EXPLAINS THE IMPURITY WITH WHICH
SUCH ELEMENTS ACT. THE CAIB EDITORS SAID THAT THESE
ELEMENTS ESTABLISHED IN NEW JERSEY AND MIAMI "HAVE
PARTICIPATED IN CRIMES SUCH AS THAT AGAINST
LETELIER AND HIS ASSISTANT, AGAINST CUBAN
DIPLOMAT FELIX GARICA'S AND THOSE AGAINST
THE ANTONIO MAECIO BRIGADE EVEN THOUGH THE
FBI KNOWS WHO THEY ARE AND WHERE THEY ARE
AND, IN SPITE OF ATTRIBUTING THESE CRIMES
TO THEM, TAKES NO ACTION AGAINST THEM". THIS
TRAIL (OF LOPEZ ESTRADA) AND OTHER ACTIONS PROVE
— THAT THEY HAVE NEVER STOPPED COMMITTING SUCH
CRIMES AND CONTINUE TO DO SO.
— "IF YOU PUT THINGS TOGETHER, YOU FIND THE
SAME PEOPLE AND THE SAME METHODS. THERE ARE
MANY RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE EXILE GROUPS AND

U.S. RIGHT-WING GROUPS LIKE THE KU KLUX KLAN"
THEY ADDED.
THE CAIB EDITORS WENT TO AFRICA TO INVESTIGATE
CIA INTERFERENCE IN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA. THEY
SAID THAT THE NEW U.S. (ADY) AMBASSADOR (ED:
REFERENCE APPARENTLY TO U.N. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK)
STRONGLY SUPPORTS SOUTH AFRICA'S RACIST GOVERNMENT
SINCE REAGAN'S GOVERNMENT IS GOING TO WORK HARD TO
PREVENT NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE.
THEY STATED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO LET IT BE KNOWN
AROUND THE WORLD HOW THE CIA WORKS SO THAT THOSE
WHO SUFFER FROM ITS ACTIONS CAN IDENTIFY THEM, MAKE
THEM PUBLIC AND FIGHT AGAINST THEM".
IN THE NEXT THREE OR FOUR YEARS WE WILL HAVE
A LOT OF WORK TO DO SINCE THIS NEW GOVERNMENT
OF OURS IS GOING TO INCREASE ITS COVERT ACTION
AND IT'S OUR JOB TO DENOUNCE IT" THEY SAID
UPON ENDING.
JORDAN

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-21-2017 BY 086943T30 ADC

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23 MAR 24 1981

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We shall look forward to further discussion with you
concerning this most important matter.

Yours,


STANSFIELD TURNER
Stanisfield Turner**Attachments****SECRET**

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4-787 (Rev. 11-18-83)

NOTICE OF
CLASSIFICATION ACTIONFile # Serial NR 7-10-4(b)(3)
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b7E

Classified by DPB QJA/osp 4-10-84

Reason For Classification:

EO 12356 Sec. 1.3(a) 4-5Declassify on 0900R
246051

FBI/DOJ

Sect 1

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505b6
b7C

[FEDERAL GOVERNMENT]

217091
16 APR 1980
DECLASSIFIED BY 10 APR 1984
ON 11/3/84
OCC 11/3/84MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of InvestigationATTENTION: James E. Nolan
Chief, Soviet Operations Section (CI-1),
Intelligence DivisionSUBJECT: ~~Covert Action Information Bulletin (CAIB)~~

1. The following material on Covert Action Information Bulletin (CAIB) is forwarded for your background information. Copies of issues of this publication are attached.

2. Covert Action Information Bulletin (CAIB) is a Washington, D.C. based anti-CIA publication which has been in existence since July 1978. This publication was established by Philip Agee and its existence announced in a speech made by Agee at the Havana World Youth Festival in July 1978. The magazine is the mouth-piece of a "world-wide network" of informants whose task it is to expose CIA personnel, sources and methods. This "network", called "CIA Watch", is felt by Agee to be a permanent weapon in the fight against "FBI, CIA, military intelligence and all the other instruments of U.S. imperialist oppression throughout the world."

3. Included on the original editorial staff of the magazine were Philip Agee and John, all of whom are former CIA employees. Two individuals are now members of CAIB's Board of Advisors, along with CAIB's (b)(7)(c) Paris-based representative Karl Van Meter and Ken Lawrence, a journalist working out of Jackson, Mississippi, who is the director of the "Anti Repression Resource Team", a research and publication project focusing on cases of political repression in the U.S. V38 DE5 (b)(3) b3 (b)(7)(e) b7E

4. The three individuals who are on the Editorial Board of CAIB and who claim to be entirely responsible for the content of the magazine are William Schaap, his wife Ellen Ray, and Louis Wolf.

5. Schaap, a Washington lawyer, is a member of the National Lawyers Guild and is active in many of this group's projects. He is regarded as a military law expert. Ray, Schaap's wife, served on the advisory board of CAIB's predecessor "CounterSpy" (now publishing but not affiliated with CAIB). Both of these individuals served as National Lawyers Guild observers at the Baader-Meinhof trials in Germany.

WARNING NOTICE: INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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REVIEW ON Apr 00
DERIVED FROM D9c

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6. Schaap and Ray have traveled to Cuba and Ray has had contact with a Cuban intelligence officer in New York City.

7. These individuals are also in contact with [redacted] (b)(6) b6
[redacted] (b)(7)(c) b7C
who is also very friendly with Agee.

8. Louis Wolf, born [redacted] 31 October 1940, Philadelphia, was involved in anti-Vietnam war activities in the Philippines in the late 1960s. He was a member of the Fourth International and was in contact with a member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) [redacted] about 1969. With Agee, [redacted] wrote [redacted] (b)(6) b6
[redacted] a book which named over 700 individuals alleged to (b)(7)(c) b7C
CIA employees.

9. Schaap, Ray, Wolf, and Karl Van Meter were the publicized authors of Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa, a book which had in pre-publication advertising been attributed to Agee and Wolf. This book also named several hundred individuals alleged to be CIA employees.


10. As of July 1978, CAIB had a circulation of approximately 6000 copies, 2000 of which went to regular subscribers. The magazine's offices are believed to be located at 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. We do not know where funding for this magazine comes from but suspect that the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) and the Stern Fund help to support this group and their activities.

11. Since publication of this magazine began, issues have carried the full text of 2 classified U.S. government documents and one forged document which the magazine stated was authentic. *Not false info*

12. Many of the articles contained in this publication merely speculate on what CIA is involved in--with little basis in fact for the information published therein.

13. All portions of this document are Secret.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:



David H. Blee

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Attachments: CAIB - July 1978
CAIB - March-April 1980

~~SECRET~~

COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN

PREMIER ISSUE

JULY 1978

FREE

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
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ENCLOSURE

Covert Action Information Bulletin, Number 1, July 1978, published by Covert Action Publications, Inc., a District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation, P.O. Box 50272, F Street Station, Washington, DC 20004. Telephone (202) 296-6766. All rights reserved; copyright © 1978, by Covert Action Publications, Inc. Permission to reprint will be liberally granted. Typography by Art for People, Washington, DC.

DIRTY WORK

The CIA In Western Europe



For the past several years, beginning in 1974, new "enemies" have haunted the Central Intelligence Agency — journalists and ex-agents. These people are bent on exposing the CIA's unscrupulous tactics so the American public can see what the CIA has spawned and what is being done under the deceptive cover of "national security."

John Marks, Victor Marchetti, Morton H. Halperin and especially Philip Agee have shown considerable courage in informing the world about the seamy side of American espionage. They have opened much of the secret portfolio, ranging from the routine planting of phony news stories to assassination attempts and the overthrow of legitimate governments.

In this startling book a comprehensive picture of the CIA emerges. More important, the authors explain the simple way in which any competent researcher can recognize the people behind the dirty work — thus breaking the "cover" of thousands of CIA agents around the world.

Dirty Work is a major exposé of the CIA — what it does and who does it — on a scale never before revealed.

PHILIP AGEE, an ex-CIA operative, is the Agency's number one nemesis and author of the best-selling *Inside The Company: CIA Diary*. LOUIS WOLF is a journalist who has done intensive research into the American intelligence community.

LYLE STUART

\$24.95

0-8184-0268-7

Edited by Philip Agee and
Louis Wolf

SPECIAL OFFER

This startling and invaluable new exposé of the CIA, just published, lists for \$24.95. If you order your copy through the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, and at the same time subscribe to the *Bulletin*, we will give you a \$10.00 discount from the cost of your subscription. Just send the enclosed order form in along with your subscription blank.

DIRTY WORK: Order Form

Please send me a copy of *Dirty Work*. My check or money order for \$24.95 (U.S. funds, please), is enclosed.

Name: _____

Mailing Address: _____

WHO WE ARE

One and a half years ago the last issue of *CounterSpy Magazine* appeared. Although the scope of coverage, the depth of research, and the impact of *CounterSpy* around the world were on the rise, personal and political disputes coupled with CIA harassment led to an impasse among the staff. Those of us who had been working most closely with Phil Agee left the magazine to continue research, and others stayed on, ostensibly to continue the magazine. They were not successful.

We have felt, since the beginning, that there is an important and vital role to be played by the sort of exposés for which *CounterSpy* had become world-famous. We decided that the dissemination of such information must resume. That *CounterSpy* and its uncovering of CIA personnel and operations around the world were so violently hated by the Agency was our best endorsement. The compliments and encouragement we received from progressive people everywhere convinced us that we could not leave this void in the mosaic of struggles against the U.S. intelligence complex.

We begin modestly with a small Bulletin which we intend to publish approximately bi-monthly. This first issue is being distributed at no charge. We are confident that there will be sufficient subscribers to make this publication a permanent weapon in the fight against the CIA, the FBI, military intelligence, and all the other instruments of U.S. imperialist oppression throughout the world. We know that the information and the research is there, crying out to be published and disseminated.

We encourage everyone to keep in touch with us, to correspond, to submit leads, tips, suggestions and articles. We will try to track down all your leads. Most especially, we will never stop exposing CIA personnel and operations whenever and wherever we find them. We are particularly anxious to receive, anonymously if you desire, copies of U.S. diplomatic lists and U.S. embassy staff and/or telephone directories, from any countries.

A major step in that battle has already been taken. Two of our group, Phil Agee and Lou Wolf, have edited and prepared a new book, *Dirty Work*, just published by Lyle Stuart, Inc. This book describes in detail how to expose CIA personnel, includes dozens of articles from many countries which have done just that, and presents, in Appendix form, detailed biographies of more than 700 undercover CIA and NSA personnel lurking in embassies and military installations in virtually every country on earth. We urge all our readers to study this book, and the simple methodology it sets forth. And, of course, to let us know the results of your own research.

The book, which is at present only in hardcover, is unfortunately expensive. While we recognize that the years of research which went into it, and the expensive, complicated and lengthy printing which it involved, justify such a cover

price, we have arranged for a special offer for our readers. If you order a copy of the book through us—see the ad on page 2—we will give a \$10 rebate on all charter one-year subscriptions to the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. If you are in the United States, this is the full price; if you are overseas, you will only have to pay the postage.



One of our group was a CIA case officer for twelve years; two others worked in finance and support for the CIA for nine years; the rest of us have devoted much of the past several years to direct research on U.S. intelligence operations. We hope that we can put this experience to valuable use through the pages of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. We hope you will agree, and will support us.

Phil Agee
Ellen Ray
Bill Schaap
Elsie Wilcott
Jim Wilcott
Lou Wolf

WHERE MYTHS LEAD TO MURDER

... by Philip Agee

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[This article is a slightly modified version of the introduction to the book *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, just published. It expresses much of the philosophy of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*.]

Today the whole world knows, as never before, how the U.S. government and U.S. corporations have been secretly intervening in country after country to corrupt politicians and to promote political repression. The avalanche of revelations in the mid-1970s, especially those concerning the CIA, shows a policy of secret intervention that is highly refined and consistently applied.

Former President Ford and leading government spokesmen countered by stressing constantly the need for the CIA to retain, and to use when necessary, the capability for executing the kinds of operations that brought to power the military regime in Chile. Ford even said in public that he believed events in Chile had been "in the best interests of the Chilean people." And even with President Carter's human rights campaign there has been no indication that the CIA has reduced or stopped its support of repressive dictatorships in Iran, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, and other bastions of "the free world."

The revelations, though, have not only exposed the operations of the CIA, but also the individual identities—the names, addresses, and secret histories—of many of the people who actually do the CIA's work. Yet, with all the newly available information, many people still seem to believe the myths used to justify this secret political police force. Some of the myths are, of course, actively spread by my former CIA colleagues; others come from their liberal critics. But whatever the source, until we lay the myths to rest, they will continue to confuse people and permit the CIA—literally—to get away with murder.


Myth Number One: The CIA is primarily engaged in gathering intelligence information against the Soviet Union.

This is perhaps the CIA's longest-playing myth, going back to the creation of the Agency in 1947 and the choice of the name "Central Intelligence Agency." As the Agency's

backers explained the idea to the American Congress, afraid even in those early days of getting dragged into unwanted foreign adventures, the CIA was needed to find out what a possible enemy was planning in order to protect the United States from a surprise attack. Americans at the time still shared a vivid memory of the unexpected Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, and with the likelihood that the new enemy—the Soviet Union—would soon have atomic bombs, no one could really doubt the need to know if and when an attack might come.

The real success in watching the Soviets, however, came from technological breakthroughs like the U-2 spy plane and spy-in-the-sky satellites, and the job of strategic intelligence fell increasingly to the technically sophisticated U.S. National Security Agency. The CIA played a part, of course, and it also provided centralized processing of information and data storage. But in its operations the CIA tended to put its emphasis on covert action—financing friendly politicians, murdering suspected foes, and staging *coups d'état*.

This deeply-involved the Agency in the internal politics of countries throughout Western Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, as well as in the Soviet bloc. And even where CIA officers and agents did act as



spies, gathering intelligence information, they consistently used that information to further their programs of action.

The CIA's operatives will argue that the ultimate goal of discovering Soviet and other governments' intentions requires live spies at work in places like the Kremlin—that the Agency exists to recruit these spies and to keep them alive

and working. A Penkovsky or two should be on the payroll at all times to keep America safe from Russian adventures. This argument may influence some people, because theoretically, spy satellites and other forms of monitoring only give a few minutes' warning, whereas a person in the right place can report on decisions as soon as they are made, giving perhaps days or weeks of warning. Such a spy might also be of great value for the normal conduct of relations--whether in negotiations, cooperation, or confrontation."

Nevertheless, the vast CIA effort to recruit officials of importance in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, KGB, and GRU has never had significant success. There have indeed been defections, but these, I was told in the CIA, had nothing to do with the elaborate traps and snares laid out by the CIA around the world. They resulted from varying motivations and psychological pressures operating on the official who defected. In this respect, the CIA's strengthening of repressive foreign security services, necessary for laying out the snares (telephone tapping, travel control, observation posts, surveillance teams, etc.), can scarcely be justified by the nil recruitment record.

Today, notwithstanding recent "reforms," the CIA remains primarily an action agency--doing and not just snooping. Theirs is the grey area of interventionist action between striped-pants diplomacy and invasion by the Marines, and their targets in most countries remain largely the same: governments, political parties, the military, police, secret services, trade unions, youth and student organizations, cultural and professional societies, and the public information media. In each of these, the CIA continues to prop up its friends and beat down its enemies, while its goal remains the furthering of U.S. hegemony so that American multinational companies can intensify their exploitation of the natural resources and labor of foreign lands.

Of course this has little to do with strategic intelligence or preventing another Pearl Harbor, while it has a lot to do with the power of certain privileged groups within the United States and their friends abroad. The CIA spreads the myth of "intelligence gathering" in order to obscure the meaning of what the Agency is really doing.

Myth Number Two: The major problem is lack of control; that is, the CIA is a "rogue elephant."

This myth comes not from the CIA, but from its liberal critics, many of whom seem to believe that all would be well if only Congress or the President would exercise tighter control. Yet, for all the recent horror stories, one finds little evidence that a majority in Congress want the responsibility for control, while the executive branch continues to insist--rightly--that the Agency's covert action operations have, with very few exceptions, followed the orders of successive presidents and their National Security Councils. As former Secretary of State Kissinger told Representative Otis Pike's Intelligence Investigating Committee, "Every operation is personally approved by the President."

For its part the Pike committee concluded in its official report, first published in "leaked" form by the *Village Voice*, that "all evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs."

So the problem is said to be with the presidents--Democratic and Republican--who, over the past 30 years,

have given the green light to so many covert operations. But why were the operations necessary? And why secret? The operations had to be secret, whether they involved political bribes, funding of anticommunist journals, or fielding of small armies, because in every case they implied either government control of supposedly non-governmental institutions or violation of treaties and other agreements. In other words, hypocrisy and corruption. If the government was going to subvert free, democratic, and liberal institutions, it would have to do so secretly!



There is, however, a more basic reason for the secrecy--and for the CIA. Successive administrations--together with American-based multinational corporations--have continually demanded the freest possible access to foreign markets, labor, agricultural products, and raw materials. To give muscle to this demand for the "open door," recent presidents have taken increasingly to using the CIA to strengthen those foreign groups who cooperate--and to destroy those who do not. This has been especially clear in countries such as Chile under Allende, or Iran 20 years earlier under Mossadegh, where strong nationalist movements insisted on some form of socialism to ensure national control of economic resources.

The CIA's covert action operations abroad are not *sui generis*. They happen because they respond to internal U.S. requirements. We cannot wish them away through fantasies of some enlightened President or Congress who would end American subversion of foreign peoples and institutions by the wave of a wand. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Senate rejected by a very wide margin a legislative initiative that would have prohibited covert action programs by the CIA.

Only prior radical change within the U.S., change that will eliminate the process of accumulating the value of foreign labor and resources, will finally allow an end to secret intervention abroad. Until then, we should expect more intervention by the CIA and multinational corporations--not less. Increasingly important will be the repressive capabilities of the Agency's "sister" services abroad.

Myth Number Three: Weakening the CIA opens wider the door for Soviet expansion and eventual world domination.

This myth is peddled especially hard at times when liberation movements make serious gains. Former President Ford and Dr. Kissinger used it frequently during the CIA's ill-fated intervention in Angola, and we continue to hear it again as liberation movements seek Soviet and Cuban help in their struggles against the apartheid policies of the white Rhodesians and South Africans.

The problem for America, however, is not "Soviet expansionism," despite all the anticommunism with which we are indoctrinated practically from the cradle. The problem, rather, is that the American government, preeminently the CIA, continues to intervene on the side of "friends" whose property and privilege rest on the remnants of archaic social systems long since discredited. The political repression required to preserve the old order depends on American and other Western support which quite naturally is turning more and more people against the United States—more effectively, for sure, than anything the KGB could ever concoct.

As Senator Frank Church explained in an interview on British television, "I'm apt to think that the Russians are going to choose [sides] better than we will choose nine times out of ten. After all we're two hundred years away from our revolution; we're a very conservative country."

Myth Number Four: Those who attack the CIA, especially those who have worked in the intelligence community, are traitors, turncoats, or agents of the KGB.

This has been the Agency's chief attack on me personally, and I'm certain that the fear of being tarred with the same brush is keeping many CIA veterans from voicing their own opposition. But as with earlier efforts to find the "foreign hand" in the American antiwar movement, the CIA has failed to produce a shred of evidence that any of its major American (or European) critics are in the service of any foreign power.


Would-be "reformers" of the CIA have also discovered how the Agency reacts to criticism. According to Representative Pike, the CIA's Special Counsel threatened to destroy Pike's political career. In a conversation with Pike's chief investigative staff person, the Special Counsel was quoted thus: "Pike will pay for this [directing the vote to approve the committee report on the CIA]—you wait and see. I'm serious. There will be political retaliation. Any political ambitions in New York that Pike had are through. We will destroy him for this."

CIA veterans must not be intimidated by the Agency's false and unattributed slander. We have a special responsibility for weakening this organization. If put at the service of those we once oppressed, our knowledge of how the CIA really works could keep the CIA from ever really working again. And though the CIA will brand us as "traitors," people all over the world, including the United States, will respond, as they have already, with enthusiastic and effective support.

Myth Number Five: Naming individual CIA officers does little to change the Agency, and is done only to expose innocent individuals to the threat of assassination.

Nothing in the anti-CIA effort has stirred up more anger than the publishing of the names and addresses of CIA

officials in foreign countries, especially since the killing of the CIA Station Chief in Athens, Richard Welch. CIA



spokesmen—and journals such as the *Washington Post*—were quick to accuse me and *CounterSpy* magazine of having "fingered" Welch for the "hit," charging that in publishing his name, we were issuing "an open invitation to kill him." The Agency also managed to exploit Welch's death to discredit and weaken those liberals in Congress who wanted only to curtail some of the Agency's more obvious abuses. Subsequent research, noted in *Dirty Work*, makes abundantly clear that *CounterSpy* had nothing to do with the Welch killing.

The result of the Agency's manipulations isn't hard to predict. The CIA, for all its sins, came out of the recent investigations strengthened by the Ford "reforms," while the Congress may attempt to pass an official secrets act that will attempt to make it a crime for any present or former government official ever again to blow the whistle by making public classified information. No more *Pentagon Papers*. No more Watergate revelations. No more *CIA Diaries*.

Nonetheless, the naming goes on. More and more CIA people can now be held personally accountable for what they and the Agency as an institution do—for the real harm they cause to real people. Their military coups, torture chambers, and terrorism cause untold pain, and their backing of multinational corporations and local elites helps push

millions to the edge of starvation, often beyond. They are the Gestapo and SS of our time, as in the Nuremberg Trials and the war in Vietnam, they cannot shed their individual responsibility simply because they were following a superior's orders.

But apart from the question of personal responsibility, the CIA remains a secret political police, and the exposure of its secret operations—and secret operatives—remains the most effective way to reduce the suffering they cause. Already a handful of journalists and former intelligence officers have managed to reveal the names and addresses of hundreds of CIA people, and even the *Washington Post*—which condemns us for doing it—has admitted that our efforts added greatly to the CIA's growing demoralization. We also noticed from our own investigations that the Agency was forced to step up its security precautions and to transfer many of those named to other posts. All of this disrupts and destabilizes the CIA, and makes it harder for them to inflict harm on others.

Of course, some people will always raise the cry that we are "trying to get someone killed." But, as it happens, violence is not really needed. By removing the mask of anonymity from CIA officers, we make it difficult for them to remain at overseas posts. We hope that the CIA will have the good sense to shift these people to the increasingly smaller number of safe posts, preferably to a desk inside the CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia. In this way the CIA will protect the operatives named—and also the lives of their potential victims.

From the old song and dance of the "intelligence gathering" to the claim that "those who expose are the murderers," these five myths won't simply vanish. The CIA—and its allies—will continue to propagate them, and the CIA's critics will have to respond. We must increasingly expose these myths and the crimes they cover up.

But besides debating, there is much more that we can do—especially in furthering the exposure of the Agency and its secret operatives. The CIA probably has no more than 5,000 officers experienced in running clandestine operations and it should be possible to identify almost all of those who have worked under diplomatic cover at any time in their careers. *Dirty Work* lists mainly those named as CIA operatives in Europe; we hope additional volumes can be published on the CIA's people in other areas. All that is required is a continuing effort—and a novel form of international cooperation. Here's how:

1. In each country a team of interested people, including journalists, should obtain a list of all the Americans working in the official U.S. Mission: the Embassy, consulates, AID offices, and other U.S. installations. This list can be acquired through a friend in the host Foreign Ministry, in the American Embassy—or by other means.

2. The team should then get past editions of necessary public documents—U.S. *Foreign Service Lists* and *Biographic Registers* (both published by the Department of State) from a local library, and the *Diplomatic List* and *Consular List* published regularly by every Foreign Ministry. The *Diplomatic* and *Consular Lists* will contain the names and addresses of the higher ranking members of the official mission, including some of the CIA people.

3. Check the names as suggested in the various articles in *Dirty Work*, especially John Marks' "How to Spot a Spook." Watch carefully for persons carried on the Foreign Ministry's *Diplomatic* and *Consular Lists*, but who are missing from the recent *Biographic Registers* and *Foreign Service Lists*. Most of these will be CIA people purposely left off the State Department lists.

4. After narrowing down the list of likely suspects, check them with us and with other similarly oriented groups. *CovertAction Information* will follow up on all leads, and publish all the information it can confirm.

5. Once the list is fully checked, publish it. Then organize public demonstrations against those named—both at the American Embassy and at their homes—and, where possible, bring pressure on the government to throw them out. Peaceful protest will do the job. And when it doesn't, those whom the CIA has most oppressed will find other ways of fighting back.

Naturally, as new CIA people replace the old, it will be necessary to repeat the process, perhaps every few months. And as the campaign spreads, and the CIA learns to correct the earlier and more obvious flaws in its use of State Department cover, we will have to develop new ways to spot them. Already the Agency has gotten the State Department to restrict circulation of the all-important *Biographic Register*, and it is likely that the Administration will in future place more of its people under cover of the Department of Defense (for example, in military bases, and in Military Assistance Groups), the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the multinational corporations.

In rare cases, the CIA may even attempt changing the identities of certain operatives. Nonetheless, the CIA will always need a secure base in embassies and consulates to keep its files and communications facilities, and there are many ways to identify the CIA people in these missions without relying on public documents.

Within the United States, people can help this campaign by supporting the groups struggling to stop covert intervention abroad. There is also the need for continuing research into current CIA operations, and new programs to identify and keep track of all the FBI special agents and informers, military intelligence personnel, and the Red Squads and SWAT groups of local and state police departments.

Together, people of many nationalities and varying political beliefs can cooperate to weaken the CIA and its surrogate intelligence services, striking a blow at political repression and economic injustice. The CIA can be defeated. The proof can be seen from Vietnam to Angola, and in all the other countries where liberation movements are rapidly gaining strength.

We can all aid this struggle, together with the struggle for socialism in the United States itself.

THROWING A CASE: THE TRIAL OF ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA

"The testimony will essentially be this. On approximately August 15th of 1977 at approximately 10:00 a.m., Special Agents of the United States Customs Service went to the house of Pedro Gil at 52 Northwest 58th Avenue in Miami, Florida, just a short ways off Flagler Street.

"At that location, which is a house, or a house that is fairly close to the street, a single family dwelling, there was a boat parked on a trailer in the driveway.

"The evidence will show that this is a 23 Formula outboard boat.

"At the time the agents went there they met Mr. Gil and after a brief conversation with Mr. Gil, they boarded his boat and searched it.

"What they found on the boat then becomes the subject of the evidence in this case.

"They found on the boat one 20 mm. cannon, one .50 caliber machinegun, one .30 caliber machinegun, two Browning rifles, five weapons that are commonly known as AR-15 Colt rifles, two of which had been converted to fully automatic.

"Approximately ninety rounds of 20mm. ammunition and thousands of rounds of additional ammunition to fit these other weapons."¹

Thus begins the prosecutor's opening statement in the trial of four Cuban exiles charged with unlawful possession of unregistered firearms. Never once did any of the four deny that they possessed the weapons, or that they were intended for an armed raid against the Republic of Cuba. Four days later, on January 10, 1978, they were acquitted.

What happened, and why? *CovertAction Information Bulletin* obtained the complete transcript of the trial, never before available, and carefully studied it and the surrounding events. The conclusion is inescapable that the acquittal was foreordained, and that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Justice were responsible. What is also clear is that the Carter Administration's alleged detente with Cuba, well before the recent Shaba incident and Brzezinski's ravings, was hypocritical at best, and, on some levels, a simple lie.

¹United States v. Pedro Gil, Armando Lopez Estrada, Juan Reimundo Areo and Isidoro Pineiro Castineira, No. 77-481-Cr-JE, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Official Transcript (hereinafter "Transcript"), January 6, 1978, Part I, pp. 5-6.

The CBS Documentary

The opening scene can be pinpointed. On June 10, 1977, CBS-TV aired a Bill Moyers special: "CBS Reports—The CIA's Secret Army." The show documented the paramilitary roles of certain segments of the Cuban exile community in the United States. It reviewed the preparation and implementation of the CIA-directed invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the ignominious defeat of the benighted invaders, and the subsequent recruitment by the United States government of the veterans and sympathizers of the fiasco into bands of terrorists hell-bent on attacking Cuba and overthrowing the government led by Fidel Castro.

The TV correspondent of the *Miami Herald* reported this in his review of the show:

"The Kennedy vengeance began, reports Moyers, as soon as the members of the Brigade 2506 captured during the invasion were ransomed months later. Bobby Kennedy gave top priority to the CIA's mustering of a secret army, based in Miami, to start covert sabotage operations against Castro and his regime. It was called 'Operation Mongoose.'

"A CIA agent, Grayston Lynch, was its recruiter. An Army general, Edward Lansdale, was its military director.

"The CIA virtually dropped 'Operation Mongoose' by 1972, but few involved were aware of that Now . . . the onetime CIA soldiers are simply proceeding on their own, conducting their own war."²

The Moyers show had interviews with various members of Brigade 2506, including Armando Lopez Estrada, the "Chief of Military Operations" of the Brigade. It also exposed to U.S. audiences some shocking scenes filmed in a warehouse in Miami which was stacked floor to ceiling with weapons. Two exiles—one of them as it turns out being Lopez Estrada again—were filmed in the warehouse standing proudly in front of the weapons with sacks over their heads to disguise their identities.

It was a difficult time, diplomatically, for such a show to air. The U.S. and Cuban administrations were negotiating the lessening of tensions, cultural exchanges, and the mutual opening of Interest Sections in each other's country. At the same time, right-wing forces within the United States were decrying any improvement in relations, self-interest notwithstanding. Ironically, the same day that the CBS documentary was aired, Senator Howard Baker was

²*Miami Herald*, June 10, 1977.

quoted as saying, "I think this is the worst time in history to be cozying up to Cuba."³

Despite sentiments such as [redacted]er's, it was clear that something had to be done. The Cuban exiles had it, and they were flaunting it: Warehouses full of weapons in downtown Miami. Cuban exiles bragging about armed attacks. Bombings and killings around the world. And Brigade 2506 stage center, and proud of it. But, as we shall see, what was done by the U.S. government was little more than show.

Armando Lopez Estrada, 38, Juan Raimundo Arce, 37, and Isidoro Pineiro Castineira, 38, were also arrested. They were all charged with possession of unregistered firearms and violation of the Neutrality Act. To this day, Pedro Gil has never made any public statement about the case. The others, however, from the day of the arrests, admitted that the weapons were theirs, said they had been given to them by the CIA, and proudly proclaimed that they were for use against Cuba. The *Miami Herald* noted:



Astonishingly, nothing ever happened to the warehouse full of weapons. Presumably it is still there in Miami. CBS was never questioned, never subpoenaed, nor were the cameramen and still photographers from many newspapers, all of whom saw the inside of the warehouse. Had the participants been left-wing activists instead of right-wing terrorists, one can imagine what would have happened.

Because of the public outcry, though, some kind of investigation—surveilling and following leading Brigade 2506 members—was conducted, and as the Assistant United States Attorney explained to the jury some months later, on August 15, 1977, two months after the TV show, the Customs agents searched Pedro Gil's boat. Thus began the trial that, in the final analysis, might just as well never have taken place.

The Arrests

Pedro Gil, 41, was immediately arrested. Shortly thereafter, based on fingerprint identifications and interrogations,

"Lopez Estrada confirmed that the boats and weapons were part of a plan to attack Cuba. He said one boat was to be used to transport the weapons to a fourth 'intermediary boat' somewhere outside the U.S. limits. Lopez Estrada said that he didn't feel that the group was doing anything wrong since the attack was to be launched from outside the United States. 'If I take weapons outside the United States to be used outside of the United States, is that wrong?' he asked."⁴

Following the arrests, Roberto Carballo, President of Brigade 2506, called several meetings to gather support for the defendants in the Cuban exile community and to raise funds for their defense.

Brigade 2506

The Brigade, with perhaps 500 active members, is comprised of veterans of the Bay of Pigs and other sympathizers.


³*Ibid.*

They are a powerful force in the Miami area, where well upwards of 100,000 Cuban exiles reside. A Miami city Commissioner is a member, and the state Democratic Party Chairman. A few years ago when the Brigade held its "First Congress," Miami Mayor Maurice Ferré and U.S. Representative Claude Pepper were featured speakers. On the day of the arrest, the *Miami Herald* news story pointed out that the Brigade was "well respected" in the community. Ironically, the editorial in the same issue of the *Herald* took a less-laudatory position:

"Until the mid 1960s, overthrowing Fidel Castro seemed to be the official policy of the United States government. Toward that purpose an agency of the government armed and supported a group of exiles in an abortive attempt to invade Cuba. Other efforts were made to depose the Cuban dictator.

"But the policy gradually changed, and in recent months the rate of change appears to have increased. Most Cuban exiles—many of them now citizens of the United States—find the changes in policy hard to accept. Some merely grumble. Others take their cues from the fiery oratory of demagogues who promise to turn back the clock. And a few—a tiny number, really—take the law into their own hands."

They did more than take the law into their own hands, though; they seemed to have ignored it with relative impunity. On June 29, 1976, there was a meeting at the New England Oyster House in Coral Gables, Florida, involving, as a recent *Penthouse Magazine* article put it, two Chileans, two Cuban exiles, and an American.⁶ It now appears that the participants included Hector Duran, Bernardo de Torres and Armando Lopez Estrada, from the Brigade 2506; General Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the notorious then-head of DINA, the Chilean secret police; and Michael V. Townley, the American who conspired with the fascist, paramilitary *Patria y Libertad* against the regime




of Salvador Allende, became a DINA operative after the coup, and was directly involved in the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt in September of that year.

S/bd.

⁶Ernest Volkman and John Cummings, "The Assassination of Orlando Letelier," *Penthouse*, July 1978, p. S2, at p. 59.

This meeting, which was apparently conducted under police and FBI surveillance, and which may have included an informant centered on the murder of Letelier and several sabotage actions. No police action followed this meeting.

What is more, it is public knowledge that Carballo and Lopez Estrada were also present at the secret meeting in July of 1976 in the Dominican Republic which organized the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU), which claimed credit for the heinous bombing of a Cubana Airliner in October 1976.⁷



We will return to the terrorists—no "tiny number" by the way—and to the Chilean connection, presently. But what of the Miami trial? After so many years of openly defiant and illegal behavior, Armando Lopez Estrada and three of his colleagues were charged with possession of unregistered weapons and violation of the Neutrality Act.

The Neutrality Act Charges

On January 4, 1978, the day before the trial proper was to begin, on the motion of the defense attorneys, United States District Judge of the Southern District of Florida Joe Eaton severed the Neutrality Act charges from the case. The Neutrality Act count of the indictment charged the defendants with planning, from the United States, to attack Cuba, "a country with which the United States is at peace." This particular phrase, essential to a Neutrality Act charge, was at the heart not only of the defense motion to sever, but of the entire trial as well. And this is because (as the defense incessantly pointed out to the judge and jury) of Public Law 87-733 passed by the Eighty-Seventh Congress and signed by John F. Kennedy on October 3, 1962. It reads:

"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

"That the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary including the use of force, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere.

⁷*Miami Herald*, August 16, 1977.

"To prevent in Cuba the creation of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States, and

"To work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination."⁸

This Resolution—this Cold War Monroe Doctrine—is still on the books despite three unsuccessful attempts to repeal it. And because, Judge Eaton said, "it calls for the overthrow of Fidel Castro," he withdrew the Neutrality Act charges until the prosecution could prove to him that Cuba was "a country with which the United States is at peace." So far, there has been no disposition of those charges. The case which went before the jury in Miami in January did not include Neutrality Act charges. Nevertheless, the Act and this Resolution were constantly referred to. Although the defendants were merely charged with possession of unregistered weapons, the defense continually implied that the United States was at war with Cuba, and that the defendants were simply well-meaning patriots.

The Trial

And so, Jerome Sanford, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, commenced his prosecution of the four Cuban exiles for the knowing and unlawful possession of unregistered firearms.

The prosecution's case was simple. Sanford proved that the weapons and ammunition were found on Pedri Gil's boat in front of his house; he proved that they were in working order; and he proved that they were not registered. He also proved that the fingerprints of the other three were all over the weapons and the boat. He even demonstrated that the defendants did not deny that they were their weapons, and, in fact that they intended to use them to attack Cuba.

Edward O'Donnell and his partner Donald Spain represented the defendants. Although they were well-known Miami criminal lawyers, their entry into the case was somewhat unusual, because Spain had been an Assistant State's Attorney who had prosecuted many Cuban exiles in the local courts. But at present he is well-ensconced in the exiles' legal defense teams, and is representing Guillermo Novo Sampol, a key figure in the Letelier-Moffitt assassinations, on a parole violation charge. He is also the lawyer for Alvin Ross Diaz, like Novo one of the New Jersey exile terrorists, charged with possession of explosives, firearms and drugs.

O'Donnell presented the defense's argument in his opening statement. He concentrated on Lopez Estrada. He was trained, he told the jury, by the CIA for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Afterwards, he was brought to the United States to meet Robert F. Kennedy. "Armando Lopez Estrada personally met with Robert F. Kennedy and was asked if he wanted to continue his fight against Cuba, the Castro Communist regime that was in existence in Cuba at that time. His reply was in the affirmative."⁹ Then he even met President John F. Kennedy, in addition to many CIA agents who trained him in the use of various weapons.

⁸Transcript, January 6, 1978, Part II, p. 99; January 9, 1978, Part I, pp. 87-88.

⁹Transcript, January 6, 1978, Part I, p. 95.

With the express approval of Bobby Kennedy, he took part in dozens of invasions and attacks against Cuba. He also spent several years in the early 1960s in the United States Army, while receiving pay from the CIA. All this time, O'Donnell pointed out, he handled many weapons and was never, obviously, told that he had to register them.

Some time later, Lopez Estrada was given a map by a member of the CIA which gave the location of an arms cache on a small island in the Bahamas, not far from Cuba. There he went with some friends, dug up the weapons, and brought them to Miami for cleaning and for an attack against Cuba to be launched from some place outside the United States. Yes, the defense agreed, Lopez Estrada and his friends had these weapons, but they never dreamed they had to register them. They were still proceeding under Bobby Kennedy's personal orders given seventeen years before. And, yes, the defendants were familiar with Public Law 87-733, and that, to them, was the law of the land, regardless of any so-called detente in the late 1970s.

It was only because of the CBS-TV show that these defendants—"scapegoats"—were before the court at all:

"That documentary did not go far towards cementing relationships with Cuba. A good faith effort towards the cementing of those relationships with Cuba had to be shown.

"Armando Lopez Estrada, Mr. Pineiro, Mr. Arce and Mr. Gil, the evidence will show you, are that good faith effort to show Fidel Castro we mean business.

"The arrests were applauded from the front pages of the *Miami Herald* by Fidel Castro.

"He, in his own words, said this is a step in the right direction towards cementing relationships between the United States and Cuba. That is why we are here."¹⁰

Unfortunately, Fidel Castro had no idea how little good faith there was. As a knowledgeable Miami reporter put it to *CovertAction*, "The prosecutor was ordered to bring the charges, but he sure wasn't ordered to get a conviction."

The Peculiarities of the Trial

There are a number of instances in the trial which do not ring true to an experienced criminal lawyer, or indeed anyone familiar with criminal law. In order to highlight them, we give a brief overview of the proceeding. The prosecution's case was uneventful. The defense first presented Lopez Estrada himself, the only defendant who took the stand. He testified about his Bay of Pigs history and subsequent meetings with high officials, his training in the Army, and his twenty-six commando raids against Cuba. But he also testified that his last payment from the CIA was in 1965, and his last raid was in 1963. He did testify that he had remained in contact with Grayston Lynch until the present time, and was still in contact with him. (Lynch, in fact, was present at court for the entire trial, and testified on behalf of the defendants.) Lopez Estrada also testified that he had received the map of the weapons cache in 1976 from a man he knew only as "Red Bob," whom he had known in 1961 as a member of the CIA, and whom he

¹⁰*ibid.*, p. 101.

assumed still was. He said that the weapons "were very dirty and in very bad situation because I think, if I recall correctly, that the weapons were hidden in 1966."¹¹ Finally, he mentioned in passing that he had been to the White House in 1976 to meet with an aide of President Ford.

What is important to remember is the following: except for the alleged meeting with "Red Bob" in 1976, Lopez Estrada testified to no substantive contacts with the CIA since 1965; he also testified that the weapons had been buried for 11 years, and were very dirty; and he mentioned, regarding 1976 simply that he had been to the White House. All of these points figured prominently in the subsequent crumbling of the government's case.

Grayston Lynch

The defense then called Grayston Lynch, CIA case officer for the Bay of Pigs invasion and Brigade 2506. Lynch testified about Lopez Estrada's training, particularly with respect to weapons, pointing out that the weapons provided to the Brigade by the CIA in the early 1960s were not registered so they could not be traced. He also testified that although some operations planned by the exiles received express approval, and some express disapproval, "there were some that we neither approved nor disapproved. . . . [I]f they didn't bother anything they just ignored them."¹²

It was during Lynch's testimony that the first legal puzzler arose. The following colloquy occurred during the direct examination:

"Q. Could you indicate to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury how these weapons are acquired by the agency before distribution to the people that work under you for training purposes?"

"A. I don't think, I do not think I could answer that."

"Q. Why would you be unable to answer that to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury?"

"A. I think it is classified information."

"Q. Have you taken a certain oath as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency?"

"A. Yes, I have."

"Q. All right. Does that oath preclude you from commenting on matters affecting national security?"

"A. Unless it has been brought out before."

"Q. The question that I have just asked you is a matter that has been brought out before in which there is some type of public record on it."

"A. Yes, but I could not comment on it, neither to confirm nor deny it."

"Q. And you are restricted by your oath to the United States Government from doing so?"

"A. That's right."¹³

O'Donnell, conducting the defense, had already labored Lynch's refusal to answer certain questions more than he should have. And in any other trial the exchange would have waved a red flag in front of the prosecutor. There is a well-known legal doctrine that if a witness pre-

sented by one side refuses to answer relevant questions put by the other side, that side can move to strike the *entire* testimony of the witness. A vigorous prosecutor, one would think, would have taken that advantage. Yet the cross-examination of Lynch was very brief, virtually insignificant, and touched on no sensitive areas. It would seem obvious that had the prosecutor gone to the heart of the matter of the CIA's dealings with Lopez Estrada and the others, and its providing them with weapons, he surely would have hit on a number of areas where Lynch would have refused to answer. And at that point he could have had his entire testimony stricken from the jury's consideration by the judge—something which has a substantial impact on a jury. But the government passed up the opportunity.

The defense called only one other witness, Bay of Pigs veteran and Brigade member Roberto Perez, who briefly reiterated the same experiences as Lopez Estrada, particularly the meetings with Bobby Kennedy and other high officials in the 1960s. Perez didn't know "Red Bob," but said he was always paid by "Grey Pete." Perez, much to the chagrin of the defense no doubt, also testified that he had not been involved in any raids since 1962, and didn't know anything about any other raids.

At this point the defense rested. The prosecution was now faced with a relatively simple credibility case which should have hinged on several points: First, were these weapons really given to Lopez Estrada by the CIA? If not, did Lopez Estrada and the others really believe they were? And even if they thought so, did that constitute a legal excuse?

At this point, the prosecution was entitled to bring on rebuttal witnesses, presumably to stress that the CIA had no involvement with the defendants, and had not planted these weapons for them or provided a map to them. And there was a further peculiarity here. Lopez Estrada showed the map to the court, and insisted there were still explosives on the island, and that he would lead anyone to it who wanted to see them. There is, however, no indication that any such cache really existed, nor any indication of any communication with the government of the Bahamas to check on this location, much less to warn them of live explosives lying in a hole on an island. There were a number of ways one might have proceeded to punch holes in the defendants' story. The prosecutor, however, called Robert Barteaux.

Robert Barteaux

If there was a sandbag thrown in this case, Barteaux was it. He took the stand as Edward Cohen, Assistant General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, joined the prosecution table. He identified himself as follows: "I am chief of the information processing group of the information services staff of the Director of Operations of Central Intelligence Agency."¹⁴ This was the first clinker. Knowledgeable journalists have indicated to *CovertAction* that Barteaux was in fact an operations case officer, that there was no such thing as the title he gave to the court, that it was made up for the occasion. (Whether this would constitute perjury is problematical.)

Barteaux stated, "My duties are to manage that part of the organization which conducts name traces and handles

¹¹*Ibid.*, Part II, p. 23.

¹²Transcript, January 9, 1978, Part I, p. 94.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, Part II, p. 29.

the records for the Director."¹⁵ What then was he asked:

"Q. Upon request, sir, did you perform such a name tracing to one Armando Lopez Estrada?"

"A. I did."

"Q. Did you come across his name?"

"A. I did."

"Q. And, did you determine from your records whether there had been any contact between your agency and Mr. Lopez Estrada in 1976?"

"A. In May of 1976 Mr. Estrada called the agency, Lopez Estrada, excuse me, called the agency on the public phone, a published number, and refused to give us any subject matter which he would like to discuss and that, after considerable effort, the call was terminated because we did not know what he wanted to talk about."¹⁶

Here was the second clinker. Why on earth did the prosecutor ask this question? All it did was establish that Lopez Estrada had in fact been in touch with the Agency as late as 1976, and open the door to embarrassing cross-examination by the defense. In fact, as the defense attorney correctly pointed out when he then succeeded in having Lopez Estrada recalled to counter this testimony, "It is not true rebuttal."¹⁷

Barteaux was then asked if he had conducted a name check for "Red Bob," and indicated that he had, and that there were no records of any such name. This, and this alone, would seem to be what he should have been called for, if he were a legitimate witness. But his cross-examination was mind-boggling. Consider O'Donnell's opening questions:

"Q. Sir, did you look for the name of Grayston Lynch in your records?"

"A. Grayston Lynch?"

"Q. Yes."

"A. I don't believe so, no."

"Q. Do you know him to have been a former CIA agent?"

"A. No, I do not."¹⁸

Here we have the head records keeper for the CIA, who knows all about Lopez Estrada, and, as we shall see, Pedro Gil, and he doesn't know who Grayston Lynch is, the same Grayston Lynch whom the entire world knows of as the CIA man in charge of the Bay of Pigs. Technically, however, employees of the CIA are case officers and members, and "agents" applies to non-employees engaged by case officers in various ways. It is likely that Barteaux was answering the question literally, deliberately misleading the court—a typical CIA practice.

In any event, Barteaux's concluding testimony on cross-examination was perhaps the most damaging single item for the prosecution in the entire trial. It follows:

"Q. Sir, as custodian for the Central Intelligence Agency, are you aware that Mr. Pedro Gil was in the employ of your agency until 1974?"

"MR. SANFORD: Objection, Your Honor, beyond the scope of the direct."

"THE COURT: He can answer if he knows. Do you know whether he was?"

"THE WITNESS: Yes, I do know."

"Q. He was not he not? You paid him right up to 1974, did you not?"

"MR. SANFORD: Objection, again going beyond—"

"THE COURT: Let's say that he is. We are going to allow the question and the answer. You can answer the question."

"THE WITNESS: What was it?"

"THE COURT: You paid him up until 1974?"

"THE WITNESS: He received money through '74."¹⁹



Here is where the prosecution's case went down the drain. Pedro Gil never took the stand. Up until this point there was no testimony of contact between the defendants and the CIA since at the latest 1965, except for Lopez Estrada's poignant reunion with "Red Bob" fifteen years after the Bay of Pigs. Robert Barteaux, records keeper, just happens to know that Pedro Gil received payments until 1974. It is as if the CIA and the Justice Department dragged up, from the bowels of the building at Langley, the one person who would put into evidence just what the defense wanted to but couldn't. Contacts, actual payments by the CIA to one of the defendants continuing for thirteen years after the Bay of Pigs.

According to one observer at the trial, the CIA lawyer, Edward Cohen, ostentatiously tensed in his chair and glared at Barteaux when he testified about the payments. One would think that the Assistant General Counsel of the CIA would be more circumspect, unless, of course, he was playing to the jury.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

The prosecutor's final weak argument was structured around the implausibility of Lopez Estrada's testimony, ridiculing the idea that instructions seventeen years before about different weapons and operations, and from different people, could apply today. He made the argument; but it hardly had the same impact when the defense reminded the jury that Mr. Barbeaux, the government's own witness, the CIA big shot, had told them that Pedro Gil continued in the pay of the CIA for so many, many years.²⁰

The Weapons

There is another oddity in this trial which involves the weapons. Lopez Estrada testified that they had been buried since 1966 and that they were very dirty. But Joe Crankshaw, the *Miami Herald* reporter who covered the trial, was in past years an infantry officer, and he looked at the weapons closely. It was hard to believe, he told *CovertAction*, that they could have been buried on a swampy Caribbean island for eleven years. The bores were clean and unrustled, with no pitting, and they were still covered with cosmoline, the packing grease used for new, unused weapons. Yet there was no testimony at the trial about the actual condition of the weapons, or their apparent ages. It seems that no one close to the case believes that there was a cache on that island, or that these weapons came from such a place.

An Analysis of the Trial

While the apparent decision not to press for a conviction in this case cannot be viewed in a vacuum, the trial in many ways speaks for itself. No one experienced in criminal law can read that transcript without wondering. The most important testimony for the defense arose either in cross-examination of defense witnesses by the prosecution, or came from the mouth of the key prosecution rebuttal witness. A shaky witness whose testimony could no doubt have been stricken was left unscathed.

The CIA, which could have sealed the prosecution's case, instead exploded it. Why was there never a prosecution witness called from the CIA to state, unequivocally, no, these men are not in the employ of the CIA; no, we have not given them weapons; and no, there was no "Red Bob" or anyone else authorized to present Armando Lopez Estrada with a map to a cache of weapons.

There are two glaring possibilities. Perhaps it is all true, and despite the government's protestations to the contrary, the CIA is still arming the Cuban exiles. Or, even if it is not true, perhaps Lopez Estrada and his colleagues know too much. Perhaps the CIA knew that if he were convicted, he might talk, and if he talked, who knows what might have

come out? Then, of course, there is the whole political context.

Political Conclusion

In the final analysis, then, what is United States policy towards Cuba, and what is being condoned under the eyes of the government? The activities of the exiles have been known for years. Except for the breaks in the ~~Let~~ ~~Let~~ which are tentative at best, virtually nothing has been done. Whether the prosecutions in the assassination case will lead to more than a handful of convictions is doubtful. Brigade 2506 is alive and well. And, it seems, still being supplied.

It is possible, as they claim, that the CIA is not at present supplying much in the way of arms or money to the exiles, although one can never be sure. It was a shock to many when Robert Barbeaux testified that payments were being made up through 1974. But, since 1973, there has been a new factor in the equation: Chile.

It is no secret, even before the Townley link became known, that the Chilean junta was amenable, even eager, to use Cuban exiles for its dirty work, and to pay them in weapons and funds for their troubles—weapons and funds that they could use against Cuba with Pinochet's blessings. From as early as 1974 it was clear that DINA was working with Cuban exiles, handing out assignments and transshipping weapons in payment.

One new development, in fact, has brought the Chilean menace even closer to home. Over the past few years, the incredibly repressive regime of Eric Gairy in Grenada has become Chile's one friend in the Caribbean, the only country that consistently votes with Chile in the OAS. And, more importantly, the only place in the Caribbean where Chilean naval vessels can, and do, dock with impunity. According to leading opponents of the Gairy regime, in the latter half of 1977 Chilean Navy ships began docking at St. George's, Grenada, and one such ship was observed, in the middle of the night, offloading huge numbers of crates. The crates were all marked "Medical Supplies," but they were all long, narrow crates, the kind weapons come in. They were taken away and hidden. Why medical supplies would be offloaded in the middle of the night is a good question. Why they would be hidden away and not appear in medical facilities is an even better one. There is a real danger that Chile is transshipping weapons to the Cuban exiles via Grenada, close to both Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, known exile centers.

The lessons to be drawn from trials such as these, and from all the current developments, are complex but powerful. For one thing, one can never underestimate the evil intentions of these forces. The much vaunted invasion of Cuba is a will-o'-the-wisp; the Cuban homeland seems secure. But the petty violence and the mindless bombing and killing by the exiles are serious threats to world peace unless and until the forces in a position to control and crush this terrorism do so. The investigations which are breaking—and those which have not yet done so—must be encouraged and pushed. North Americans, particularly, must demand an end to the unchecked excesses of the exile community in our midst, and the world at large must unite against Chilean fascism. Si, se puede.

-WS

²⁰There is a complicated legal point here, which might be of interest to lawyers. It relates to the position taken throughout the trial by the defense that the defendants did not know they had to register the weapons. The judge, the defense attorneys and the prosecutor all agreed in the conference on instructions to the jury that, although knowledge was an element insofar as the possession must be knowing, and insofar as the items must be known to be firearms, the government did not have to prove that the defendants knew that firearms had to be registered. *Transcript*, January 9, 1978, Part II, pp. 53-54. Yet, when the instructions were actually given to the jury, they were led to believe, over and over, that an honest mistake might be an excuse. *Transcript*, January 10, 1978, pp. 14, 15, 16. According to one news account, this was a major factor in the jury's decision to acquit. *Miami News*, January 11, 1978.

"RESEARCHING CONSUMERS": THE MARKET FOR DESTABILIZATION

In the fall of 1977, a select group of more than 450 residents of Kingston, Jamaica found on their doorsteps one morning some young people armed with a new kind of weapon in furtherance of the CIA/multinational-inspired war against democratic socialist Prime Minister Michael Manley. This time the weapon was not the guns and explosives which had become commonplace during the well-known destabilization attempts against Manley's left-leaning government, but a long, seemingly innocent questionnaire, which on closer inspection proved equally chilling in its implications for the future of the economically plagued and violence-torn island.

CovertAction Information Bulletin obtained a copy of the questionnaire, ambiguously entitled "Consumer Research Project: A Study of Three Communities in Kingston, Jamaica," and with the assistance of a former CIA operations officer and an academic expert in social science and opinion research, we have examined the document in detail and come to the conclusion that a new overt ingredient has been added to the covert war against Jamaica. It is highly likely that this project was conceptualized and initiated as a method not only to recruit new CIA informers and agents on the island, but also to poll various strata of the island residents as to their willingness to accept or participate in a foreign-inspired or supported coup.


Jamaica, as we reported in the Winter 1976 issue of *CounterSpy*, had been subjected to a campaign of destabilization similar to that which toppled the Allende government in Chile, and this new method of operation may be but a continuation of that policy. What follows is our study of the questionnaire and some attempt to analyze its real meaning.

been made in designing the questionnaire to ensure that you can never be identified from your response."

Without any doubt, this statement is an outright lie. Not only were the respondents, as the letter admits, "specially chosen," but also each person answering the questionnaire was given a "Questionnaire Number" by the interviewer to write in the blank which was provided. This can only mean that there exists a master list of respondents, and this number enables the answers to be recorded, correlated and analyzed with respect to their names and addresses. Even if each person's name and answers were not to be printed in one of Kingston's daily papers, the guarantee of anonymity is patently false. We shall discuss the implications of this later.

Additionally, the "Dear Respondent" letter indicates that those who prepared the questions were well attuned to the formidable political development and awareness of Jamaican citizens today. Anticipating this, the letter emphasizes rather defensively: "The project is in no way connected with any government agency, neither will the results be made available to such an agency or organization. The results will be used for educational purposes only and will better explain how people like you feel about many products you buy and many of the social and economic problems that all Jamaicans face. What you will tell us may help lead to changes in these areas that will benefit people across this wonderful land of ours."

It is implicit in the above statements that the government referred to as having no involvement in the questionnaire is the Jamaican government. This is undoubtedly true. But the letter does not even hint, nor would many of the respondents be aware, that in fact governments of other



The Recipients

A "Dear Respondent" letter attached at the beginning of the questionnaire thanks the recipients for their "willing participation" in answering questions which are "the results of years of research and much effort which has gone into their preparation." The more than 450 subjects of the research are assured in the letter: "In any event, your response will be completely anonymous. Every effort has

countries—the U.S. government, the CIA, and the multinational corporations they protect—have a great deal of interest in the answers to the carefully prepared questions.

Who Is Behind The Questionnaire?

The project is ostensibly being directed by Lee Roy Duffus, a 39-year-old Jamaican-born graduate of New York's Pratt Institute, where he received a B.S. in Mechanical En-

gineering, and Purdue University, where he received an M.S. in Industrial Administration. In 1971 Duffus began a Ph.D. program in Operations Management, but after he completed his coursework he returned to Jamaica to work with Exxon Oil Company as chemicals manager at their Kingston refinery. Duffus cancelled his *in absentia* academic status in January 1973 to continue with Exxon at least through 1975, and probably until mid-1977. After setting up the questionnaire and supervising the initial interviewing of respondents, he went to Nassau, Bahamas, for a few weeks as a "consultant" in an undivulged field of work. He then returned to Kingston for a short time to check the progress of the project, and then on to Purdue, where, in early 1978, he re-registered in the Ph.D. program. Duffus went back once more to Kingston in late January for about two weeks, apparently to pick up the completed questionnaires.



Taking into account both Duffus' academic training and the technical nature of his employment with Exxon, it is unlikely that this man was really in charge of such a large-scale, politically sensitive project on his own. Clearly, a research project of this magnitude, involving the design and printing of the questionnaire, design of the computer program, hiring and coordinating employees to conduct the over 450 interviews, the required computer time, and the correlation and analysis of the data, could not have been paid for out of Mr. Duffus' pocket. Yet, when reached by a *New York Times* reporter, one of Duffus' academic advisors said that indeed Duffus was conducting such a study as part of his Ph.D. thesis program, and that he was paying for it entirely out of his own pocket.

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire contains 133 separate questions, many of which include sub-parts, totalling 415 items requiring answers. No small wonder the letter apologizes that "unfortunately, all questions must be answered, completely and honestly," reinforced further by a "please answer all questions" printed at the top of each page.

The scope of the statements and questions contain such a high degree of political content that even a layman understands this is not the kind of "consumer research" Ralph Nader, for example, might undertake. Part I contains 48 questions with a 9-point scale from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." The gist of the questions, most of which are suggestively phrased, is to place the respondent on a scale measuring Jamaican nationalism versus acceptance or positive feelings about foreign political domination and foreign imperialism. The respondent's attitudes are assessed in the following areas:

(3) Inclination to emigrate (especially to the U.S.) versus being firmly rooted in Jamaica.

(b) Inclination to accept foreign aid and economic guidance versus real Jamaican political and economic independence.

(c) Inclination to accept foreign corporate investment, profits, and imports, as well as foreign products as preferable or superior to Jamaican products versus negative feelings toward foreign imperialism.

Following are some of the questions and an effort to analyze them:

5. In the interest of fairness to all, it would be better to use foreign soldiers for police in this country in the event of internal disorder instead of Jamaican soldiers or police.
17. An international police force ought to be the only group in the world allowed to have weapons.
20. I don't see why it's so important that this country should be free to determine which system of government it wants.
40. It is ridiculous to say that no other nation has a right to tell Jamaica how to manage its own affairs.

The strength of feeling in the answers given to these show how receptive the respondent would be in the event of direct political, economic, or military intervention in Jamaican affairs.

3. It is silly to love one's country more than any other just because you were born there.
14. I don't feel patriotic because I see too many flaws in my country.
16. I don't care which country I live in as long as I am happy.
18. Our country is probably no better than any other.
22. I don't know much about other countries, but I am not satisfied with this one.
24. One should strive for loyalty to mankind before considering loyalty to any particular country.
30. I don't feel any special pride in being identified with Jamaica.
31. The high cost of living and other hardships far exceed the benefits which Jamaica derives from being an independent country.
42. It is unreasonable to ask Jamaicans to accept economic hardships just to ensure that the country remains independent.
43. Jamaicans should be willing to accept any sacrifice that ensures that the country remains independent.

These statements are made to assess whether the "consumer" (respondent) is nationalistic, loyal, proud of their heritage and identity, or on the other hand, how anti-Jamaica and antigovernment they might be. It would be difficult for the respondent to feel neutral toward these statements, so they are effective in deriving the kind of

PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONSStatementStrongly
AgreeStrongly
Disagree

11. Jamaica should have greater consultation with more experienced nations in developing its Laws. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

12. Jamaica was better-off before Independence. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

13. Immigration should be controlled by an international organization rather than by each country on its own. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

14. I don't feel patriotic because I see too many flaws in my country. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

15. All prices for exported or imported products should be set by an international trade committee. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

16. I don't care which country I live in as long as I am happy. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

17. An international police force ought to be the only group in the world allowed to have weapons. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

18. Our country is probably no better than any other. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

19. Everyone who loves his country has a duty to serve it by cooperating with his fellow citizen in building the country for the benefit of all. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

20. I don't see why it's so important that this country should be free to determine which system of government it wants. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

21. I would prefer to be a citizen of the world rather than of any particular country. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

22. I don't know much about other countries, but I am not satisfied with this one. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

23. I would prefer to be an American rather than a Jamaican citizen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

information that obviously is being sought about his or her attitudes.

7. Jamaica should have greater consultation with more experienced nations in developing its foreign policies.

8. The easiest route to economic development is by imitating more developed countries.

11. Jamaica should have greater consultation with more experienced nations in developing its laws.

25. An international committee on education should have full control over what is taught in all countries about history and politics.

These statements probe the respondents' views about independence and national sovereignty as compared to the virtues of outside direction in developing the laws, domestic and foreign political-economic policies of the country, and the virtue of imitating other countries' systems. Depending on the rest of the answers given, this latter group could then be interpreted as demonstrating a propensity either toward free-enterprise capitalism or in favor of socialism.

23. I would prefer to be an American rather than a Jamaican citizen.

28. If I could obtain a permanent visa to go to the United States I would leave Jamaica as soon as possible.

Answers to these two statements clearly will help the project evaluators to determine the person's readiness to leave Jamaica forever. Because the U.S. is specified in statement 28, this is a surreptitious way of drawing out political sympathies vis-a-vis the United States.

12. Jamaica was better-off before Independence.

32. Jamaica was better off before independence from England.

These two statements take a reading of the respondent's views about Jamaica's colonial relationship with the United Kingdom. As with statement 28, this isolates the U.K., apparently with a similar intent in mind.

33. Any foreigner who sees an opportunity to invest his money here and does so should be free to do whatever he likes with his profit, so long as he obeys the Laws of Jamaica.

35. Since foreign companies invest a lot of money in Jamaica it is only fair that they be allowed to take their profit out of the country.

37. Non Jamaicans should be allowed to own land in Jamaica if they desire to do so.

39. It is not important if any business is local or foreign owned, since they both serve the country.

41. The need to develop local industry is not a strong enough reason to deprive people of the variety of products available through import.

Once again, the power of suggestion is employed. These statements are designed for one purpose: to provide a gauge of the respondent's acceptance and positive liking of or opposition to active involvement in the Jamaican economy by foreign investors, both by individuals and multinational

corporations. Statement 41 is especially interesting because it is difficult to answer either way and not be caught in the middle.

1. Jamaican American should be preserved at all costs.

4. I would never trade my Jamaican citizenship for that of any other country.

19. Everyone who loves his country has a duty to serve it by cooperating with his fellow citizen in building the country for the benefit of all.

26. No duty is more important than duty to one's own country.

38. Loyalty to one's moral convictions is more important than loyalty to one's country.

48. If all Jamaicans are self reliant then the entire nation will be self reliant.

Of the 48 statements in this part of the questionnaire, these are practically the only ones which can be categorized as being phrased in a positive tone. Yet, each of them has a built-in yardstick of the person's attitude toward Jamaica. Note that the first statement is as mild and non-controversial as possible, but it is designed to get the respondent warmed up to the heavy statements which follow.

34. Censorship can never be justified in a free country.

As with a number of other statements in the questionnaire, this one is deeper than it seems. The respondent's sense of idealism is being tested against his or her willingness to accept or promote an authoritarian approach. The answer can in turn be correlated with the attitudes expressed about the system of government in Jamaica today.

27. If I can help it I would not fight for any country.

This statement is not presented solely to discover whether the respondent is a pacifist, or even a coward. It could be expected to provide a small number of respondents who might take up arms in military or paramilitary activity (on behalf of a country other than Jamaica) if the opportunity arose, and who if acceptable on other levels, might therefore be recruitable.

6. I am not happy with everything I see in Jamaica and because of this I would consider leaving this country to live in another that is more suitable.

10. Regardless of the benefits to the country, I am unwilling to work in any capacity that is not in my best interest.

29. I would like to go from country to country and settle down where I am happiest.

These statements seek to evaluate the degree to which the respondent is interested in personal gain and comfort. As in the previous case, they can also be applied to gauge the person's recruitability as a kind of mercenary (in a military or other capacity).

36. In general, imported products are superior to locally produced products.

44. There should be a greater variety of brands in the products available at the supermarket.

45. It is not necessary to sell more than one brand of any product in a small country such as ours.
46. In general price is more important to me than which country a product was made in.
47. It is better to buy Jamaican made products whenever they are available than to buy imported products.

These statements begin to look at the respondent's orientation towards imported consumer goods or, put more bluntly, their predisposition to be bribed by the availability of such goods. The person's attitudes in this area are also assessed in the latter parts of the questionnaire.

Class Analysis

Part II of the questionnaire draws from the "anonymous" respondent a wide range of hard data which can be used to establish quite precisely their economic and social class position in Jamaican society. Not only the normal questions like age, marital status, number and ages of children, type of dwelling lived in, educational level attained, and occupation are asked. It demands to know first the combined weekly income of the respondent and his or her spouse, and then three questions later, as if to cross-check against the first answer, the respondent's annual income.

Question 26 asks, "In general, would you say that you belong to the: 1) Lower lower class; 2) Lower class; 3) Middle class; 4) Upper middle class; 5) Upper class." This is not just an idle question. It leaves us more than an inference as to what is the fundamental underlying dynamic of this self-proclaimed "consumer research project"—to force "willing" and "anonymous" respondents to reveal what are, in anybody's book, intimate details about their lives and feelings.

The respondents are asked about their reading habits, which newspapers and other publications they read, and which parts of the newspapers they read (*i.e.*, political news, other local news, comics, international news, sports, editorials, birth/death notices, society, horoscope, etc.), measured on a scale from "extremely interested" to "not interested." The respondent is asked to apply this same scale and another "extremely informed" to "uninformed" scale to their awareness of local and international political and economic events.

Fifteen countries are listed (U.S., Ethiopia, Japan, China, France, United Kingdom, Guyana, Soviet Union, Mexico, Germany, Trinidad, Nigeria, Egypt, Brazil, and Cuba), and the respondents are asked how many times (if any) they have visited each. Then: "Given a choice of a two week, all expense paid trip to any of the above listed countries, which would you prefer to visit? Why?" Another esoteric question that yields the researcher considerable insight into the respondent's political-cultural orientation and sophistication.

Part III is the only part of the questionnaire that deals with what traditionally might be called "consumer research" (products, prices, quality, etc.). It is designed to measure feelings about Jamaican vs. other products. It seeks out the respondent's preferences (on a "Satisfactory"—"Unsatisfactory" scale) of eight different consumer items (spray deodorant, vitamins, mirrors, jewelry, toothpaste, canned



foods, ladies clothing, and portable electric fans) in terms of five countries of manufacture (Jamaica, the U.S., United Kingdom, Trinidad, and Japan). This particular section also measures the person's honesty and consistency, first with regard to Jamaican products (by asking the same questions twice about products produced there), and then by making the respondent answer the same question all over again for all the products and all the countries, but this time slightly re-phrased with a ranked 1 to 5 scale of "how favorable/unfavorable they (the same five countries) appeal to you as a source" of the products.

The final section of the questionnaire seeks the same kind of information about the respondent's partiality toward the U.S., United Kingdom, Japan, and Trinidad, as compared to Jamaica. This time however, the range of variables is made considerably wider than just the consumer products of the respective countries. The intent of these queries is to probe the attitudes and affinities felt by the respondent toward rival imperialisms. Take the following for example:

Compared to Jamaica, would you say that in (the four countries)—

- (1) The Government is more/less/equally effective;
- (2) Workers are more/less/equally reliable;
- (3) People are more/less/equally self reliant;
- (4) Life is not as hard/harder/just as hard;
- (5) People are more/less/equally intelligent;
- (6) The educational level is higher/lower/about the same;
- (7) People do not have to work as hard/work harder/work just as hard;
- (8) Life is more/less/just as relaxed;
- (9) People are more/less/about as trustworthy;
- (10) People are more/less/just as interested in helping each other.

The Big Question: Why?

To try to understand why a 39-year-old Jamaican who worked until recently as a technician with one of America's largest conglomerates was conducting an irrefutably political "consumer research project" far afield from his own background or work in the fall of 1977 in Kingston, Jamaica, we must give some brief indicators of the political climate previous to and during the period of the project.

In the pre-independence Jamaica, the two major political parties, Alexander Bustamante's Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and Norman Washington Manley's Progressive National Party (PNP), were much the same. Both were tied in with the leading labor unions on the island, and advocated nationalism and independence within the Commonwealth. After independence in 1962, the JLP government proceeded to maintain good relations with both Britain, with whom it was tightly allied economically, and the United States, whose tourists were a major source of income, and whose aluminum companies, since World War II, had been essential to the local economy. In 1972, when the government switched to the PNP, and Norman Manley's son Michael, also a union leader, became Prime Minister, little changes were foreseen.

However, two years after entering office, Manley shocked the conservative elements in the country by announcing the new program of the PNP—"Democratic Socialism." From 1974, Manley has attempted to chart a moderately socialist course, nationalizing portions of the aluminum industry, banks, sugar cane plantations, and the like. Early on he made what in the eyes of the U.S. government, and especially the CIA, was the cardinal sin. He became friendly with Fidel Castro. Manley has visited Cuba, and Fidel has visited Jamaica. There have been exchanges of technicians, educators, agronomists, doctors, etc.

By 1976 it was clear that neither U.S. nor British intelligence were happy with developments, and during that year a massive destabilization campaign was waged. Guns, thugs, explosives and poisons were imported, and violence became widespread. By June of 1976, Manley had to declare a State of Emergency, and forbid completely the possession of weapons. Within a short time the violence had abated, although the damage done to the tourist industry has still not been completely reversed. Destabilization in such a blatant form had not worked. The example of Chile was too fresh in the minds of the people, and some of the ham-handed attempts at toppling the Manley government were almost carbon copies of some of the tricks pulled in Chile.



In September 1976, Philip Agee went to Jamaica at the invitation of the Jamaica Council for Human Rights, a legal, civil rights organization. While there, Agee investigated and exposed the intensive, CIA-backed destabilization campaign, and publicly named nine CIA officers then operating in

Jamaica under diplomatic cover, including the then Chief of Station, Norman M. Descooteaux. Shortly after returning to Britain, where he and his family had lived since 1972, Agee was served with a deportation order. After a protracted eight-month struggle which affected a broad cross-section of British public opinion, he was finally deported in June 1977. Coincidentally, at this same moment, the "Consumer Research Project" was being readied.


It is clear that around this time in Jamaica, as the State of Emergency was lifted, a new approach was underway: extensive economic destabilization. Foreign loans became more and more difficult; the importation of foreign products became harder; credit was cut off. And the International Monetary Fund made it known that it was willing to consider loans to Jamaica only if certain preconditions were filled. Meanwhile, the right-wing, which controlled the JLP, and maintained a powerful minority in the PNP, began to increase its attacks on the Manley government. The local press, which was controlled entirely by the conservative, wealthy few families which dominated the local economy, became nearly rabid in their condemnation of democratic socialism.

The situation in Jamaica is still very fluid. Manley has been forced to accept certain IMF loans to maintain international credit. The requirements laid down by the IMF remain in large part secret. The forces on the island have become more and more polarized, and pressures on the government mount. The right has made it clear that it would not be averse to drastic action—whether an internal or an external coup—and Manley will not be able to appease both wings of his party at the same time much longer.

In the midst of this delicate situation, the significance of this "consumer research" becomes clear.

While it is not possible to determine the personal motives of Lee Roy Duffus (aside perhaps from getting a Ph.D.), it is clear that this project could not be solely his own. Consider the number of questions. Presuming that all of the 450-plus respondents followed instructions and answered each and every one of the 415 questions/statements in the questionnaire (which must have taken them an average of two hours each—quite a chunk of interviewing time for a simple "consumer research project"), there would be a total of more than 188,750 responses on the completed forms. For obvious statistical and analytical reasons (and as Duffus confirms in his "Dear Respondent" letter), a study with this volume of raw data to be tabulated, correlated and analyzed would require a sophisticated computer program and sufficient computer time.

If the questions "are the results of years of research," had Duffus been working on these questions while on the job, or during his lunch breaks, as Exxon's chemicals manager since 1971? Moreover, a person like Duffus would hardly have either the means or the training and background to analyze properly the data, much less to apply it to what Duffus calls "the social and economic problems that all Jamaicans face." Such a program requires organization. Since Purdue University has no known program of any kind in Jamaica or related to Jamaica at its West Lafayette, Indiana campus, and since the Jamaican government knew nothing about this project until informed about it from a number of the "specially chosen" respondents, we must consider carefully whether an outside organization might be behind the whole operation.



When a *New York Times* reporter spoke to Duffus about the project, and asked him about the contents of his questionnaire, his funding, the degree of the Jamaican government's knowledge and sanction of the project, etc., Duffus seemed strangely naive and defensive. He refused any comment on the source of funding or the relationship, if any, of Exxon to the overall effort. He promised to call the reporter back, but never did.

Conclusion

In exposing this covert Caribbean project, we are cognizant of three important factors.

1. Duffus may or may not actually have been conscious of the political implications of such a project, although as both a Ph.D. candidate and a citizen of contemporary Jamaica, such ignorance would seem inconceivable.

2. Exxon may or may not have been involved directly, since it has not been established conclusively that Duffus was an Exxon employee during the period the project was being formulated and implemented. He was, however, definitely employed by them in the recent past.

3. Exxon may or may not have been fronting for the CIA if it was employing Duffus at the time. It is patently obvious that the project is not a simple toothpaste consumer survey, and that the project must involve a major financial input. It is also curious that a Purdue University spokesperson said Duffus was funding the project "entirely on his own."

Given the 450-plus sample, it seems likely that there would emerge about 25 to 50 people that fit into the CIA's desired mold, and who therefore would likely be recruitable to do the CIA's bidding in whatever way is best suited to their abilities, whether in Jamaica or elsewhere. In addition to deriving a number of recruits there are strong indications in the questionnaire of another, even more sinister objective.

Number 1 (July 1978)

Statements 5, 17, 20 and 40 suggest that Lee Roy Duffus and friends were really asking what the respondent's stance is toward a (hypothetical) foreign military intervention or a (hypothetical) *app d'état*, directed at Jamaica. Statement 27 and to some extent statements 6, 10 and 29 are looking for prospective first-line participants in such interventions in Jamaica's internal affairs.

What better research could an intelligence agency possibly want than the results of this research on Jamaica's "consumers"?

The history of the CIA is replete with covert operations of various sizes and shapes run under corporate cover. The offer of \$1 million to the CIA by ITT for direct application against the presidential campaign of Salvador Allende, and its subsequent participation with assistance from the CIA and other companies in spending some \$700,000 in the 3-year destabilization program is the most famous example. There are also numerous other cases where private companies have been active participants in CIA operations, some of them initiated and entirely funded by the CIA, which are known as "proprietaries."

The list is lengthy, but includes Fodor Travel Publications, J. Walter Thompson Company, Robert Mullen Company, and as former State Department intelligence man John Marks points out, Southern Capital and Management Corporation, Southern Air Transport, Air America, Africair, Pan African Airlines, United Business Associates, Joseph Z. Taylor & Associates, and many more, including those yet to be discovered.

Other companies, legitimate in their own right, have provided cover to CIA personnel in various parts of the U.S. and around the world. Some justify their actions by reasons of patriotism, but most collaborate because it helps their business. For example, Howard Hughes' former lieutenant, Robert Maheu, testified that Hughes believed that "if he ever became involved in any problem with the government, it would be beneficial for him to be in a position of being a front."

Obviously the CIA is just as interested in maintaining its present cover arrangements and in forging new ones as Howard Hughes was in fronting for them to serve his own ends. A five-year plan of the CIA is strong evidence of the Agency's fear of the vulnerabilities of its traditional cover arrangements with the Department of State. *Newsweek* quotes the document: "We are dealing with our cover impediments by creating a truly clandestine corps of operations officers."

With numerous similar "social science" surveys, many created in the 1960s and 1970s by the Rand Corporation in Southeast Asia and Latin America, as a precedent, the so-called "consumer research project" of Lee Roy Duffus could well be a signal of one small part of the changing mode of operations undertaken by the CIA.

-LW



RECENT NEWS

Whistleblowers' Conference

On the weekend of May 19-20, 1978, a *Whistleblowers' Conference* was held in Washington, DC, under the auspices of the Institute for Policy Studies. The lengthy conference included talks by legislators, news reporters, and a number of well-known whistleblowers. Among them were Daniel Ellsberg of *Pentagon Papers* fame; John Stockwell, Donald Jordan, and Frank Sneed, all formerly of the CIA; journalists Daniel Schorr and Gloria Emerson; and Senator James Abourezk. Participants from IPS included Saul Landau, Robert Borosage, Marc Raskin, and Ralph Stavins, the Director of the Government Accountability Project of IPS, the organizer of the conference.

Plans for the publication of the proceedings of the conference are underway, and persons interested in receiving a copy should drop a line to Ralph Stavins, Institute for Policy Studies, 1901 Q Street, NW, Washington, DC 20009.

Harvey Point CIA Base Exposed

A feature story in the June 25, 1978 *Virginian-Pilot and Ledger-Star*, a Norfolk, Virginia newspaper, has exposed the Defense Department Ordnance Testing Base at Harvey Point, North Carolina, for what it really is: "a secret Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary training base." According to the article, which was picked up by newspapers throughout the United States, "the base was activated in 1960 as an equipment staging area for the ill-fated CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. Since then, the CIA has trained its officers, mercenaries, and foreign troops there for operations in the Belgian Congo, Cuba, and parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia." This base appears to augment the better-known facilities at Camp Peary, Virginia, where the CIA has conducted espionage training for many years.

The base, and the air space over it, are off limits to everyone, but local residents tell strange tales of hearing explosions and seeing flashes of light, and seeing small planes entering and leaving. But most chilling of all are the stories about the cars. Every few days, Navy trucks



bring batches of new passenger cars onto the base, and every few days demolished cars are brought out. Some, according to neighbors, have their hoods blown off; others are smashed flat. It seems clear that the CIA is still training terrorists in passenger car demolition—just like the training which Michael V. Townley received and later put to use in the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt. This is not training to defend this or any other country. This is training in brutal murder, no more, no less, and it would be interesting to know by what theory the Defense Department justifies such activity.

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
NAMING NAMES

A regular feature of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*.

We do not believe that one can separate the dirty work of the CIA from the people who perform it. The exposure of past operations is valuable, but it is only half the job. How many times have we all heard the CIA, the FBI and others say, whenever a particularly nasty covert operation has been exposed, "Oh yes, but we don't do that any more." We believe that they do, and that the same people are often involved.

As a service to our readers, and to progressive people around the world, we will continue to expose high-ranking CIA officials whenever and wherever we find them. This column, we hope, will usually be longer. In preparing the premier issue, we have been unable to conduct much of our regular research, and have one item for our readers:

The new CIA Chief of Station in JAMAICA is *Dean J. Almy, Jr.* Almy replaces Norman Descoteaux, who was exposed by Philip Agee in late 1976, during the Manley reelection campaign. Almy was born December 18, 1926, in New Jersey. From 1951 to 1955 he was a "political analyst" for the Department of the Army—a dead giveaway for early CIA activity. From 1956 to 1958 he was a political officer at the Medan, Indonesia consulate; from 1960 to 1962 he was a political officer at the Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia embassy; from 1962 to 1965 he was a political officer at the Manila, Philippines embassy; and from 1973 till recently he was a political liaison officer at the Madrid,



Spain embassy. During his tenure in Spain, his CIA connections were exposed in the Madrid magazine, *Cambio 16*.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

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PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Some Interesting New Publications

Howard M. Wachtel, *The New Gnomes: Multinational Banks in the Third World*, 60 pp., \$3.00, plus \$.25 postage, from Transnational Institute, 1901 Q Street, NW, Washington, DC 20009; or 20 Paulus Potterstraat, Amsterdam 1007, Holland.

Michael T. Klare, *Supplying Repression*, 56 pp., \$2.50, from The Field Foundation, 100 E. 85th St., New York, NY 10028. (A detailed look at U.S. military and private aid to human rights violators around the world.)

Some Worthwhile Periodicals

First Principles, the newsletter of the Center for National Security Studies, 10 issues/year, \$15 (\$10/students) from CNSS, 122 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002. (An excellent review of the abuses of the U.S. intelligence community, with a comprehensive bibliography in each issue.)

NACLA Report on the Americas, bi-monthly journal of the North American Congress on Latin America, \$11/year

(for air, add: U.S. & Canada, \$4; Mexico, C. Am., Carib., \$6; S. Am., Eur., \$8; rest, \$9), from NACLA, P.O. Box 57, Cathedral Station, New York, NY 10025. (Well-researched reports on the political economy of the Americas, with particular attention to the role of U.S. imperialism.)

Organizing Notes, the newsletter of the Campaign to Stop Government Spying, available by request to the Campaign, 201 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Room 112, Washington, DC 20002. (It is suggested that foreign requests include a contribution to cover airmail postage.) (A review of activities in the U.S. involving the surveillance practices of the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies.)

State Research, from the United Kingdom, newsletter of a group of independent security apparatus researchers, £3/year, U.K. and Europe; \$8, elsewhere, individuals; \$16, institutions, from State Research, 9 Poland Street, London, W1, United Kingdom. (Research notes from a group of counterspies in the U.K., with much information, especially about British intelligence, hard to come by elsewhere.)

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
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Special:**ATTACKS AGAINST AGEE ESCALATE**

Covert Action INFORMATION BULLETIN



**The CIA
vs.
Philip Agee**

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Editorial

International events—most notably Iran and Afghanistan, but also Nicaragua, Grenada, El Salvador and elsewhere—have created a climate of hysteria and McCarthyism unmatched in nearly three decades. The media have begun, with considerable justification, to refer to Cold War II. Critics of United States foreign policy must swim against the current, and the current, not to mention the undertow, is strong.

Unleashing the Monster

The cutting edge of such swings to the right is, as it always has been, national defense and national security, and critics of the defense and intelligence apparatus will, in such times, be drawn to the front of the fray.

As we learn in school, the United States government has three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial; all three branches are fighting to "unleash" the CIA. The intelligence agencies and their boosters within the Administration have been quick to take advantage of international tension. The preposterous argument that a stronger CIA with fewer restrictions would have led to different results in Iran or Afghanistan is taken off the shelf, dusted and polished.

In his State of the Union Address, President Carter said, as Admiral Turner appeared on the TV screen smiling broadly, "we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence." In his written

message he mentioned the "need for a strengthened and clearly defined role for our intelligence community." "We will not shortchange," he wrote, "the intelligence capabilities needed to assure our national security." We must "develop new technical means of intelligence collection while also assuring that the more traditional methods of intelligence work are also given proper stress."

Unfortunately, the victims of "more traditional methods of intelligence work" have had little say in this national debate. They are the dead, the tortured, the maimed, in Vietnam, in Iran, in Uruguay, in Guatemala, around the globe.

The Administration's "Charter"

In recent months there has been a flurry of legislative activity centering around the role of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Late last year a spate of "Intelligence Identity Protection" bills were introduced—purportedly aimed at this *Bulletin*, but in fact threatening the entire journalistic community. Then, under the aegis of Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, two new elements were added to the cauldron—a proposed law to exempt the CIA from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and another to limit, if not eliminate altogether, Congressional oversight of covert action. Finally, the Senate version of the long-awaited Foreign Intelligence Charter was introduced.

The bill was, in some respects, worse than anything the

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Administration had been publicly asking for, authorizing, in some instances, burglaries and mail openings against U.S. citizens not suspected of crimes, specifically authorizing the use of journalists, academics and the clergy as agents, and other clear steps backwards. Senator Walter Huddleston, the chief sponsor of the bill, noted that the committee members had been able to overcome "purist attitudes" about such minor inconveniences as bugging, tapping and burglarizing innocent people. In all the discussions, of course, it seems to go without saying that the U.S. can do anything to "foreigners"—other peoples in other lands.

This legislative potpourri is discussed and analyzed in detail in this issue of the *Bulletin*.



The Boland Bill

We have reported previously on the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, introduced in October 1979, which would make it a crime for anyone—former CIA employee or private journalist—to disclose the identity of any intelligence employee, agent or source, or even information from which one might ascertain such an identity. After considerable discussion among ourselves, the staff of the *Bulletin* requested, and were granted, the opportunity to present our views in testimony before the House Select Committee on Intelligence. In this issue we present the full text of our

statement, excerpts of the questioning which followed, and some selections from the presentations of other speakers.

The Anti-Agee Campaign

The beginning of the 1980's brought with it a new, sophisticated, and well-coordinated campaign against Philip Agee. A barrage of false newspaper stories, passport revocations, attempted book bannings, and injunctions, and other legal maneuvers followed one after the other during the first two months of the year. They are described in full in another article in this issue. We can only reiterate our admiration of, and support for, the battle which Agee has waged for more than five years. As his lawyer, Melvin Wulf, said, "Anything that increases public knowledge of the CIA's clandestine activities contributes to world peace."

The Snepp Decision

We have never been political admirers of Frank Snepp; but we have supported fully his right to publish whatever he wished about his former employer. Shortly before we went to print with this issue, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in his case—a travesty of legal reasoning, further proof, if any were needed, that the Court is just another institution which makes political, not legal, decisions. It bodes ill for all the present and would-be whistleblowers, who remain, in some cases, our only hope for exposing governmental atrocities. The courts, like the other branches of government, are wrapping themselves in the flag. They don't realize that to do so is to blindfold oneself.

Also In This Issue

We continue our regular features, *Naming Names* and *Sources and Methods*. Our reasons for continuing to do so are explained in our testimony before the House Committee. The CIA, we are sadly convinced, remains beyond reform.

Several other items of interest to our readers are presented. We apologize for the bit of delay in the publication of this issue, but, as we hope is evident, we have been kept busy by the constant attacks.

To our many charter subscribers who have renewed their subscriptions, our thanks for your continuing support.—

Correction

In *Bulletin* Number 6 we printed the document authored, in 1975, by former Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby. Through our oversight in layout, a large section of the document was inadvertently repeated. The section beginning on page 20, column 1, with "Part III" through the first full paragraph on page 21, ending with "... property" should be eliminated.

The Man Without a Country:

ATTACKS AGAINST AGEE ESCALATE

For a number of years the CIA relished its description of Philip Agee as its "only ideological defector." Although the writings and speeches of John Stockwell, Victor Marchetti, Jessie Leaf, and others belie this, still the Agency reserves inordinate hatred and vehemence for Agee. Rumors spread, after "Inside the Company" was published, that there were serious offers within the Agency to assassinate him. Whenever a journalist wants a suitably juicy quote, any CIA source can be asked about Agee—most recently, according to UPI: "If I can get him with my bare hands, I'll kill him, I'll kill him."

Agee has lived with this foolishness with some equanimity: "If I were constantly looking behind me," he once said, "I would just trip over my own feet." Still, he has been forced to pack up and move with his family from his homes in England, in France, and in Holland, one after the other, as the local authorities have bowed to petty pressure from the CIA. Now, the campaign has soared to new heights.

The Frame-Up

The Agency has never had any compunctions about fabricating material about Agee whenever it suits their purpose. (Probably the most persistent lie is that it was Agee who named Richard Welch in the pages of *Counter-Spy*; although it has been documented that that naming had nothing to do with Welch's subsequent death, it is also true that Agee had nothing to do with that article in *CounterSpy*.)

The latest move, however, indicates a high level of sophistication. It began in early December. Agee conceived a possible solution to the problem of the people held in the Tehran Embassy. On the telephone to some diplomat friends, he suggested that the Iranians should offer to exchange the prisoners for the CIA's files on Iran. He urged that someone get that proposal to the Iranians, in hopes of securing the release of the prisoners. The practicality of the suggestion has been questioned in some circles. A former case officer remarked to CAIB that the Agency would let 500 people die, never mind 50, before they would ever release any files. But what must be kept in mind is that the conversations with the friends were originally private.

Then, the night of December 16, the plot unfolded. CAIB received a phone call from Gregory Rose, a reporter

for the *New York Post*—the paper that Australian press baron Rupert Murdoch has turned into a scandal-mongering rag, the current joke in journalistic circles. Rose, described in a recent *Washington Star* article as a disaffected former member of the U.S. Labor Party of cultist Lyndon LaRouche, wanted Agee's phone number in Germany right away, to call him and get his response to the news item Rose had been "handed" to write up—that the Iranians wanted Agee to sit on a tribunal which, there were rumors, might be established to try the prisoners. It was 3 a.m., and Rose was told that, as far as CAIB knew there was nothing to such a rumor, and in any event CAIB would try to reach Agee later that day. However, within a few hours, the early edition of the *Post* was on the stands in New York City.

The banner headline, which took up half the front page, read: "CIA Traitor May Judge Hostages." (This was apparently too much even for the *Post*, because later editions changed the word "Traitor" to "Defector.") The article contained this sentence: "A leading Iranian diplomat in the U.S. told the *Post*: 'There will be an anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist American on the tribunal and Philip Agee is at the top of our list of candidates.'"

What is significant is that the *Post* never named the "diplomat," the Iranian Embassy and U.N. Mission denied the story, Agee later pointed out that no Iranian had asked him to sit on any tribunal, and, in fact, no such tribunal ever took place, with or without Agee. Moreover, the article, which Rose admitted he was writing, had no by-line.

The next day, both CAIB and Agee issued statements explaining that Agee had never been asked to serve on such a tribunal, and, in fact, would not contemplate traveling to Iran while there were people held in the Embassy.

Vance Makes His Move

Five days later, the Administration made its move, through the State Department. A consular official, embarrassed because it was Christmastime, arrived at Agee's apartment in Hamburg and served him with a letter from the State Department informing him that Secretary Vance had decided that "your activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States." This language is from State Department regulations outlining the instances

when, it is said, the Secretary has the authority to refuse to issue someone a passport, or to revoke one already issued. The letter informed Agee that his passport was revoked.

Agee's lawyers went to court to challenge the authority of the Secretary of State to revoke someone's passport simply because the Secretary thinks his activities are not in keeping with U.S. foreign policy. The government's answering papers filed in Court demonstrate how the fabricated *New York Post* story grew in stature. The affidavit of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom, said: "It has been reported in the press (*New York Post*, December 17, 1979) that Mr. Agee has been invited to travel to Iran in order to participate in a Tribunal involving the hostages in Tehran." The original article never said that Agee had been invited by anyone, an assertion he denied, and on which he was never contradicted. The article simply said that an unnamed diplomat said that Agee was on a list of people who might be asked to serve on such a tribunal.

The German Authorities

The degree to which the media are unable to stick with the truth when it comes to Agee is demonstrated in the series of articles which followed the news of the passport revocation, and dealt with the question of Agee's residency in the Federal Republic of Germany. At no point, it should be noted, did the German authorities threaten Agee with deportation. Yet, within two days of the revocation, an AP story circulated stating that local officials were studying the question and deciding whether to deport Agee. This, in fact, was not true, though the headlines said, "W. Germany May Oust Agee." The *New York Times* compounded the error. Its headline read: "West Germany Acts to Bar Agee."

All this time, there was no coverage given to the arguments of Agee's lawyers that the Secretary of State had no authority to do what he had done—that a citizen's passport had been revoked even though the citizen was not charged with any crime, was not under any court order, was not wanted as a material witness, or any of the other limited exceptions wherein one's freedom of movement might be restricted. The concept that a person's passport could be revoked because he disagreed with U.S. foreign policy is ludicrous. As one of Agee's lawyers noted, Henry Kissinger interferes in U.S. foreign policy more in a week than Agee could in a lifetime.

CIA Reactions

Although it is apparent that the passport revocation was part of a well-coordinated plan designed first of all to limit any influence Agee might have with respect to the situation in Iran and secondly to force him back to the United States, official CIA comments were naturally not forthcoming. UPI was reduced to running a story quoting the unnamed intelligence officer who wanted to kill Agee with his bare hands, and a few of Agee's better-known professional enemies, such as former CIA men David Atlee Phillips and Jack Blake.

To The Courtroom

Finally, by year end, articles appeared indicating that Agee denied that he had any plans to travel to Iran. It was almost two weeks after the original *New York Post* article that this information appeared. In the meantime Agee's lawyers had commenced the action in U.S. District Court in Washington, *Agee v. Vance*. The hearing was put off until mid-January, primarily because Agee's lawyers asserted, without contradiction, that he had no immediate travel plans, whatever the newspapers said. The *New York Times*, in the interim, printed an editorial suggesting that it was doubtful that U.S. law permitted lifting Agee's passport. They gave appropriate weight to Rose's *New York Post* article: "The State Department's fear that the former agent will go to Iran seemed based on a misreading of an unconfirmed news report. He says he hasn't been invited and wouldn't accept such an invitation."

At the Court hearing, the Justice Department's performance was pathetic. They now insisted that the passport was not revoked because of any plans for travel to Iran—apparently because there was simply no confirmation that that had ever been in the works. They indicated that the revocation was because Agee spoke out against the CIA all over the world. But, as the Judge pointed out, revoking someone's passport doesn't stop him from speaking. The Justice Department replied that at least it made it more difficult for him to travel around. Several days later the Court ruled that the Department of State had no authority to revoke a passport in the manner they had. The regulations, the Court said, were invalid.



However, the Justice Department immediately went to the next highest court, the Circuit Court of Appeals, and asked for a stay of the District Judge's order directing the return of Agee's passport. To the surprise of many observers, the Circuit Court granted the stay, leaving Agee without a valid passport, despite the victory in the lower court. The case was scheduled for expedited consideration, and will be argued in mid-March.

Gregory Rose had a parting shot. On February 6, he by-lined a brief article with the heading, "CIA turncoat marking U.S. diplomats for death." This rather provocative headline accompanied an article which had no context. It merely quoted "U.S. officials" for seven paragraphs, without saying who was being quoted, what had occurred, or why they were being quoted. All this, ironically, from the same reporter who, when the Embassy was first occupied, called *CAIB* to find out if we had the names of any CIA people in the Embassy.

The Freedom of Information Act Case

The full extent of the government's campaign against Agee became abundantly clear the same day the Circuit Court issued the stay order. Several months earlier, after years of frustrating delays and denials, Agee had filed a Freedom of Information Act suit in federal court against the CIA, the FBI, the Justice Department, the NSA, and the State Department, because of their refusal to turn over their files on him. Some agencies, like the State Department, had, in fact, turned over a substantial percentage of

their files on him, but others, like the CIA, had given up virtually nothing. The case was, it was thought, a simple FOIA personal file suit.

To the wonderment of Agee's attorneys, the Justice Department finally filed a request on behalf of the United States government to intervene in the case, and to counter-claim against Agee, requesting an injunction against him preventing him from writing or speaking without first clearing the text with the CIA. This is the same type of injunction which the government had obtained against John Marks and Victor Marchetti several years before. The papers also asked for an injunction against the "imminent" publication of *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*. When it was found that the book was already published, this request was withdrawn (see sidebar).

What was so surprising in this case was that Agee had never set foot in the United States; his lawyers had merely filed suit for his personal files under the FOIA. This case, too, and the entire question of jurisdiction is now pending in the courts.

The Book That Couldn't Be Stopped

Either the Justice Department is guilty of even greater disingenuousness than usual, or the CIA doesn't let its own lawyers know what is going on. Nine days after filing an emergency motion in federal court to prevent the "imminent" publication of *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*, Justice Department lawyers were forced to withdraw the request when they "learned" that the book had already been published.

In August 1979 the publisher, Lyle Stuart, and two co-editors, Ellen Ray and William Schaap, attended the Sixth Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Nonaligned Nations, in Havana. They brought with them copies of a special paperback edition of the book which was presented to dozens of heads of state, foreign ministers and other government officials from around the world.

Copies were also presented to a number of journalists and generally made available. Then, in January 1980 the regular hardcover edition was shipped by Lyle Stuart, Inc. to bookstores around the country. When the Justice Department filed the emergency motion, *Dirty Work 2* had already been available in a number of Washington bookstores for weeks.

What was even more peculiar was that the Justice Department was asking the court to restrain Philip Agee from publishing a book which was not his. The book, which contains two articles by Agee, was researched and edited by four other persons, and is owned by a corporation with which Agee has no connection. Moreover, Agee never asked for, nor received, a penny from the publication of *Dirty Work*

2, or for that matter from *Dirty Work 1*, either.

Lyle Stuart issued a press release charitably describing the Justice Department officials as "ignorant" and "inefficient." *Time Magazine* said the lawyers were "astonished" to learn that the book had already been published. The *Washington Post* said the lawyers were "unaware" the book "has already been on sale in at least one Washington bookstore."

In the court papers withdrawing the request, however, as the Associated Press accurately pointed out, "the department stopped short of admitting its gaffe." In fact, it was worse than that. The papers said: "Before the Court could act upon the United States' motion for intervention or joinder, however, the book was published and available in at least one bookstore in the District of Columbia." This statement is at best misleading, and at worst a deliberate falsehood. It implies that the book was rushed into the bookstores after the motion was filed and before the Court could do anything about it. Aside from ignoring the rather significant fact that Agee does not own the book, and therefore could hardly be ordered to stop its publication in any event, the implication is untrue. It strains credulity to believe that the CIA did not know the book was distributed at the Sixth Summit in August and that it was in bookstores in January.

In the vicious, hysterical campaign against Philip Agee, the U.S. government is unable to stick to the truth. They lie about his intentions; they lie about his travels; they won't even keep it straight who writes what books.

Conclusion

It is hard not to draw the conclusion that the government has set in motion a massive campaign to hound Philip Agee back home, and to gag him. It is only this threat of an injunction which has kept him from returning long ago to the U.S. Agee, who has never been charged with a crime, who has simply spoken out forcefully against the abuses of the U.S. intelligence complex, who has become synonymous with criticism of the CIA, has, at the insistence of the CIA, been forced to move from country to country and been wrongfully accused of assorted heinous acts. It is a measure of the strength of his struggle that he continues to speak out and to fight back.

And the Writer That Could

The Supreme Court's decision in *Snepp v. United States* has shocked most observers and many editorial writers. The Court decided the case without benefit of oral argument from the opposing lawyers, and gave the government more than they had asked for—two extremely unusual actions.

The case appears to have been decided more as a question of contract law than of the delicate balances of freedom of speech and press and national security. The Court held that Snepp's secrecy agreement was a binding contract, and he breached it by publishing his book, regardless of the fact that, as the CIA admitted, there was no classified information in the book. The remedy the Court approved was to apply what is called a "constructive trust" to all of his profits from the book—that is, to require him to turn over to the government every cent he received for the book.

The worst language in the case appears in the footnotes, one of which says: "This Court's cases make clear that—even in the absence of an express agreement—the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First Amendment.... The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service."

The threat to whistleblowing is clear. The Court is openly limiting the First Amendment rights of government employees. The case also includes much unabashed praise for intelligence services in general, and emphasizes the irrelevance of the argument that the material in question was not classified. Indeed some commentators have suggested that the vehemence of the opinion is related to the breaches of confidence by former and present clerks of the Court which led to much of the scandalous gossip in the recently published book about the Supreme Court, *The Brethren*.

PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Asia Monitor, \$3/issue, from Asia/North America Communications Center, 2 Man Wan Road, 17-C, Kowloon, Hongkong. (A quarterly magazine focusing on U.S. economic involvement in Asia. Very detailed, with a wealth of research information and materials for persons working in this area. Also published by A/NACC: *America in Asia: Research Guide on U.S. Economic Activity in Pacific Asia*, \$10/surface; \$19/air; and *A Survey of Education/Action Resources on Multinational Corporations*, \$2.50.)

Third World, 10 issues, air/\$22; five issues/air/\$12, from Periodistas des Tercer Mundo, Apartado 20-572, Mexico 20, D.F., Mexico. (Approximately monthly, an excellent review of the entire Third World, with perceptive articles from many of the best researchers around the world. The same group also publishes a Spanish edition, *Tercer Mundo*, as well as a Portuguese edition, *Terceiro Mundo*. Write for rates.)

Italy and US, \$6/year, \$10 overseas, from Committee for a Democratic Policy Towards Italy, P. O. Box 32351, Washington, DC 20007. (The bimonthly newsletter of a recently established group working against U.S. intervention in the Italian political process.)

IDAF Publications, on request from International Defense and Aid Fund, Publications Department, 104 Newgate Street, London EC1A 7AP, United Kingdom; overseas requesters should include an IRC. (This is the catalog of the well known publications of Defense and Aid, the group which has, for many years, done some of the best research on Southern Africa. In addition to their own research papers, they publish works by Nelson Mandela, Barbara Rogers, Gillian and Suzanne Cronje, and others. Also available is *Focus*, their bi-monthly news bulletin; subscriptions £3, surface; £5, air.)

Graymail Legislation, Hearings of Legislation Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, August 7, September 20, 1979. From the Committee. (This House Committee pamphlet includes the text of the various pending graymail bills and the testimony of a number of witnesses, including Morton Halperin and Michael Tigar.)

Impact of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act on Intelligence Activities, Hearing of Legislation Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 5, 1979. From the Committee. (This House Committee pamphlet does not purport to present a "balanced view," but instead presents the views of the FBI and the CIA, their arguments and proposals for limiting the FOIA.)

Intelligence Legislation Makes the Rounds

By William Schaap

As we have noted in our Editorial, international developments—especially Iran and Afghanistan—have been used by the CIA and other friends and boosters of the intelligence complex to support and justify a wide range of efforts to “unleash” the CIA. The major battlefield is Congress, and in both Houses numerous proposals are under consideration. What is ironic is that these discussions first began in a very different context.

Originally people were worried about an unrestrained CIA. It was felt that some kind of charter was needed to define the limits beyond which the Agency could not step. There was a fear that existing legislation was too vague and left too many loose ends. Now, although the existing laws have not changed a bit, although there has been as little control of the CIA as ever, the move is on to “unhandcuff” them. Somehow the CIA has created the impression that if it had had a freer hand, things would not have gone as they did in Iran or in Afghanistan. This incredible argument prevails even though the CIA probably had the freest hand in Iran it has ever had—even though it worked hand-in-glove with the Shah and SAVAK for thirty years.

The Major Legislation Pending

There are a number of different bills under discussion, several of which have already been introduced, and some of which have already gone to hearings. This article is an attempt to catalog them for our readers, to give some idea of their scope, and to show what different dangers they pose. We say that because *nothing* that is seriously under consideration right now is aimed at controlling the CIA or the other intelligence agencies; they are all designed to “unleash” them to one degree or another.

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act

This is the proposal—ostensibly designed to criminalize our *Naming Names* column—about which we testified before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Since our testimony is reprinted in full in this issue, along with much of the other testimony and the questioning, this bill need only be summarized here. It contains two provisions; the first makes it a crime for any former government employee with authorized access to classified information identifying intelligence officers, agents or sources to disclose those identities, or information from which those identities could be ascertained. The second provision makes it a crime for anyone else to disclose such information, “with the intent to impair or impede United States intelligence activities.”

As we and several others testified, the bill has a number of serious defects. Although the first provision might not be unconstitutional *per se*—particularly given the outcome of the *Snepp* case (see sidebar this issue)—it severely limits whistleblowing in the entire intelligence field. Also, it is not limited to information which is in fact secret and it is not limited to identities alone. (And, as one witness noted, it even prevents a former CIA officer from saying that he or she used to work for the CIA.)



The second provision, however, is, in our opinion, clearly unconstitutional—a view apparently shared by the Justice Department. Their remedy for this defect, however, is not a very liberal one. They proposed a substitute bill to make it a crime for *anyone* to release classified information, identifying an officer, agent or source, “with the

knowledge that such disclosure is based on classified information." They do not define what is meant by being "based on" classified information. This provision would presumably affect a newspaper editor who received a supposedly classified document in the mail anonymously, a frequent occurrence.

The Justice Department bill also makes the first provision worse. They propose criminalizing the disclosure of an identity by a former employee with "access to information revealing the identities of covert agents," even if the person identified was not one to whose identity the employee had access, and even, for that matter, if the information identifying the person disclosed did not come from classified sources. It proposes a perpetual, broad ban on all former employees.

The Moynihan Bill

Also in January, the Senate took its first steps in this area. Senator Moynihan introduced a three-part bill, S. 2216, which contained the verbatim text of the Boland House bill and two other parts. One was to exempt from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act all requests about the CIA except for requests by citizens and permanent resident aliens for files about themselves. The other was to repeal the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requiring advance notice of covert actions to the Congressional Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committees, and substituting a provision which required notice "as soon as possible" or notification of a finding by the National Security Agency that the action "does not involve substantial resources or risks."

The first provision, the inclusion of the Boland bill, led to an embarrassed admission from Moynihan on the Senate floor soon after its introduction that he had not studied the bill carefully and that he was going to move to strike from his bill the second provision of the Boland bill, relating to persons other than former government employees. He conceded the provision "might have a chilling effect" on the press.

Moynihan and his co-sponsors, however, have staunchly defended the other parts of his bill. The Freedom of Information Act specifically exempts records which are "properly classified... in the interest of national defense or foreign policy," an exemption which in the past Agency spokespersons always defended as adequate. But the CIA, and the Senator, have now taken the position that the appearance of additional protection is as important to present and prospective agents as an already sufficient law.

The argument is bizarre, but not as much so as the justifications given for restricting the FOIA to citizens' requests for personal files. It is "absurd," Senator Moynihan said, to allow "an agent of the KGB" to seek intelligence under the Act. But, if classified national defense and foreign policy matters are already exempt from the Act, what is the point? Moreover, the new proposal limiting requests to personal files is a direct attack at the academics, historians and researchers who have, with the sub-

stantial or partial assistance of the FOIA, published some of the most significant public discussion of intelligence issues in recent years. John Marks' book, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*, William Shawcross's book, *Sideshow*, and Dan Morgan's book, *Merchants of Grain*, among others, fall in this category.

The line on the Hughes-Ryan Amendment repeal is equally inconsistent. Even as the bill was introduced, Senator Walter Huddleston, one of its sponsors, admitted that "he knew of no leaks that could definitely be blamed on Hughes-Ryan, but he said that there have been some covert operations the CIA has decided not to undertake because of fear of disclosure." (*Washington Post*, January 24, 1980.) What makes the repeal movement even more foolish is the poorly guarded secret that the CIA has ignored Hughes-Ryan whenever it wished. Finally it came out into the open on February 21, 1980, when Admiral Turner was testifying before Congress in opposition to the Charter introduced a few days earlier (see below).



STANSFIELD TURNER

Under persistent questioning he admitted that he had not always kept Congress informed in advance of anticipated activities. When it was suggested that this contradicted his testimony before Congress at his confirmation hearings that he would have "no difficulty" complying with the advance notice provisions, he waffled. He noted that he had only said he would have no difficulty trying to keep Congress informed, not that he would. A few days later, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd said he would insist on prior notice of covert action.

The Charter

The icing on the cake was presented on February 8, when the National Intelligence Act of 1980 was introduced. This 171-page bill, some three years in the making, was submitted with a special letter of support from President Carter, an Administration synopsis, and lengthy statements from bi-partisan sponsors. As noted above, certain differences between Congress and the CIA were expected, most notably the prior notice provision. Another area of expected disagreement is the express approval of use by the CIA of journalists, clergymen and academics as agents. The Agency wants this provision removed, for obvious reasons. (As with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, though, there is no reason to believe that the CIA has not ignored present minimal restrictions whenever it has suited their purposes.)

But, most shocking to civil libertarians were the provisions of the Charter which permit considerable burglarizing, bugging, wiretapping and mail opening, much of it without even the need for a court order—not that the judges, selected to sit on a special court for such purposes, are to be expected to rally around the protection of individual rights. The bill would, for example, allow a burglary

"No Charter Is Better Than This Charter"

overseas of anyone, U.S. citizen or not, suspected of possessing information "that is essential to the national security of the United States." This means that anyone with any

contacts overseas which might lead the Administration to believe the person has such information—even though lawfully obtained and lawfully possessed—could find his home or office ransacked, because the CIA wanted whatever he or she had.

The Charter also exempts the CIA from the Freedom of Information Act, regardless of the unclassified nature of the information sought, and also includes another version of the Boland bill.

Because of the complexity of the Charter, and because it appears likely that most subsequent debate on these issues will take place within the framework of the Charter, a detailed analysis of the Charter is in order. *CAIB* expects, in its next issue, to present such an analysis and a report on the current status of the various pending bills.

Conclusion

In part because the CIA continues to ask for more than almost anyone is willing to offer, it is unlikely that any of the more serious proposals will be rushed through Congress. It is certainly hoped that there will be increased public awareness of the inherent evils in these bills. Like the fight to prevent the most serious violations of individual rights in the Criminal Code Revision Act (the old S. 1), the struggle will not be easy. Current events are being manipulated by the CIA with a vengeance. For now, however, it is clear that despite the high sentiments voiced some time ago to restrain the CIA, the tide has turned. At this time, no charter is better than the one which has been proposed.

Ghostwriting, CIA Style:

"It is imperative that the 96th Congress clearly and compellingly declare that the unauthorized disclosure of the identities of our intelligence officers and those allied in our efforts will no longer be tolerated."

From the statement of Frank C. Carlucci to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 1980

"It is urgent that the 96th Congress clearly and compellingly demonstrate that the unauthorized revelation of the identities of our intelligence officers and those allied in our efforts will no longer be tolerated."

From the statement of Representative Charles E. Bennett to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 1, 1980

STATEMENT OF CAIB BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE, JAN. 31, 1980

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* is pleased to have this opportunity to present its views to you. The three of us comprise the complete staff of the Bulletin.

Let us mention one point before we continue with the prepared statement. We were somewhat concerned yesterday with the references to "so-called journalists" and to persons "purporting" to be journalists. We want to note that Mr. Wolf has been an accredited journalist for fourteen years; Ms. Ray has been a documentary film maker for twelve years, and a writer for the past several years; and Mr. Schaap has been a full-time professional writer for more than four years. Philip Agee, incidentally, who left the CIA ten years ago, has also been a professional journalist since then.

On that subject, let us also clear up some other obvious misconceptions before we proceed. Mr. Agee is neither a director, an officer nor an editor of the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*. He does contribute articles to it, although as one could ascertain from reading them, those articles do not name any names. You might all be interested to know that Mr. Agee has *not*, to our knowledge, named any names in at least three years, and that applies to both "Dirty Work 1" and "Dirty Work 2."

Because so much of the discussion which has led to the introduction of H.R. 5615 suggests that it is aimed expressly at us,¹ we would like to touch briefly on our philosophy, and on what, in fact, we do. Although there may be a profound difference between our view of appropriate intelligence work and that which has led to the introduction of a bill such as this, we suggest that our position has been misrepresented.

Our publication, as you are undoubtedly aware, is devoted to exposing what we view as the abuses of the western intelligence agencies, primarily, though not exclusively, the CIA; and to exposing the people responsible for those abuses. We believe that our nation's intelligence activities should be restricted to the gathering of intelligence, in the strictest sense. We believe it is wrong, and in the long run extremely detrimental to our democracy, for this country to interfere covertly in the affairs of other countries. We believe that other countries should choose the governments and systems which the people of those countries want for themselves. We also believe that when our government

chooses to support another government and to give it aid, it should do so openly and publicly.²

In this connection, we believe that the CIA, as it is at present, is probably beyond reform; we believe that it should be completely revamped, or abolished altogether, and another new agency created, strictly limited to the gathering of intelligence. In sum we believe that the covert manipulation for which the CIA has become notorious—undercover officers and agents corrupting and bribing officials, buying elections, secretly controlling various media, employing economic and political sabotage, all the way to bombings and assassinations—that this manipulation does not strengthen democracy here in the United States, but in fact weakens it. Indeed, over the past 30 years or so, the CIA has generated more hatred of the United States government around the world than any other single institution. The situation today in Iran, for example, is in large part *because* of the CIA, not in spite of it. If it is a reasonable goal for a nation to try to live in harmony with the rest of the world, the CIA is constantly frustrating that goal for this country.

Before commenting on the specifics of the bill, we would like to try to dispel two myths which affect not so much our actual work as other people's perceptions of it, myths which have clearly affected the deliberations of this Committee.

First of all, there is the myth that exposure subjects a CIA officer to a serious threat of physical harm, even death. This is objectively false. Of the more than a thousand CIA people who have been named over the past five or six years by many people and many publications in many countries, *not one* has been physically harmed on account of it. Indeed they are rarely transferred ahead of schedule. We won't belabor the point here, but you should be aware, as we know the CIA is, that Richard Welch, the CIA Station Chief in Athens, was murdered by people who were originally stalking his predecessor, and that his death had nothing to do with having been named, many times, in various countries over the years, as a CIA officer.³

2. The American public—and their representatives in Congress—had no voice, for example, in the now well-documented massive aid to the Christian Democratic Party in Italy, or to the Front for the National Liberation of Angola, or to the anti-Allende parties in Chile, to give just a few examples.

3. See "Communiqué," by The November 17 Revolutionary Organization, reprinted in "Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe," for confirmation that the group was first watching Welch's predecessor. See, for the manipulation of the murder by the CIA, "CIA News Management," by Morton Halperin, *Washington Post*, January 23, 1977, and Mr. Halperin's Statement to this Committee, January 4, 1978. Mr. Welch was first publicly exposed as a CIA officer in 1968, in "Who's Who in CIA," by Julius Mader. He was also named in newspapers and magazines in both South America and Europe.

1. See, for example, the remarks of Senator Bentsen in the *Congressional Record*, May 15, 1979, at S5959-60, and the letter from Admiral Turner to Senator Bentsen, reprinted at S5960. See also the remarks of Representative Boland in the *Congressional Record*, October 17, 1979, at H9324, and the remarks of Representative McCloskey at H9325. See also the letter to the Editor of the *New York Times* from Representative Boland, published January 15, 1980.

In the one instance where physical harm might have been an issue, the taking of hostages in Iran, we have consistently, and against considerable pressure from the media, refused to comment on the identification of anyone involved.

The second myth is that we and others doing similar work have some special access to secret classified information; that it comes from some inside source. This is simply not true. None of us ever worked for the government. The deductions we draw, the journalistic conclusions we come to, that certain persons are in fact intelligence officers, come from dozens of public sources, from research methods well known and well publicized.⁴ Similar deductions and conclusions are made every day by investigative journalists in this country and around the world. The identities of people we and others have exposed are usually quite well known to the host country governments, and we are sure they are already known to the other major intelligence services. Indeed, as this week's *Newsweek* points out, CIA officials admit "the names aren't news to hostile governments."⁵ These undercover people are usually not known, however, to the people of the host country, and to the people of this country, even though their conduct is generally totally, completely illegal in the host country, and often at home.

Finally, we would like to outline our specific arguments regarding H.R. 5615. We believe that the entire bill represents a serious threat to the backbone of our democracy—particularly freedom of the press. The bill is not, in reality, aimed merely at our publication or others like it; it is aimed at journalists generally, and at their sources—at outside investigators and inside whistleblowers. For one thing, the bill is not even limited to exclude exposures of patently illegal activity. Nor is it limited to the exposure of identities learned because of access to classified information, or even to identities at all. The bill censors "any information that identifies" an undercover officer or agent. Yet it is virtually impossible to expose an improper or unlawful or immoral operation or activity in government without disclosing information from which one might ascertain the identity of the persons responsible for such an activity. Whistleblowers have traditionally been this country's greatest weapon against official corruption and immorality. This bill would wipe out whistleblowing in the intelligence field, where it may be most necessary.

Critically, from a constitutional point of view, the bill is not limited to information which is *in fact* secret and classified. This appears to be the first time that something really approaching an Official Secrets Act has been so seriously proposed in the United States. We believe that if truly secret and classified information is exposed, and if it is truly damaging to the national security, then the existing espionage laws are sufficient to protect the interests of the country.

4. Best known, and often reprinted, is "How to Spot a Spook," by John Marks, *Washington Monthly*, November 1974. Similar articles have appeared all over the world.

5. January 28, 1980, p. 32.

Lastly, the idea of specific intent required in the second part of the bill presents another great difficulty. The bill only criminalizes journalism, it appears, if the writer's intent is "to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States." But what if the intent is to expose illegality or to engender greater morality in government? The specific intent requirement does not minimize the unconstitutionality of the section. What one person sees as reform, another will see as impairment. Indeed, as we said before, we believe that the best thing for the security and well-being of the United States would be to limit severely, if not to abolish, the CIA. Our intent both in exposing the abuses of the intelligence agencies and in exposing the people responsible for those abuses is to increase the moral force in this nation, not to lessen it. That many people would disagree with us is clear. That the CIA would assume our intent is simply to impair or impede their foreign intelligence activities also seems likely. Patriotism is to some extent in the eye of the beholder. But it is very distressing that such disagreements could become the substance of criminal prosecutions under a bill such as this.

Our society is supposedly dedicated to openness, to accountability, to continuing reform. Investigative journalists and their sources represent one of the key elements of that tradition. The danger that the hysteria of the moment could subvert that tradition is great. The current move to "unleash" the CIA, of which this bill is just one part, would be, we believe, completely counterproductive. Efforts to exempt the CIA from the Freedom of Information Act and to repeal the Hughes-Ryan Amendment are equally dangerous.

To conclude, we hope that you understand our motivations; we hope even more that you recognize the effect this bill would have, not on us, but on freedom of the press in this country, and on government morality.

Following the presentation of the CAIB statement, there was an extensive period of questioning by the Committee members. Excerpts of that interchange follow:

Mr. Mazzoli (D., Ky.): Thank you very much. We appreciate your being here, and your statement is certainly quite thought provoking. I have to confess, to be candid with you, that I can see where you might be motivated to disclose the outrages or overreachings of an intelligence agency, but I just really can't quite handle the approach that you take. I recognize that it is important to have a dialogue in America; the beauty of this nation is that we can have people who so very diametrically disagree with one another and still be in the same room together without polemics going back and forth. But I have to say in candor that your view, while carefully reached and zealously held, is, I am sure, that of a very, very small minority throughout the country, and I think legitimately a small part. I would ask you a question. You say that you believe the nation's intelligence activity should be restricted to the gathering of intelligence in the strictest sense. Accepting that that should be its mission, and that anything beyond that is

wrong, does not your activity exactly impede and in many cases interrupt and destroy that intelligence gathering mission?

CAIB: The answer depends upon understanding our philosophy about the CIA. We have no delusions that we have come here to change the minds of the members of the Committee. We have come here to try to explain where we are coming from, and to make clear that we do not use secret documents and do not have any inside line to the CIA, that we work from public research. But our philosophy is that the CIA is in fact an evil instrumentality which is beyond reform because of a tradition which has built up over many years, doing those activities which have been exposed in the press over the past number of years. It is our belief that those activities continue to this very moment. There are members of this Committee who would quite seriously take the position that it is a good thing that they do; we sincerely take the position that it is a very bad thing that they do. We think that one has to start over again, either with a completely revamped agency, or with a new agency.

Mazzoli: I appreciate that, but of course that is not to happen. I wonder if your effort at exposing the wrongdoing doesn't really destroy the mission as you see it, which is to gather intelligence? It certainly doesn't make it any easier.

CAIB: No, we don't think it makes it any easier. Our problem is that the manipulation that we see, the dirty tricks as they're called, are so intertwined. It is our understanding that the vast majority of intelligence gathering, up to 95% of it at least, is done through microwave interception by the National Security Agency, through electronic surveillance, and through the clipping of newspapers. There are we don't know how many thousands of employees at the CIA headquarters in Virginia, analyzing documents, reading books, clipping newspapers. We have no problem with that kind of intelligence analysis.

Mazzoli: Don't you think that you could accomplish your mission, which you have reached very thoughtfully, to reform the intelligence agency, without naming names?

CAIB: Possibly, but our feeling at this point, after working in this area for several years, is that we cannot, partly because of the value it has in many instances in explaining operations. Consider yesterday's comments about the King Hussein story. An editor wouldn't even have put it in the paper, much less on page one, if you didn't say who it was. Also, we feel strongly that you cannot separate the responsibility for the actions from the individual responsibility of the people who do them. If you accept our premise that the CIA station in a foreign country is manipulating, is paying off politicians, is buying elections, is doing whatever else, even putting aside assassinations and the like—if you accept that the manipulation is taking place, the individuals involved are responsible. They certainly know what they are doing.

Mr. Boland (D., Mass.): It's nice to get both sides of the argument, and you presented it very well. As a matter of fact, you even present your *Covert Action Information*

Bulletin very well. It's a slick publication; I mean the format is, and the paper you use is slick, and the information in the *Bulletin* is slick information too.

CAIB: We appreciate the compliment. We might point out that the CIA, as well as Congress, were among our earliest subscribers.

Boland: Well, I would think they would be. Now just a moment ago you referred to the CIA as an evil instrumentality. Is that the description you want to apply to it today?

CAIB: To the extent that the manipulation that we are talking about still takes place, yes.

Boland: Give me one example of some manipulation that is taking place right now that makes it an evil instrumentality.

CAIB: If we knew something that was taking place right now it would be in this issue of the *Bulletin*. We can only tell you about what was taking place. There is no past experience to give us reason to believe the Agency when it makes the comment, in whatever words, that "We don't do that any more." We say that because over the years, every time that has been said, and on several occasions to this Congress, by officials of the Agency, under oath, it has turned out to be untrue. We don't mean that everything that is going on rises to the level of the intervention in Chile, or the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran, or Guatemala, and so on. We simply feel to a moral certainty that it is going on right now. We are sure that politicians are being paid off right now by our government through the CIA; we are sure there are elections being bought right now by the CIA. We will find out about them a year from now.

Mr. McClory (R., Ill.): You say that one of the aims of the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* and those who are associated with it is to stop illegal or immoral activity. Is that a fair statement of what you believe?

CAIB: Yes.

McClory: Is the issuance of fake passports illegal in your opinion?

CAIB: We would imagine in every country in the world it is illegal, yes.

McClory: Would you be critical of the government of Canada for issuing fake passports to the Americans who were secreted out of Iran? If the Canadian government did that would you be critical of them for engaging in illegal activity?

CAIB: Not that illegal activity, no. We are not critical that they assisted in helping these people to escape, nor are we critical that, according to the newspapers the CIA assisted in forging some visa stamps on the passports in order to assist them to escape. We are somewhat critical of the mass media for having published the fact.

Boland: Now you also say that your intent is to expose

abuses and that H.R. 5615 would criminalize whistle-blowing. What abuses does your *Naming Names* section reveal? What abuses come to the surface as a result of your naming names and your books?

CAIB: That information, in particular instances, especially instances of diplomatic cover officials in embassies, would only come to light thereafter, and would be recognized by the citizens of the host country. In most cases where we are simply reporting on a case officer in a country, we don't know *precisely* what he is doing. As we have said, you have to understand our philosophy which posits that a large part of what he is doing is wrong, and that it is bad for this country that he is doing it. It generally only comes out afterwards what the specific thing might be.

McClory: My principal observation is that, while your testimony and the activity of this publication appear to be directed at the abuses of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, what we are dealing with ourselves are what we regard as abuses of First Amendment rights, which we feel threaten the destruction and loss of these First Amendment privileges which we have. I've made mention several times of the change in direction the liberal community appears to be taking as a result of the tremendous threats of the KGB and other covert operations of adversary nations. What if anything have you done to try to expose any of the covert operations of any persons that I would regard as our enemies, those that are trying to destroy these First Amendment rights that you purport to be championing?

CAIB: We don't know very much about the KGB. But you should understand that if they are doing the same things that we say we don't like the CIA doing, we don't like their doing it either. The point we are trying to make is that we are Americans, and we know about our government. We are trying very hard to make it, in our opinion, a better government. We certainly hope that there are citizens of the Soviet Union trying hard to make their government a better government. We hope there are people like that everywhere.

McClory: To justify your publication and your position, you suggest that people in all nations should have the right to choose the government they want. Yet it seems to me that what you are contributing to is denying the opportunity to people to have the kind of government they want.

CAIB: We think that it is important to remember that for the United States to stand as a beacon before the world, it must demonstrate and carry out its principles.

McClory: You don't think we are?

CAIB: Well, we think the CIA stands for quite the opposite of what we are talking about.

McClory: Do you think that if the CIA or any agencies, covert or overt, support the opportunity for people to vote in free elections, that that is contrary to our interests, and can you tell me of any instance where any of our intelligence agencies have tried to suppress that opportunity?

CAIB: The most obvious example is that they pumped many millions of dollars into the Christian Democratic Party in Italy, for example.

McClory: Do you think western free Europe is anti-American?

CAIB: We have a profound difference of opinion. All we're saying is that it is wrong for this country secretly to pump millions of dollars into the coffers of a particular political party in another country. We think it is wrong for anyone to do that.

McClory: I can only observe that you are not answering the question.

Mazzoli: Let me ask you this. You seek to disabuse the Committee of any thought that you use clandestine means to get your information, that you work with public records and what have you. You say here that you don't have some special access. Now this special access is important, because the staff has handed me a copy of your April-May 1979 issue, in which there is a very long secret document, Department of State, dealing with something that occurred in Europe. This is the first time I've seen your publication, so apparently you do use classified information also. Perhaps the use of that document can be squared with your statement, but it seems like you're leading the Committee to believe that classified information doesn't play a part.

CAIB: That particular example can be explained very easily. This document appeared, prior to our publication, in an Italian newspaper called *La Repubblica*, in full, and one of the reporters for *La Repubblica* sent us a copy in the mail, and additionally we received two other copies in the mail anonymously. In fact, it had appeared in full in an Italian newspaper and was not secret.

Mazzoli: Maybe I'm wrong, because I really don't want to read anything especially into this, but in your statement you say that despite the entreaties of your colleagues in the fourth estate, you have not succumbed, and you haven't given out the names of the CIA people, if any, in Tehran, and you take some small issue with the papers for having published the fact that allegedly the CIA helped doctor the visas.

CAIB: For having published it while there are hostages being held. We wouldn't mind it being published after there was a different situation.

Mazzoli: It seems to me that you are trying to have it both ways. You are trying to indicate that you have a certain honor, if you will, or righteousness in how you approach this, and at the same time, you, without any backward looks, publish names, some of which are not even correct. If they're correct possibly your righteousness has been displayed and demonstrated concretely, but sometimes there are wrong names. Sometimes you finger the wrong people.

CAIB: Nobody has ever proved that to our satisfaction, we might add. No one has ever sued us for being named, no

one has ever threatened us for being named, no one has ever pointed out a mistake.

Mazzoli: Well, I would hardly think that people would ever sue you, for obvious reasons, because if they are an agent or not, the very fact that suit is brought, demonstrates that the cover is blown. The matter has been confirmed in that action. I wonder why you would argue with what the papers have done. I mean why would that concern you, give you trouble?

CAIB: It gives us trouble because we are very sensitive to this aspect of putting people's lives in danger. Ever since the Welch assassination there has been an assumption on the part of many people that it was caused by his having been named in *CounterSpy*, when in fact that wasn't true. The real problem is that in March of this year Admiral Turner admitted in a speech at Johns Hopkins that perhaps it was true that the naming of Welch in *CounterSpy* had nothing to do with his being killed, but that that was irrelevant to the issue then being discussed. We have had to live with that for a number of years. We are not in favor of putting anyone's life in danger, and we don't believe that we do. The situation in Iran is *sui generis* and that is why we feel so concerned. It is not a principle that relates to naming names.

Mazzoli: Well, let me thank you again. As I say, there is a profound disagreement between the two of us, but I think that you do serve a very useful purpose to this Committee in explaining your position and the perspective which you use in doing your work.

Boland: Where do you draw the line at exposing secrets? Is it okay to name names of agents, but not the details of reconnaissance satellites, for instance?

CAIB: Well, we don't know very much about reconnaissance satellites.

Boland: Have you ever published anything with respect to reconnaissance satellites?

CAIB: To our knowledge we have not published anything with respect to reconnaissance satellites.

Boland: If you had information with respect to highly secret reconnaissance satellites, I presume that you would print it?

CAIB: We are not so sure, unless we had a situation where it related to manipulation of events or dirty tricks. As we said, as we have stated publicly many times, we are not against intelligence in that sense.

Boland: All right. Where do you draw the line at exposing secrets? You're in the business of exposing secrets, are you not?

CAIB: In part. Let us point out that we publish a 32 or 36 page magazine, one or two pages of which may be devoted to naming names and unfortunately we must live with the fact that nobody talks about the rest of it. We do

publish investigative pieces and political analyses and reports which don't name names but discuss politics around the world.

Boland: I suppose one of the reasons why people center on naming names is because to a lot of people that is very serious. What do you know about the one thousand individuals that you have exposed that leads you to believe that they are performing individually illegal acts, and what makes you so confident that no harm has come to those whose names have been exposed, or disclosed, or harassment to their families? You really don't have that knowledge, do you?

CAIB: We feel fairly certain that if any serious harm had occurred to anybody we had named, the Press Office of the CIA would have called a press conference and had it on the wire services instantly. The Welch assassination—they had a press conference called before he was in his coffin.

Boland: Well, I'm not sure they would do that. The CIA can respond to that when we interview them. I'm not sure they would respond in the way that you have indicated, because I think that may well lead to harm to others. I presume you would agree that harm can be done to families, they have to move, they have to pull up their roots in a particular country when the name of an agent is disclosed, and harassment can easily occur and has occurred, many, many times to the homes and the families of those who are connected with the intelligence community in various countries whose names have been disclosed. Now, would you consider that to be harmful?

CAIB: We are not sure what you mean by harassment, but we have no knowledge of any that has occurred. We are against physical harm, and have no knowledge that any has occurred. But frankly, within the ambit of our philosophy, which is that we think the Agency is beyond reform and ought to be revamped, our aim is to try to stop it from continuing to do what it is doing. If it were proved to our satisfaction that it didn't do those things, we would feel completely differently.

Boland: Let me ask you again. What abuse are you stopping by naming names? You mention the abuses of the intelligence community, the abuses of the CIA, and naming names to me doesn't stop whatever abuses you are concerned about.

CAIB: Well, it stops a large area, we think, or we hope, which has to do with the undercover officers obtaining the confidence of persons in various positions in other countries by pretending to be something other than what they are. The only way they can really get to meet, let's say an opposition politician or a labor union leader in circumstances where they can hope to corrupt that person and cause that person to become an operative for them would be by having this cover, pretending to be something else.

Boland: But how do you obtain intelligence in foreign countries without cover?

CAIB: Again, you must understand our philosophy

about the CIA as an institution and the abuses which it has committed. If there were a fresh start and it were simply intelligence gathering, if there were a different *esprit de corps*, if there was not what we sense, a veneer which has built up over many years of allowing an agency to think it can do virtually anything it wants throughout the world, including killing, murdering, bombing, and everything under the sun, if it weren't for that, we would feel differently.

Boland: I don't think a lot of people would disagree with that. The abuses have been extensive in the past, but the question is whether they are present now, and I am convinced they are not. In any event, is your bottom line that the United States should not be engaged in any covert activities? Is that a fair assessment of one of your positions?

CAIB: No. Any covert manipulation.

Boland: What's the difference between covert manipulation and covert activity?

CAIB: If someone undercover is quietly attending political rallies and making notes of what the political temper in the area is, and so on, that's one thing. If on the other hand the United States, through the CIA, is paying money to certain political parties so that they can have more election propaganda and win the election, that is something else.

McClory: Reading from one of your advertising letters you sent with complimentary copies of your *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, inviting the person to subscribe, you mention not only *Naming Names*, but you say, "We also commence with this issue a column entitled *Sources and Methods*, dealing with some of the more unusual techniques, technical accomplishments of the intelligence complex." It seems to me that it is inherent in the intelligence community, as we develop techniques and methods and sources for gathering information—which is the principal activity of intelligence work, not to expose them to persons who would utilize them in a way that would be adverse to our national security interests. How do you justify publicizing that kind of activity?

CAIB: If you had read the column in question, you would discover that it does not deal with secret information, that it deals with public information reported in books and scholarly journals. The particular article in question—which was covered all over the world—dealt with using essence of cockroach to track people, and how powerful it was as opposed to almost any other substance. It was quite humorous, was picked up by many wire services, but it came from a public book which many people know about.

McClory: You make the pretense that you identify CIA officers by reading publications, but both your magazine and the book *Dirty Work* by your contributing editor Philip Agee and Mr. Wolf list as sources "Paris Embassy sources, Athens Embassy sources, Department of State sources." So you have these people who apparently spy for you and on other Americans, do you not?

CAIB: Well, that is a bit of an overstatement.

McClory: Are these covert agents for the *Covert Action* publication?

CAIB: No. By and large, those are people simply confirming that CIA case officer Joe Smith is in fact at the Paris Embassy. It is very often done by picking up the telephone, calling the Embassy, and asking for Joe Smith. Joe Smith gets on the phone. As many witnesses testified yesterday, it is very simple, from a number of books and magazines, to discover that a certain supposed State Department employee is in fact a CIA case officer. If the diplomatic list published by the government of France lists him as being in Paris as of a certain date, you have a friend in Paris who can pick up the phone, call the Embassy, and ask for him. If he answers the phone, then we have ascertained, through our "source in Paris," that he is there.

McClory: Do you think that if we publish your testimony here, it would kill the circulation of your magazine?

CAIB: We doubt it.

McClory: Now you mention the book, *Who's Who in the CIA*, by Julius Mader. That's a book that did what you do now, back in 1968.

CAIB: Far less accurately, we might add.

McClory: What you neglected to mention was that the book was a product of the East German government, and that the false identification in the book of a man by the name of Dan Mitrione resulted in his murder by terrorists. What do you know about Mader and his activities?

CAIB: We don't know him; we know of him. We have a copy of the book, and there are a number of inaccuracies in it. We would take issue with the description of Mr. Mitrione, though. He received his pay check, we understand, from AID and not from the CIA, and in that sense was not a CIA employee. But former Agency employees have mentioned in books, other people have written books, that in fact he was doing a CIA case officer's job. We really don't know much about it; we have read books ascribing rather terrible things to Mr. Mitrione.

McClory: You justify your publication and that naming names is harmless because nobody's been killed or murdered. This should suggest to you that this is very, very dangerous business, and very, very dangerous to the individuals and the families of those persons whose names you name.

CAIB: If it were true, it would, but we don't believe it is true. At least from what we have read, vast numbers of people in Uruguay knew who Mr. Mitrione was, and knew that he worked with the secret police and knew that he was involved in the securing of implements of torture and so on.

McClory: What's your rate of accuracy in the *Naming Names* column?

CAIB: As we said, we think it is 100%. We try very hard to err on the side of caution, and have rejected hundreds of names.

McClory: I think there will be considerable dispute over whether or not it is 100%, and if it is not, then those who've been named have been falsely accused, haven't they?

CAIB: If we ever found out we had done that, we would print a retraction and an apology, but we really don't think that we have.

McClory: Well I'm glad you say that. I think you have some duty to those who have been falsely named in the *Naming Names* column. Thank you.

Mazzoli: Thank you, Mr. Schaap, Mr. Wolf, and Ms. Ray.

avowed enemies of United States intelligence activity as the publishers of *Covert Action Information Bulletin* have been accurate. This indicates that they are based on extensive investigation, using many of the same techniques as any intelligence service uses in its counterintelligence efforts—in effect, spying on the United States.

There is nothing that has been more damaging to morale and to the effectiveness of the Agency . . . I happened to arrive in one country on a trip about seven or eight months ago and was greeted at the airport by a young officer, who had that very morning been exposed in one of these so-called bulletins—*Covert Action Bulletin*. He was an able young officer, who had worked for eight or ten years and had concealed his identity. He had valuable assets in the country. All of that is now worthless . . . Clearly this has been highly damaging to our intelligence capability overseas.

One place in his formal presentation, the Deputy Director may well have been guilty of himself leaking secret, and potentially damaging information. Blaming the naming of names, the Freedom of Information Act, and other public exposures, he told those assembled:

Nearly all major foreign intelligence services with which we have liaison relationships have undertaken reviews of their relations with us.

While of course the CIA maintains "liaison" relationships with a number of "major foreign intelligence services," this rather specific public declaration made by Carlucci reveals, at least to a certain extent, the status of relations between a fairly narrow circle of "major" foreign services and the CIA, principally among them the British MI-6, the French SDECE, the Canadian RCMP, the Australian ASIO, and the New Zealand service.

Excerpts From

Other Speakers and

Committee Questioning

A number of people testified at the House Committee hearings, some in favor, some against, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. CAIB reprints here some excerpts from those statements, and Committee questioning. These selections are by no means comprehensive, but are included here to give a flavor of the proceedings.

Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director of Intelligence:

I do not believe there is any justification or excuse for the deliberate, public disclosure of the identities of personnel having concealed employment or other relationships with intelligence agencies of the United States government.

Those who seek to destroy the intelligence activities of the United States have propagated a number of fallacies. Unfortunately some of these have found their way into discussions of H.R. 5615 in the press and elsewhere.

One of these fallacies is that accurate identification of CIA personnel under cover can be made merely by consulting publicly available documents, like the State Department's *Biographic Register*, and therefore the bill would impinge on discussion of information that is in the public domain. This is untrue. . . . It is only because of the disclosure of sensitive information based on privileged access and made by faithless government employees, such as Philip Agee and John Marks, with the purpose of damaging U.S. intelligence efforts that the public has become aware of indicators in these documents that can—and sometimes do—distinguish CIA officers.

This, however, is not the full extent of the problem. A substantial number of the identifications made by such

Carlucci continued:

Finally, a statute should require proof that unauthorized disclosures by those who have not had an employment or other relationship of trust with the United States were made with a specific intent to impair or impede the nation's foreign intelligence activities. This requirement would be for the protection of those who might claim they have made a public disclosure for a legitimate purpose, although I believe Congress should determine if there are any such purposes and make provision for them. For example, if the Congress finds that current requirements and procedures for reporting allegations of illegal or improper activity by intelligence employees may not be sufficient to discover such activity, it could provide in statute for direct reporting to the Congress, or to the Attorney General, or even to the President. In this way it could be made clear that there is no justification for the public disclosure of protected intelligence identities.

Robert L. Keuch, Associate Deputy Attorney General:

Speaking of the second part of the bill:

In proposing a section of such breadth, the House bill

marches overboldly, we think, into the difficult area of so-called "born-classified" information, an area that has not yet been litigated in a criminal context. The House provision would cover disclosures of publicly available information made by ordinary citizens, who claim no special expertise in intelligence affairs and have not held special positions of trust nor associated with others who have. Conversational speculation about whether foreign official X may have been a CIA source and whether we have covert operatives in country Y, ordinary discussions by citizens about foreign affairs and the extent and nature of our intelligence activities abroad, even if based on no studied expertise or scholarly background, could come chillingly close to criminality under the standard of §501 (b).

The scienter requirement—that an individual must have acted with "intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States"—is not a fully adequate way of narrowing the provision. First, even such a scienter standard would have the effect of chilling legitimate critique and debate on CIA policy. A mainstream journalist, who may occasionally write stories based on public information mentioning which foreign individuals are thought to have intelligence relationships with the U.S., might be fearful that any later stories critical of the CIA could be used as evidence of an attempt to "impede" foreign intelligence activities. Speculation concerning intelligence activity and actors abroad would be seemingly more hazardous if one had ever taken even a general position critical of the conduct of our covert foreign intelligence activity.

Jerry J. Berman, Morton H. Halperin and John Shattuck—for the American Civil Liberties Union:

H.R. 5615 is not contained within a comprehensive charter nor is it narrowly drawn. It poses a double danger. If passed as separate legislation or part of a "package" such as the ones proposed by Senator Moynihan and others last week (S. 2216), the measure would all but end the effort to enact an intelligence charter. Once the intelligence agencies obtain the authorizations they seek, they will not be very interested in legislated restrictions. If passed in its present form, the measure seriously infringes on the Freedom of Speech and Press guaranteed by the First Amendment.

While there may be justifiable reasons for protecting all agents and sources in some circumstances, the breadth of the protection has grave implications for inhibiting open discussion of foreign policy and intelligence matters . . .

[The first part of the bill] could be read to prohibit a former government official who had access to classified information from disclosing the identity of an agent based on wholly public information obtained since leaving the government . . .

We believe that this prohibition is unconstitutional and unwise because it would chill public debate on matters of great public importance. Recognizing the importance of public discussion of national security matters, the courts have found laws punishing dissemination or publication of information in the public domain constitutionally defective.

[They cited the statement of Attorney General Keuch before the House Committee hearing about "Espionage Laws and Leaks" on January 24, 1979, saying he accurately and succinctly summed up the decisions of the courts as holding that no one can be convicted of espionage or the compromise of information relating to the national defense if the information was made available to the public, or if the government did not attempt to restrict its dissemination or if the information was available to everyone from lawfully accessible sources.]

In our view, the inhibition on public discussion is not cured by the requirement that the government prove from evidence other than the disclosure itself that a person acted with the "intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States." Would criticism of CIA activities indicate an "intent to impair or impede"? What if the foreign intelligence activity impeded were illegal? Would a government warning that to publish would subject a person to punishment evidence evil intent if the warning were ignored?

Speaking about the second part of the bill:

Suppose that the student newspaper at a university discovers that the head of its European campus has been an agent, informant or source of operational assistance to the CIA, and suppose that the paper publishes that fact asserting that it does not believe that university officials should cooperate secretly with the CIA. Would the newspaper not be in violation of the proposed statute?

Mr. Chairman, in our view this section of H.R. 5615 is vague and overbroad and clearly unconstitutional.

Speaking of the first part of the bill:

It is simply not clear what is intended by the "any information" formulation of Section 501(a) and we urge an amendment to make it clear that the provision is limited to those identities learned by an individual in the course of his or her official duties.

. . . we believe that the provision should apply only to lawful activity and hence to the disclosure of names of agents or employees performing lawful intelligence functions. Some protection for "whistleblowers" is in order.

. . . we believe that there should be an exemption which permits an individual to be free from penalty for revealing the fact that he or she is or has been an agent, employee, or source of the CIA or other intelligence agency.

Finally, we are concerned that even a narrowly drawn statute not become the vehicle for investigating or harassing the press on the grounds that it is publishing information provided to it illegally. We therefore applaud the restrictions in [the proposed bill] relating to the conspiracy laws which bar their use except where there is an intent to impair or impede a foreign intelligence activity. However, we would urge the Committee to go further and make it clear that no journalist can be subject to investigation because he or she publishes a story which includes the name

of an agent and that journalists may not be called before a grand jury and compelled under penalty of contempt to reveal sources of information.

Reform of the espionage laws should start with the principle that activities of private persons related to publication or other public dissemination of information is not a violation of the law.

We believe the public will act responsibly if the agencies do the same. An intelligence charter is the central vehicle for establishing the ground rules on which public trust can be built. A criminal statute passed in the midst of perceived crisis without a charter could have the very opposite effect from what is intended. If the statute is meant to signal a return to secrecy and business as usual rather than reform and lawfulness, agents may be put in jeopardy by those who perceive that the glare of publicity is the only "check" on intelligence abuses. Moreover, instead of reaching these persons, guided or misguided, the statute will likely adversely affect those who are committed to democratic institutions.

Candidate Carter told the American people in 1976 that we had gone astray abroad when policies were decided and implemented in secret. Nothing that has happened since would suggest that that judgment was not correct.

Ford Rowan—until recently NBC Pentagon Correspondent, now a visiting professor in journalism at Northwestern University:

The disclosures of recent years, although widely condemned by some as undermining the effectiveness of the CIA, may actually have helped intelligence officers regain an understanding of their duty *within* the constitutional framework. Publication of the investigative findings may have contributed to a healthier intelligence community by refocusing its attention on its proper role and deemphasizing the undue stress on covert operations, some of which were directed against law-abiding American citizens.

... reporters believe in many of the same values as you. The First Amendment confers enormous power upon journalists and most of us feel that the responsibilities are enormous. Most of us are patriots, but the day is past when simply waving the flag will convince a reporter or editor to kill a story without exceptionally compelling reasons.

Too many reporters have seen the phrase "national security" used to try to hide embarrassing and illegal conduct by government agencies.

In covering intelligence activities a reporter had to exercise judgment when deciding which way to direct his investigatory efforts, in deciding which facts to stress or omit, when deciding which activities should be disclosed. For example, when I broadcast the first story about computerized electronic surveillance by the National Security Agency in 1975 I felt that the domestic spying, directed by an agency involved in foreign intelligence gathering against American citizens, was so newsworthy that disclosure out-

weighed any argument about sensitive sources and methods being compromised. I cite this example because it was a hard case and one that could still spark disagreement today.

I realize that intelligence officers and many public officials feel very uncomfortable knowing that journalists—unelected and sometimes unwashed—sit in judgment on their conduct. Aside from reminding you that this is a result of the First Amendment, I would like to stress that most American journalists try to make responsible judgments.

The First Amendment wasn't just designed for mainstream journalists. In fact, it wasn't designed for institutions at all. The First Amendment was designed for Tom Paine, who printed up pamphlets. And so if the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* was mimeographed in somebody's basement, it has the same protection. You can make the argument that's what the Constitution was designed to protect—an individual or small group printing up stuff. And I think you're stuck with it. I don't think you can legislate what they can and cannot print.

... At the Committee's invitation I have examined the proposed legislation to make it a crime to reveal the identity of a clandestine American intelligence officer or his agent.

I have tried my best to avoid letting where I sit (in the press gallery) determine where I stand on this issue. But as a journalist I cannot consider this legislation without becoming concerned about preserving First Amendment rights.

Speaking of the first part of the bill:

... Some people will leak information no matter what the rules, no matter what the penalties. An insider who feels strongly enough about the wrongful nature of a clandestine operation to disclose it will make his decision on whether to also name names for reasons unrelated to potential criminal penalties.

Speaking of the second part of the bill:

... unlike CIA or military intelligence officers, reporters have taken no oath to keep secrets. Second, reporters should not be forced by Congress—in effect—to take a secrecy oath. That's what this bill would do.

... Reporters who named names to get at the truth about the (CIA) assassination plots (against foreign leaders) usually were opposed to such plots and wanted to assure they did not recur. People who revealed such plots and the plotters wanted to impair this form of intelligence activity, yet they hoped—in most cases—that this would help the United States regain some of the respect it had lost in the world.

In sum, it is a mistake to decree that all foreign intelligence activities of the United States equally merit secrecy. Some should be exposed, denounced, dismembered. Congress should not pass legislation which interferes with the

First Amendment right to expose illegal, immoral, and unethical conduct.

My feeling, however, is that neither injunctions nor criminal penalties provide much control over the flow of information. Look how unsuccessful the federal government was when it tried to enjoin publication of the *Progressive* magazine article on how to build an H bomb. If you cannot stop disclosure of atomic secrets I doubt if the government could stop disclosure of the names of some of its spies. Spilling H bomb secrets seems much more threatening to national survival.

The H bomb article was based in part on "unclassified information available in government libraries open to the public. That factor in that episode could have relevance to our discussion today, for this bill would punish a reporter who combed through open sources such as biographic registers to identify covert officers and agents. The government extracts a high price from journalists when it seeks to punish them for revealing what the government was too inept to keep secret.

Democracy works best that knows most. Some conflicts between the press and government are healthy—symptomatic of a dynamic society with competing values. An independent press with watchdog functions, the tradition of open criticism, the disclosure of corruption, the reform of institutions—these all contribute to a vibrant society.

Society—the public—pays a price when government attempts to seal off part of its activities from public view. In some cases the courts have sided with due process and privacy rights in limiting access to information by the media. In other cases the courts have evaluated then decided against claims that publication of certain information would harm national security.

While First Amendment guarantees may not be absolute, they should be tampered with very cautiously. This proposed legislation is unnecessary, unworkable, and unconstitutional.

Floyd Abrams—Constitutional lawyer and First Amendment expert:

... I appear before you for the primary purpose of urging upon you that Section 501 (b) of the proposed legislation—the section relating not to agents or the like, but to the rest of us, including the press—is flatly and facially unconstitutional; that it is, as well, unwise; and that, on reflection, it should be rejected. And I appear to urge that Section 501 (a) is, as now drafted, of extremely dubious constitutionality.

The effect of such a statute would be startling and unprecedented. Under the terms of the statute, when Francis Gary Powers was captured by the Russians for over-flying their air space in a U-2, every publication in the United States that published Mr. Powers' name would have been subject to criminal prosecution under the statute until the Executive Branch of the United States "had publicly ac-

knowledged or revealed the intelligence relationship to the United States" (Section 501 (a)) of Powers. This would have been possible, notwithstanding the fact that Powers' name was widely, indeed internationally, known; that the Russians had themselves revealed Powers' capture; and that, indeed, Powers was then facing charges in the Soviet Union. It is true that under the statute, all who mentioned Powers' name could have defended on the ground that they did not "intend to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States." But the effect of this would simply have been to permit different results as to different individuals who had done precisely the same thing: to disclose what had already been disclosed.

I would go further. Subject to its exceptions, the statute would not only have made it a crime for the news media to disclose Powers' name, but for each and every American who read it or heard it to repeat the name.

One could cite many other examples of material which, I believe, should have been and should be published, and as to which publication under Section 501 (b) would subject all connected with prospective criminal liability. What of, for example, a situation in which it is learned that an intelligence operative is acting illegally under American law, by, for example, spying on Americans who have done nothing wrong but oppose those in power? What of a student who learns that his professor has been recruited by the CIA in violation of law and wishes to tell others of that fact? What of any instance of criminal wrongdoing by the CIA or any other intelligence operation? On its face, Section 501 (b) puts at risk all who would disclose such illegal acts—whether they refer to the name of the individuals who have committed the acts or simply provide "any information" from which such identification could be made.

These examples illustrate some of the ways by which Section 501 (b) may operate to restrict freedom of expression. At its core, Section 501 (b) flies in the face of a first principle of the First Amendment: While government may try to keep information secret, the disclosure of information which has already become public may not later be criminally punished. Indeed, as phrased by Chief Justice Burger, "The government cannot restrain publication of whatever information the media acquires—and which they elect to reveal."

Beyond these objections to Section 501 (b), I would urge the Committee to consider this question: law aside, even constitutional law aside, is it really necessary for the first time in our nation's history to attempt to make criminal the publication of material which is essentially within the public domain? I would urge upon you that it is not and that whatever you may decide to do with respect to the disclosure by CIA agents or the like, that you adopt no legislation which bars the rest of the American people from disclosing fully the activities of our Government of which they learn. To do otherwise would not only deprive the public of information; it would deprive us all of credibility as we deal with each other—press with public, citizens with each other.

William E. Colby—former Director of Central Intelligence, now in private law practice:

In speaking in favor of the proposed legislation, Colby asserted that we and others "have developed a cottage industry of exposing fellow Americans," and suggested that it is like "being shot in the back."

The dangers to intelligence personnel abroad have been increased in recent years by the sensational and irresponsible exaggeration of a comparatively few incidents in the history of CIA, to give a totally false impression of the scale of its missteps and misdeeds and stimulate attention and hostility to its activities.

Jack Blake—President, Association of Former Intelligence Officers

In the aftermath of excessive charges and the many ill-founded allegations of the mid-70s, this legislation is a concrete step to enhance the effectiveness of intelligence.

Speaking of the last issue of CAIB (Number 7), in particular to the Naming Names section, he declared:

I will not address myself to the accuracy of the identifications because to do so would be to give aid and comfort to the enemy.

Sources and Methods

(continued from page 36)

then opened hearings on the subject. But within a few months the entire inquiry had been effectively sabotaged, and little was revealed.

According to the Committee's report, the CIA had sought to assassinate only a few individuals, and in every case its plots had flopped. In almost all of the cases investigated, by amazing coincidence, someone else succeeded where the CIA had failed: Patrice Lumumba of the Congo in 1960, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic in 1961, Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam (assassinated together with his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu) in 1963, and General Rene Schneider in Chile in 1970. Also, in 1960, an attempt by the CIA to "incapacitate" an unnamed leftist Iraqi colonel came to naught, but instead he "suffered a terminal illness before a firing squad in Baghdad."

So despite the CIA's alleged ineptness, in all those instances the Committee considered, each of the intended victims was killed, with the exception of Fidel Castro. (The Church Committee also "received evidence" of CIA assassination plots against Francois Duvalier of Haiti, Sukarno of Indonesia, Raul Castro, and Che Guevara, but these were not described in detail or evaluated.)

Writing at the same time the Church Committee was conducting its investigation, journalist Tad Szulc described several of the CIA assassination plots later confirmed in the Committee's report plus another one they failed to include—a 1958 plan to poison Chou En-lai during a visit to Burma combined with a "black" propaganda campaign that would have blamed the Soviet KGB for his

death (*Penthouse*, August 1975).² Szulc also pointed out "the possibility of murders of lesser-known figures" (reports that the CIA contemplated killing Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko after completing its interrogation of him, the "accident" that befell a young hitch-hiker who had



COLLEGE MEDIA SERVICES.

stumbled onto secret preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the "suicides" that plague so many agents caught spying for other countries, would fall into this category), while the Committee concerned itself only with "alleged" assassinations of "foreign leaders."

Szulc went on to describe the CIA's "complicated and cumbersome procedure" for planning an assassination, beginning with the "political decision" by the Deputy Director for Operations (Clandestine Services) "that the United States interest would be served by the murder of a foreign leader." His "Staff D" would then study the operational aspects of the plan. Once having cleared the Clandestine Services, the Counterintelligence staff would check to make sure the target wasn't secretly a CIA source, and that the plot couldn't be traced back to the Agency. The Technical Services Division would then recommend the mode of assassination. Final approval was supposedly up to the 40 Committee, but according to the Church Committee, approval by the 40 Committee and its predecessors was bypassed in the plots against Castro and Gen. Schneider.

During the first day of the Church Committee's public hearings, September 16, 1975, William Colby testified that the CIA spent \$3 million from 1952 to 1970 to develop and store a variety of poisons and "delivery systems," a project of the Technical Services Division. One of those "delivery systems," the so-called "microbioinoculator" (electronically-activated dart gun) stole the show. A picture of Senators Frank Church and John Tower inspecting the strange pistol with its telescopic sight appeared on the front page of the next day's *New York Times* and in other papers around the world. It was straight out of James Bond, but probably the device least likely to be used operationally (although it probably was useful for testing the efficacy of various poison darts, as Colby said). Colby testified that the CIA had developed poison darts which could strike a human target without the person's knowledge from a distance of 100 meters and kill him or her silently without the toxin later appearing in an autopsy. (An assassination made to appear to be a natural death is called "dying of the measles" in the CIA.)

Despite the size of the investment and the sophistication of the technology, Colby insisted that none of the toxins had ever been used operationally—except once. In another of those amazing coincidences for which the CIA is so famous, Colby testified that the only operational use was the one that happened to have been reported in the press 15 years earlier: during the U-2 flight over the USSR in May 1960, Francis Gary Powers had carried a poison-impregnated drill bit concealed in a silver dollar. (In his own account, *Operation Overflight*, Powers said that although most U-2 pilots had declined to carry the cyanide pills offered before 1958, they were "fascinated" by the silver dollar, which was routinely offered to each one at departure time.)

According to Harrison E. Salisbury, "the bottom line at the CIA is blackmail, the squeeze, and, if necessary, murder" (*Penthouse*, May 1975). While the Church Committee limited its inquiry narrowly to a handful of attempts on the lives of a few foreign leaders, Salisbury counts "such major (and scandalous) operations as the infamous Phoenix program of political murder in South Vietnam." Operation Phoenix was a mass assassination program which resulted in at least 26,369 deaths of South Vietnamese civilians; from 1968 to 1971 William Colby was its supervisor.

Salisbury noted that two of the CIA's most prized "successes" involved murder—the overthrow of Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, and the assassination of Che Guevara in Bolivia. Salvador Allende of Chile should be added to this list. Despite the narrow focus of its investigation, the Church Committee report noted a common thread: "The assassination plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small and none of which possessed great political or military strength." In this respect, assassination as a method conforms to what is true of covert action generally.

But there are two specific patterns which are especially worth noting. On the one hand, the CIA tends to resort to assassination plotting when a particular U.S. puppet/client has become a political embarrassment or liability, as in the cases of Trujillo, Diem, Duvalier, and Amin. On the other hand, killing leftist leaders of newly independent or revolutionary countries seems to have been considered especially effective—Mossadegh, Lumumba, Allende, and the attempts on Chou, Sukarno, and Castro.¹ (In the typically chauvinistic jargon of the trade, intelligence people refer to these leaders as "George Washingtons" and consider their political bases especially fragile.) The other cases are variants of the latter: Che Guevara, who had become—and still is—a revolutionary symbol for all of Latin America, and General Schneider, who was considered an important obstacle to the plans for the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile. A senior CIA official told Tad Szulc, "We had to be absolutely sure that *all* the military commanders were against Allende—and there were some unconvinced generals. So we had to convince them."

Obviously, then, there are countries today whose leaders may soon come under CIA scrutiny as possible assassination targets if we apply these same criteria. Nicaragua, Grenada, St. Lucia, Jamaica, Iran, Western Sahara, Zimbabwe, and Namibia are the ones that most readily come to mind. One of the few good things about the proposed CIA Charter currently under consideration by Congress is the section that would outlaw assassination as a method of covert action, but with President Carter's current moves to "unleash" the CIA, there is little reason to expect that this law, if passed, will be enforced any better than was Richard Helms's 1972 directive.

1. Apparently Agency policy had been clearer than Helms liked to recall. The man who had been Deputy Chief of the CIA's Program Branch 7 testified before the Church Committee that its written charter had included this language (Church Committee, Final Report, Book IV, p. 129):

"PB/7 will be responsible for assassinations, kidnapping, and such other functions as from time to time may be given it . . . by higher authority."

2. In its Supplementary Report, however, the Church Committee described CIA consideration of a plan to kill an "Asian leader" in 1949 and another against an "East Asian leader" in 1955. (Church Committee, Final Report, Book IV, pp. 132-133.)

3. The older colonial powers freely employed assassination for a third purpose—to eliminate the most uncompromising and visionary leaders of liberation movements or newly independent countries in order to promote others into leadership roles who were considered more pragmatic or less able.

NEWS NOTES

DEPLOYING FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT


On December 27, 1979, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown announced the nomination by President Carter of Major General Paul X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps, for promotion to Lieutenant General, and concurrently his assignment as Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

The Rapid Deployment Force, which became operational on March 1, will number some 100,000. The Pentagon told the *New York Times* it is "to fight that half war," a plan which would enable the U.S. to wage 1½ wars at one time—a major war in Europe at the same time as a brief, in-and-out war (like Vietnam?) in the Third World.

Kelley, 51, has a long career in the specialized field of paramilitary, commando and other "special operations." As a graduate of the Army Airborne Pathfinder School, the Commando School in Britain, and a former exchange officer in a British Commando force in Singapore, Malaya and Borneo, he brings considerable expertise to the expanding apparatus which the White House, the Pentagon, and the CIA are creating to maintain and extend U.S. influence around the world.

General Kelley is a director on the Board of Control of the U.S. Naval Institute, and is chairman of the editorial board of the Naval Institute Press which, among other materials, publishes a monthly journal, *Proceedings*.

The January 1980 issue included a provocative article by Commander Robert C. Powers titled "Escalation Control." In today's tense international climate, with casual war threats (conventional and nuclear) by high Administration figures, and with the knowledge that has emerged in recent years of the centrality in U.S. global intelligence and military operations of the U.S. Navy (it is known for example that U.S. naval ships landed on the southern coast of Chile with clandestine deliveries of small arms and tanks to the forces that overthrew the Allende government a few days later), the article assumes added significance.



The author sets forth the primary thrust of the doctrine as being the development of what he calls "middle spectrum" forces in international sea lanes (see the diagram and definitions reprinted from the article). The concluding paragraph of the article is especially noteworthy: "The Navy is in a period of self-examination and transition. Its leaders are seeking to maintain naval strength for the immediate future while developing and analyzing long-term options that may be radically different."

Despite the formal disclaimer at the beginning of the journal that the opinions in it "are not to be construed as official" and "do not necessarily reflect the views" of the Department of the Navy or the Naval Institute, the successive presidents and the Board of Control of the Institute have always been among the highest-ranking naval brass in the land. Examine the reprinted material with this in mind.

Figure 2. The Escalation Control Spectrum

Level of Escalation	Definition
Presence	The routine presence of forces to influence allies and others
Deterrence	The routine presence of forces to deter a potential opponent from undesired action
Intervention	The movement of forces to intervene in a specific situation, unopposed by another major power
Confrontation	An opposed intervention short of actual violent conflict
Firing Line	A division between those levels that involve actual conflict at sea between the superpowers and those that do not. Intervention and confrontation may involve proxy conflict ashore, but forces at sea do not engage.
Short Conventional Conflict	A violent conventional conflict of a duration not requiring the movement of reserves or significant logistics forces
Extended Conventional Conflict	A violent conventional conflict of a duration requiring the movement of reserves and/or significant logistic forces
Limited Nuclear War	A violent nuclear conflict which does not target superpower homelands, and is limited by either geography, types of weapons used, or both
Total Nuclear War	A violent nuclear conflict which does target superpower homelands, either in a selected manner or a full exchange
Post Nuclear War	Any level of the escalation ladder, conducted in the environment following total nuclear war

Figure 2. The Escalation Control Spectrum and U. S. Interests

Homeland, North America (Core Value)	Presence	Deterrence	Intervention	Confrontation	Short Conventional Conflict	Extended Conventional Conflict	Limited Nuclear War	Total Nuclear War	Post Nuclear War
NATO/Med Sea									
U. S. Petroleum SLOC						X			
NATO Petroleum SLOC						X			
Japan Petroleum SLOC						X			
Israel						X			
Middle Petroleum						X			
Latin America Objectives					X				
Africa and Indian Ocean Objectives				X					
South Asia Objectives			X						
World Political Objectives	X								

X = Suggests the minimum confidence level which the United States needs in order to defend its interests, based on politics and power relations.
SLOC = sea lane of communication.

Japanese Peace Crane Becomes U.S. Military Intelligence Symbol

All those who thought the Japanese art of paper-folding—*origami*—and the world famous crane which has for centuries been to the Japanese a symbol of long life, happiness, wisdom, and, especially since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of peace, would remain sacrosanct, must now think again.

The 500th U.S. Military Intelligence Group, based at Camp Zama, Japan, looking for a logo to depict what it refers to as its "emerging new image," has adopted the paper crane. As is more often than not the case in the intelligence community, there is a big difference between the public relations image and the actual realities of the work of MI.

In any case, it seems acutely inappropriate for the 500th to take this symbol as its own, particularly when part of the MI mission calls for spying on the lawful activity of the Japanese, to whom the crane is sacred.

Navy Electronic Warfare and Intelligence

Many of the U.S. Navy's special programs, which do not formally exist, are directed by "Electronic Warfare Czar" Rear Admiral Albert A. Gallotta, Jr. Working out of a small office in the Pentagon tagged "OP-944," Gallotta and Vice Admiral Robert Y. Kaufman coordinate the Navy's electronic warfare and crypto activities.

Working with Charles Hoffman from the Naval Research Laboratories, they are analyzing and developing electromagnetic, infrared and electro-optical devices. Over 100 types of sophisticated electronic warfare activities ranging from satellite electronic signal monitoring to anti-radiation missiles are anticipated in the future.

It is significant that Gallotta, who took the key position only a few months ago, succeeds Rear Admiral Eugene S. Ince. Ince's relative, Robert, is a middle-level case officer in the CIA. Consequently, it is not illogical that the Rear Admiral has now stepped up to a new and even more strategic Navy post, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence in another Pentagon office going by the murky code-name of "009-Charlie."

"EXCEPTIONAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYST PROGRAM" MOVES AHEAD

CAIB readers will recall the report in Number 6 (October 1979) about Admiral Stansfield Turner's new program to attract analysts from the various intelligence agencies to the CIA. On February 1, the Director of Central Intelligence announced that nineteen analysts from six other agencies had been chosen to participate in the program.

At a ceremony in the CIA Headquarters, Admiral Turner congratulated them for being picked (by him) to take part in the scheme, which offers funded research and study grants of as long as two years. The stated objective calls for "enriching their skills in ways that will benefit U.S. intelligence."

As we reported previously, Admiral Turner was attempt-

ing to recruit personnel from other agencies in "the Community" to the CIA—a practice which is very much frowned on in government circles. Of the nineteen he chose, six are from the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center, three from the Defense Intelligence Agency, three from the National Security Agency, two from the FBI, and the other five from the intelligence branches of all three military services.

If the thousands of other analysts throughout the intelligence community are wondering what they have to do to move from the normal up to the *exceptional* category, they probably will have to wait two years for another shot. However, few people in Washington anticipate that Admiral Turner will still be the Director in place then.

Newspaper Guild Finally Rejects AIFLD, AID Support

In *CAIB* Number 5 (July-August 1979) we reported on the conflict between the decision of the Executive Board of the Newspaper Guild in favor of accepting grants from AIFLD and AID, and the opposite position taken by a regional Council. At their annual convention, shortly after our report appeared, the 35,000 member union voted not to accept government or corporate funds for international trade union activities, specifically rejecting an AID/AIFLD grant.

Note Regarding the I.R.A.

In our last issue and in this there are articles which make reference, in passing, to "the I.R.A." and, in particular, its activities in Northern Ireland. A number of readers have protested to *CAIB* that there is a considerable difference between the Official I.R.A. and the Provisional I.R.A., and that distinctions should be drawn.

The articles in question have been submitted to *CAIB* by outside journalists, and they have not been altered. We hope to be able to investigate the Northern Ireland situations more fully in the near future, and to have more information on this subject.

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CIA IN ZIMBABWE

By Anton Ferreira and Jonathan Bloch

With the arrest and deportation of the American mercenary Captain William Atkins from Rhodesia recently, the CIA probably has one agent less operating in the country.

Any or all of the estimated 400 American mercenaries fighting in Rhodesia¹ could be agents said by former CIA officer John Stockwell to be operating there, "possibly preparing for a paramilitary operation like Angola."²

The mercenaries in the pay of the Muzorewa regime were one of the main targets of the Patriotic Front at the Lancaster House talks in London.

Atkins' arrest and deportation had the elements of farce which seem to mark all CIA operations. Agence France Presse reported that he pulled a gun when police arrived to arrest him and was taken away bound hand and foot. He had earlier been court-martialled for assault and pointing a weapon at an officer, who Atkins claimed had been tailing him.

The tail on Atkins and his subsequent deportation indicate that Rhodesia's Special Branch thought him too embarrassing to tolerate further—which must have been very embarrassing, given Rhodesia's desperate shortage of trained manpower in the ten-year-old guerrilla war against the Patriotic Front.

Atkins' case, and others, point to the absurdity of the CIA's relationship with the Rhodesian government. Their aims are the same—maintenance of a régime sympathetic to Western interests—but they keep getting in each other's way.

In 1969 two CIA informants—journalist John Nicholson and lawyer Alfred Gallaher—were jailed for economic sabotage. They had sent the CIA information on how Rhodesia was beating sanctions—sanctions which the U.S. was less than vigorous in observing anyway. Their arrest owed more to CIA incompetence than Rhodesian efficiency and soured relations between the U.S. and Rhodesia. The American Consul-in-Charge, Mr. Paul O'Neill Jr., and the Consulate's Political Officer, Mr. Irl Smith,* were both implicated in the incident.³

Less than a month after their trial Nicholson and Gallaher were freed and deported in return for an assurance from the U.S. that it would keep its Consulate in Salisbury open. Ian Smith, then Rhodesian Prime Minister, said at the time he was "more than happy" with this arrangement which lent his régime U.S. recognition.⁴

*Irl W. Smith was, indeed, the CIA Chief of Station in Salisbury from June 1968 to April 1970. See "Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa," pp. 461-462. [Editor's note.]

Richard Helms, then Director of the CIA, was also happy: "We have useful and workable relationships in Salisbury with our counterparts there. I think it would be a shame to sacrifice those if we didn't have to... if we got rid of the Consulate in Salisbury, we would have to run our operations out of some other context... I would like to see us keep a hand in there."⁵

But in March the same year President Nixon yielded to pressure from Britain and the OAU and closed the Consulate, going back on his deal with Smith. The CIA used "other contexts" for their operations—mercenaries.⁶

The Rhodesian military is heavily dependent on mercenary power—or what it calls "foreign soldiers"—and actively recruits them worldwide. The *Washington Post* has reported there were 400 U.S. mercenaries in the Rhodesian Army and the *Los Angeles Times* reported 200 mercenaries of all nationalities. ZANU estimates that 50% of the white forces are mercenary.⁷

Most of the U.S. mercenaries, according to evidence presented by ZANU, are recruited with the assistance and approval of the U.S. Army and the CIA through the mercenary magazine *Soldier of Fortune*, owned and edited by Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Brown of the 12th Special Forces Group (Airborne) U.S. Army Reserve. Another staffer on *Soldier of Fortune*, George Bacon, was killed while fighting as a mercenary in Angola and is acknowledged by the magazine to have been a CIA operative.⁸ *Soldier of Fortune* regularly carries articles on the war in Rhodesia with comprehensive details on how to enlist on the Government side.

Another source of mercenary recruits is the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, D.C., which supplies applicants with recruiting brochures and the address of the recruiting officer in Salisbury.

One of the earliest reported instances of CIA involvement in Rhodesia was documented by Ted Braden, a former Vietnam Green Beret, who said the Agency financed the training of Congo mercenaries by the Rhodesian Light Infantry.⁹

Since then the CIA, shaken by unfavorable publicity in the U.S., has pulled in its horns—it neglected to produce an in-depth study of Rhodesia last spring to avoid political controversy.¹⁰

According to Sean Geryasi, consultant to the Rhodesian Sanctions Committee at the UN, CIA help to Rhodesia could include the supply of sophisticated arms like the planes and helicopters used in raids on Zambia and Mozambique. An American company, Air Associates of Skokie, Illinois, acted as middlemen in last year's sale of Bell



205 gunships from the Israeli defense force to Rhodesia. Air Associates obtained an export license from the U.S. Government, and Gervasi believes it unlikely American intelligence did not know where the arms were going.¹¹

But Rhodesia, after its experience of U.S. dealings in the Nicholson/Gallaher spy deal, is wary of America's motives. According to Bruce Oudes, writing in *Africa Report* of July 1974, "Rhodesian security, obsessed with the possibility that the CIA might have agents operating in the country, scrutinizes particularly closely all whites who enter the country for any purpose except short term tourism".¹² Since then Carter has replaced Nixon and Rhodesian security can be expected to be more suspicious. —

1. *The Washington Post*, December 9, 1979.
2. *Peoples News Service*, March 6, 1979.
3. *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), January 4 and 11, 1970.
4. *The Times* (London), February 4, 1970.
5. "U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa," edited by the Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars, Boston: South End Press, 1978.
6. *The Guardian* (London), March 9, 1970.
7. "Guns for Hire," edited by ZANU Support Committee, New York, AAM.
8. *Soldier of Fortune*, Fall 1976.
9. *Ramparts*, Oct. 1967.
10. *8 Days*, August 11, 1979.
11. *New African*, August 1979.
12. *Africa Report*, July/August 1974.

Espionage Recruiting Time

by Gary Brown
and Louis Wolf

"The next time someone tells you that Turner is the stupid bastard who cut the size of the Agency out here, look at the color of his hair. . . . This is a young man's game. . . . You don't run a good, strong paramilitary or covert action program with a bunch of 55-year-olds. . . . What I've done is cut out high-grade superstructure . . . and doubled the input into the clandestine services . . . so that we have a group of young tigers. . . ."

This is the Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner speaking recently, (*Washington Star*, February 5, 1980). Contentious though he is, even to many who work for him, probably no one is going to call him stupid. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the intelligence "czar" (as he is known in Washington because he oversees not just the CIA, but the entire intelligence "community" in which there is considerable rivalry) is growing increasingly desperate in his search for young, ripe talent to staff the various spy agencies.

This trend was evidenced most recently by an all-day seminar last November at, of all places, the Central Florida Career Institute in Orlando. Billed as the first seminar in the country to give career information about the intelligence profession, the meeting was attended by 150 juniors, seniors and graduate students at central Florida universities and colleges (325 were expected). The subsidized \$1 registration fee included a box lunch, two "energy breaks," entrance to the various sessions, and a stack of recruitment propaganda from the CIA, DIA, the National Security Agency, the various military intelligence branches, and the FBI.

The program was sponsored by the Edyth Bush Charitable Foundation, Inc. Hugh F. McKean, a former CIA operative and by now a member of the Foundation's Board of Directors, was the initiator of the conference. He told those attending that he had invited his friends from the intelligence community (past and present) as seminar speakers and faculty. And they came.

Charles M. Balyeat, now an instructor at the CIA School of Management; Dr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, former CIA Inspector General and now a political science professor at Brown University; Dr. Sayre Stevens, former CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology; Dr. Edwin E. Speaker, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency Wea-

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pons and Systems Division; Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson (retired), former DIA director; Major Larry M. Tucker, currently chairperson for Strategic Intelligence Studies at the Defense Intelligence School; Capt. Richard W. Bates (retired), DIS commandant until last year and currently vice-president of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers; FBI Special Agent John M. Kelso, Jr.; and Ray S. Cline, longtime officer in the OSS, CIA, and State Department Intelligence division, now executive director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and also president of the National Intelligence Study Center.

Such a heavyweight group of gentlemen could hardly be expected to go out of their way to be either honest or objective about the nature of intelligence work. The speakers collectively reduced the intelligence community's operations to a baseline level of "problem-solving" and "technical expertise" as each of them outlined the purpose and direction of the various intelligence organizations.

CIA Gets "D-Minus" on Iran

For example, this ideology of technical necessity was behind former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Ray Cline's assessment of U.S. involvement in Iran as a "D-minus," blaming President Carter for not giving the CIA a freer hand "to operate clandestinely" there. He conveniently avoided mentioning that the CIA had, in the view of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, "historically considered itself the Shah's booster," that 75 to 100 operators the CIA had in residence in Tehran prior to the Shah's fall from power really had no independent gauge of what was happening because of the Agency's hand-in-glove relationship in Iran and in the U.S. with the Shah's brutal SAVAK network. Cline's "D-minus" might better

be understood in the context of the more honest statement by a CIA person: "... we can't do much with opaque regimes headed by friendly authoritarian figures." (*Washington Post*, December 12, 1978).

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick long sat in the CIA Inspector General's chair and, even after having softened the official report of the events surrounding the suicide-death of Dr. Frank Olson in the Agency's MKNAOMI LSD and poison experiments, was promoted to a more senior position at the Agency. The professor asserted confidently to the assembled potential espionage recruits that the CIA's organizing of Montagnard tribespeople against the Vietnamese revolutionary forces had been "successful," and that his only regret with the CIA's Bay of Pigs assault on Cuba is that "unhappily it failed." He also proceeded to justify the CIA's massive illegal domestic spying program, *Operation CHAOS*. While admitting that *CHAOS* is an example of an operation that was "on the verge of constitutionality," he claimed that the Department of State found the operation to be "strictly legal."

Those students who came to the meeting were typified by the comment of one who said: "I've probably watched every FBI show there ever was on television, and I wanted to know more about it." Perhaps they would do well to heed what one still active covert action intelligence veteran told *Newsweek*: "I am forever overwhelmed by the number of very fine people who have been deluded into wasting their lives in this business."

Nevertheless, Admiral Turner and friends continue to go after more "young tigers."

Gary Brown is an instructor in English at the University of Central Florida and a free-lance journalist.

CENTRAL FLORIDA CAREER INSTITUTE Sponsored by Edith Bush Charitable Foundation, Inc. Winter Park	
"Careers in Intelligence" Saturday, November 17, 1979 9:00 A.M. - 11:00 P.M.	
Edith Bush Theatre Princeton Street at 11th St. (Walt Disney Ave.) Orlando, Florida	
8:30 A.M. - Registration. (Doors Close Promptly at 9:00 A.M.)	
9:00 A.M. - Welcome and Statement of Purpose: Mr. David B. Roberts, President Edith Bush Charitable Foundation, Inc. Dr. Hugh F. McLean, Member, Board of Directors Edith Bush Charitable Foundation, Inc. Captain R. W. Bates, USA (Ret.), Moderator of the meeting; President, National Military Intelligence Association.	
9:15 A.M. - Careers in Intelligence I - Post-Defense Agencies: Dr. Ray S. Cline, Executive Director, Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies.	
10:00 A.M. - Refreshments (in Lobby).	
10:15 A.M. - Careers in Intelligence II - Defense Department and Armed Services: Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, USA (Ret.), Formerly-Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.	

11:00 A.M. - Science and Technology in Intelligence Dr. Bayre Stevens, Formerly-Deputy Director for Science & Technology, Central Intelligence Agency.	
11:45 A.M. - Lunch - Lobby and Grounds (weather permitting) to 1:00 P.M. - Economics in Theatre.	
1:00 P.M. - Intelligence Operations Dr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Professor of Political Science, Brown University	
3:45 P.M. - PARALLEL CONFERENCES: (Discussion Leader and Questions)	
(Theatre)	(Upperware)
Intelligence Careers I: (Non-Defense Agencies) Mr. Charles H. Balyeat, Instructor, School of Management, Central Intelligence Agency.	Science and Technology in Intelligence: Dr. Edwin E. Spamer, Head, Weapons & Systems Division, Defense Intelligence Agency.
2:45 P.M. - Refreshments (Lobby)	
3:00 P.M. - PARALLEL CONFERENCES: (Discussion Leader and Questions)	
(Theatre)	(Upperware)
Intelligence Operations: John H. Nelson, Jr., Ret., Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation	Intelligence Careers II: (Defense Agencies and Armed Services) Maj. Larry M. Tucker, USAF, Professor of Intelligence, Defense Intelligence School
4:00 P.M. - General Session - Panel of Faculty - Written QUESTIONS (and questions from the floor if time permits).	
5:00 P.M. - Adjournment.	

Former Head of MI-6 Commands Northern Ireland Troops

by Phil Kelly

Sir Maurice Oldfield, 64, given command of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, by Edward Heath, retired by Harold Wilson, is to sit in Stormont to "sandpaper down the edges" between the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, as a Northern Ireland Office person put it.

The creation of Oldfield's new post as security co-ordinator represents the death of the formal facade of "Ulsterisation." If it ever had any meaning, this was an attempt to follow the counter-insurgency text books and make the police force, and police methods, the primary means of enforcing law and order. It never worked, and lately, the British Army's frustration with even the marginal extension in the RUC's role which came with Ulsterisation has spilled over into the British press.

In demanding from a Tory Government that they should again be recognised as the main security force, the Army were pushing against an open door. As they wished, they are now back in undisputed control, able to clear proposed operations directly with the security co-ordinator.

The choice of the man to fill the post has fallen on Oldfield. MI6, which he headed between 1972 and 1975, is Britain's equivalent of the CIA. He is a career spook, and has experience in counter-insurgency. From 1950 to 1952, and from 1956 to 1958, he was based in Singapore. During the Malayan "emergency," his role was the co-ordination of MI6 activity with Army, Special Branch, and police operations.

Like the CIA, MI6 concerns itself principally with foreign espionage. Like the CIA, it is not only an intelligence gathering organization, but a means of covertly interfering in the political affairs of other countries. MI6, though, is smaller, poorer, and more sophisticated. It does not have the capacity to mount on its own the counter-insurgency operations which the CIA staged single-handed in Latin America and South East Asia, providing troops, weapons, and even air support. MI6's military capacity is often provided by the Special Air Service Regiment, the SAS: memoirs of officers who fought in Oman and Yemen bear this out. It is closer to the Foreign Office than the CIA is to the State Department: for example, British media operations, on the lines of the CIA's disinformation efforts and control of journals, were run through the Foreign Office Information Research Department. Oldfield knows the liaison game backwards.

But he has another resource to draw on: his close friendship with leading members and ex-members of the CIA. As the British media have ceaselessly reminded us, Oldfield is one of the models for John Le Carre's fictional George Smiley—the man who rooted out the "moles" inside MI6. How much mole-rooting Oldfield actually did doesn't really matter. Crucially, he was Chief of the MI6 station in

Washington between 1960 and 1964, and did a great deal to rebuild the trust of the Americans in the British intelligence establishment after the Burgess, Maclean and Philby debacle. He still has a great number of friends in the U.S. intelligence community.

How then, will he spend his time when not forcing British soldiers and Ulster policemen to talk to each other?

Britain's urgent need now is to counter the pressure building up in the international community that after ten years of war, it is time for movement, a "political initiative." This comes from many who have no sympathy for the IRA; but from the British point of view, such pressure serves to re-inforce IRA morale.

Current targets for covert action are those political forces which do not whole-heartedly endorse British policy of going for a military victory before any political initiative.

In Ireland, recent MI6 action has been aimed not directly at the IRA, but at isolating it and strengthening opposition to it. MI6 was behind the bank robberies conducted by the Littlejohn brothers to discredit the IRA. MI6 case officer John Wyman tried to bribe his way into the Garda Special Branch. MI6 planning may have been behind the Dublin bombs which encouraged the Dail to strengthen repressive measures in Ireland. Understandably, many people feel that if the British Government were going to increase covert action against the IRA, they wouldn't announce the appointment of a man like Oldfield, for the IRA would instantly reinforce their vigilance against infiltrators. As the IRA aren't the immediate target, and as the real targets won't be expecting it, these objections are not so substantial.

It is probably in the United States that the major British effort will come. That establishment politicians like New York Governor Hugh Carey and Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy are unhappy about British policies causes more concern than the IRA's backing from liberation movements and the international ultra-left. It is significant that another principle contender for the Oldfield job was Sir John Killick, Britain's Ambassador to NATO, who spends most of his time liaising with the U.S. military and intelligence establishments. The CIA and the intelligence community play a massive role in shaping U.S. national policy, and there is no doubt that Oldfield will be seeking help from his friends there to oppose Teddy Kennedy, and to remind the U.S. administration that political initiatives must follow, not precede, military victory. George Bush, a former CIA Director, is one of the front-runners for the Republican nomination. Of course, British pressure will start with lobbying and discrete persuasion. But if Teddy Kennedy looks close to the White House, and cannot be persuaded to end his criticism of British policies over Ireland, then MI6 may have dirty tricks up its sleeves.

NAMING NAMES

This column remains a regular feature of *CAIB* despite increasing efforts to attempt to make it illegal. Since the material presented here is researched from public documents, we have always maintained that it would be unconstitutional to criminalize this sort of research. We have been joined in this sentiment by such unlikely allies as the Justice Department and Senator Moynihan, as discussed elsewhere in this issue.

In any event, we have been able to conduct considerable research in this field since the last *Bulletin*, and the results are presented here. We have uncovered sixteen Chiefs of Station, including such significant posts as Chile, China, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom. In addition, we present information on twenty-three other senior CIA officers.

Bahrain

John F. Purinton, located at the Manama, Bahrain Embassy as of September 1979, appears to be a former telecommunications officer who has moved up to a case officer slot. Purinton, born June 29, 1938, was a telecommunications technician at the New Delhi, India Embassy from 1971 until at least 1974. In July 1976 he was serving in Karachi, Pakistan, apparently still in a telecommunications slot, but his cover in Manama is now as an economic officer.

Belgium

The new Chief of Station for Belgium is James Lawrence Corrigan, who has been transferred, as of November 1979, from Yaounde, Cameroon to the Brussels Embassy. Corrigan is fairly well known as a CIA officer; his biography appears in *Dirty Work 1*, *Dirty Work 2*, and *Bulletin* Number 4. Corrigan served from 1974 to 1977 in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador in Paris, and as of October 1977 was transferred to Yaounde, in which posting he was promoted to Chief of Station. As of November 1979 he is found at the Brussels Embassy.

Cameroon

Corrigan has been replaced in Yaounde, Cameroon as Chief of Station by Richard Joseph Cornish, born November 7, 1925 in Nebraska. Cornish's State Department biography includes the tell-tale service as a Department of the Army "political officer" from 1949 to 1959, indicating that he entered the CIA over thirty years ago, upon gradu-

tion from Yale University (by far the favored school, in the early days of the Agency). He served as a political officer in Rangoon, Burma from 1959 to 1962, when he was transferred back to Headquarters until 1964, when he was posted to Lome, Togo, again as a political officer. In 1966 he returned again to Headquarters, and there are no State Department entries regarding his subsequent service over the next 13 years. As of January 1980, however, he reappeared, at the Yaounde Embassy, where, considering his seniority, he clearly is Chief of Station.

Chad

The new Chief of Station in N'djamena, Chad, replacing James L. Atwater, is Larry G. Jarrett, born September 3, 1939. Jarrett, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 2*, served in the early 1970s in Sweden and Zambia. From 1974 until 1977 he was at the Lagos, Nigeria Embassy, as an economic-commercial officer—in fact Deputy Chief of Station—returning to Headquarters late in 1977, where he apparently remained till his posting, as of January 1980, to Chad.

Chile

We are pleased to uncover a powerful quartet of Agency officers in Santiago, Chile, including the new Chief of Station, the Deputy Chief, and two case officers.



The new Chief of Station is Thomas J. Keenan, born June 29, 1930 in Wisconsin. Keenan, whose biography is found in *Dirty Work 1*, served in Mexico City from 1960 to 1964, and under Department of the Army cover from 1964 to 1966, when his name disappears from State Department records for a year. In 1967 he was undercover as a political officer in Bogota, Colombia, where he remained until transferred to Lima, Peru in 1971. From 1973 to 1975 he served as Chief of Station in Kingston, Jamaica, before returning for a stint at Headquarters. CAIB's sources in Chile have located him at the Santiago Embassy as of December 1979.

Keenan's Deputy Chief appears to be Clifton J. Schaefer, born December 24, 1937, who, our sources in Chile indicate, has been serving there since late 1978. Schaefer served in Mexico City from 1969 to 1970, when he was transferred to Tegucigalpa, Honduras. After two years in Honduras he was transferred to Buenos Aires, Argentina, where he served until at least late 1975. There are no entries regarding him in Department of State records from then until mid-1978, when he appears back at CIA Headquarters. As of October 1978 he was serving at the Santiago Embassy, and, our sources indicate, since at least December of 1979 his cover has been in the political section.

Two senior case officers serving under Keenan and Schaefer are Frederick W. Silva, born February 22, 1937 in Massachusetts, and Todd D. Hagenah, born July 20, 1940 in New York. Silva's records include the phoney "research analyst" post with the Department of Defense from 1966 to 1969, followed by diplomatic cover posting to Guatemala City in March 1969, as a political assistant. In May 1971 he was transferred to Guayaquil, Ecuador as a political officer, until returning to Headquarters in July 1973. In October 1975, records indicate, he was posted to Bogota, and as of November 1978 he was in Santiago. Sources in Santiago indicate that, at least as of December 1979, he is in the political section.

Hagenah joined the CIA in 1965, and went under diplomatic cover, also in Ecuador, serving as a political officer at the Quito Embassy from late 1971 till mid-1974, when he was transferred to Lima, this time as a consular officer. We have been unable to find any Department of State references to him from 1976 to 1978, but he too appears in Santiago in late 1978 and, our sources tell us, is found in the economic section.

China

CAIB has located the Chief of Station in Beijing (Peking), China. He is David D. Gries, born May 8, 1932 in Ohio. Gries, another Yale graduate, was under cover as an "analyst" for the Department of the Air Force from 1960 to 1962, before appearing under State Department cover as a Chinese language and area trainee at the Foreign Service Institute Field Language School in Taichung, Taiwan. In 1964 he was transferred to the Singapore Consulate General as a political officer, serving there till 1968, when he returned to Headquarters. There are no ascertainable references to him in State Department records from 1970 to 1978. Then,

as of July 1978, he was at the then U.S. Interests Section (now the Embassy) in Beijing, where he is undoubtedly the Chief of Station.

Denmark

The Chief of Station in Copenhagen, Denmark, is Clark Gilbert Myers, born May 8, 1930 in Massachusetts. Myers served in Department of the Army cover from 1956 to 1964, when he assumed diplomatic cover at the Department of State. In 1965 he was posted to the Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany Embassy; a year later he was transferred to Moscow. In 1968 he returned to Headquarters, and in 1971 emerged as a political officer at the Saigon, Vietnam Embassy. In 1973 records show he was back at Langley, and there are no records of his whereabouts from early 1974 until January 1979, when he appeared on the Copenhagen Diplomatic List.

A case officer discovered at the Copenhagen, Denmark Embassy is John J. Arends, Jr., born October 21, 1937 in Michigan. Arends served in Vienna from 1968 to 1973, and then, after a year back at Headquarters, in Geneva until at least 1977. After a two-year absence from State Department records, he appears, posted to Copenhagen, as of at least August 1979.

Egypt

Murat Natirboff, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 1* and in *Dirty Work 2*, clearly a specialist on northeast Africa, former Chief of Station in Sudan and in Kenya, is now the new Chief of Station in Cairo, Egypt. Natirboff, born February 4, 1921 in the Soviet Union, and naturalized in the U.S. in 1943, has been in the CIA since at least 1952, when, the records say, he was a "training officer" with the Department of the Army, a cover he held until 1960. That year he was posted to New Delhi, India, under cover of the International Cooperation Administration. In 1961 he was transferred to Jakarta, Indonesia, still under cover of that agency's successor, the Agency for International Development. There are no State Department records on Natirboff from 1964 to 1972, when he was posted, under State Department cover, as a political officer in Khartoum, but in fact Chief of Station. From 1975 to 1976 he was back at Headquarters, and then was posted to Nairobi, again as Chief of Station. Sources have confirmed that he has been posted to the Embassy in Cairo since at least December 1979.

Ethiopia


A middle-level case officer has been spotted with the Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Embassy. He is David A. Harper, born March 12, 1942. Harper served as a political assistant in Copenhagen from 1970 to 1972, when he returned to Headquarters for two years. His activities in Denmark were exposed in the book "Under Cover," the relevant portion of which was reprinted in *Bulletin* Number 5. In May of 1974 Harper was posted to Bujumbura, Burundi, where he spent approximately three years before returning

once again to Headquarters. In July 1979 he was transferred to the Addis Ababa Embassy, although his precise cover title is not known to CAIB.

Ghana

Last year's change of government in Ghana has apparently generated some shuffling of CIA personnel. We have located two case officers there as of at least late 1979.

One is Jane Bryan Hoerrner, born July 19, 1942 in New Jersey. State Department records indicate that she was under cover as an "economic assistant" with the Department of the Army from 1967 to 1973, when she first appeared under diplomatic cover as an economic-commercial officer at the Addis Ababa Embassy. She returned to Headquarters in late 1975, and no further records have been found until our source Accra said that as of October 1979, she was posted to the economic section at the Accra Embassy. Her biography is found in *Dirty Work 2*.



The other case officer in Ghana is Kenneth Leroy Hurley, whose biography also appears in *Dirty Work 2*. Hurley was under cover at the Embassy at Lusaka, Zambia from 1974 to 1978, when he was transferred to Blantyre, Malawi, where he served as Chief of Base until at least early 1979. As of August 1979, however, he appeared in Accra, where he might be Deputy Chief of Station.

Guinea

Adrian Bernard Ciazza, born December 10, 1932, in Alabama, is the new Chief of Station in Conakry, Guinea. Ciazza, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 1*, has been with the CIA since at least 1957, when he commenced eight years under cover as a "research analyst" with the Department of the Army. He served as a political officer in Kabul, Afghanistan from 1965 to 1968, when he returned for a stint at Headquarters, before a posting, in April 1971, to Colombo, Sri Lanka. He returned to Headquarters in 1973 and went to Tehran, Iran in 1974, for a brief period. After less than a year back at Headquarters again, he was posted in late 1975 to the Brussels, Belgium Embassy. The next references to him indicate that as of September 1979 he was in Conakry, undoubtedly, given his length of service, the Chief of Station.

India

Allan Bruce Hemmings, whose biography is found in *Dirty Work 2*, is a case officer who has been transferred to

the Consulate General in Calcutta, India. Hemmings served as a consul officer in Casablanca, Morocco from 1975 to 1977, when he was transferred to Algiers, Algeria, as Third Secretary. He was in Algiers at least as late as February 1979, but recent records indicate that as of November 1979 he was in Calcutta.

Indonesia

We have located the Chief of Station and three other case officers in Indonesia. The Chief is Carl Edward Gebhardt, born June 8, 1933, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 1*. There are no available records on Gebhardt prior to 1972, when, after a few months at Headquarters, he was posted to Warsaw, Poland. In 1974 he returned to Headquarters for about a year and a half, and was then assigned to Bangkok, Thailand, in July 1976. CAIB has located references to Gebhardt indicating that at least as of November 1978 he was posted to Jakarta, Indonesia, where he is believed to be the Chief of Station.

The three case officers working for Gebhardt are James D. Anders, Jr., Ronald M. Cinal, and William H. Wright. Anders, born March 4, 1942 in Texas, was under cover as an "area specialist" for the Department of the Army from 1968 to 1973, when he took diplomatic cover as an economic-commercial officer at the Vientiane, Laos Embassy. In 1975 he returned to Headquarters and disappeared from State Department records until August 1979, when he was posted to the economic section at the Jakarta Embassy.

Cinal, who is listed in *Dirty Work 2*, was under cover as a political officer in the Nairobi, Kenya Embassy during 1976 and 1977. He reappears as of at least December 1979, as a political officer in Jakarta.

William H. Wright, born September 6, 1939 in Kansas, was posted to Rangoon, Burma from 1964 to 1970, when he was transferred to Manila, Philippines. In 1973 he returned to Headquarters; no additional records are found until he is shown, as of August 1977, at the Surabaya, Indonesia Consulate. As of October 1979 he was transferred to the capital.

Japan

The Chief of Base at the Consulate General in Osaka-Kobe, Japan is Lucius H. Horiuchi, born July 22, 1928 in Washington. Horiuchi is an Agency veteran, having served under cover as a Department of the Army "analyst" from 1951 to 1965. In July 1965 he was posted to Manila as a political officer, returning to Headquarters in 1967. Following a promotion to GS-13 in October of 1967, and his appointment as a "coordination officer" in May 1968, there are no records referring to him for the next ten years. In May of 1978 he is shown back at CIA Headquarters, and, in July of that year he was posted to Osaka-Kobe, undoubtedly as Chief of Base.

A senior case officer in Tokyo is Walter I. Floyd, Jr., born April 4, 1939 in Pennsylvania. Floyd also served in

the ubiquitous position of "research analyst" for the Department of the Air Force from 1965 to 1970, before entering into diplomatic posting, in 1971, first to Yokohama for language training, and then to the Tokyo Embassy, as a political officer. He served in Japan until 1976, when he returned to Headquarters, and then disappeared from State Department records. As of at least August 1979 he reappears as First Secretary in the Tokyo Embassy.

Jordan

A senior telecommunications officer in Amman, Jordan is Donald Charles McClung. McClung served in Montevideo, Uruguay from 1975 to 1977, when he was transferred to Athens, Greece. As of October 1979 he is found in Amman, in telecommunications.

Lebanon

The person who appears to be the new Chief of Station in Beirut, Lebanon is Jack S. Ogino, born October 9, 1935 in California. Ogino, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 1*, served in Cairo from 1965 to 1967, when he returned to Headquarters; in Kathmandu, Nepal from 1969 to 1972; and in Madras, India from 1972 to 1974, before returning again to Headquarters. In 1976 he was First Secretary at the Colombo, Sri Lanka Embassy, and, at least as of September 1979, our sources indicate that he has been posted to Beirut, where he is believed to be the Chief of Station.

Liberia

The new telecommunications chief in Monrovia, Liberia, the Agency's central telecommunications relay base for all of Africa, is Donald L. Miller, who has replaced Marvin H. Chindgren, who was listed in *Bulletin* Number 4. Miller apparently arrived in Monrovia at least as of September 1979. The new deputy telecommunications chief appears to be Dan N. Stephenson, who has replaced Richard B. George, also listed in *Bulletin* Number 4. Stephenson served at the major telecommunications installation in Manila, Philippines from 1965 to 1972, with a year during that period at Headquarters. No records regarding his whereabouts between 1972 and now have been found. Sources in Monrovia indicate that he also arrived in Liberia in September 1979.

New Zealand

The CIA Chief of Station in Wellington, New Zealand appears to be Hugh Richard Waters, born September 17, 1929 in New York. Waters served as an "analyst" with the Department of the Air Force from 1958 to 1960, when he moved into diplomatic cover, posted to the Seoul, South Korea Embassy. In 1965 he was back briefly at Headquarters, before being transferred to Surabaya, Indonesia, as a political officer, and, in fact, Chief of Base at the Consulate there. In 1967 he returned home again for two years, and

was then posted to the Rawalpindi, Pakistan Embassy, where he served as Deputy Chief of Station. From 1972 to 1979, State Department records are silent as to his whereabouts, but Waters appears on the April 1979 Wellington Diplomatic List as Attache, but in fact Chief of Station.

Paraguay

The Chief of Station in Asuncion, Paraguay, the longest-lived dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere, is Donald J. Venute, born April 5, 1930 in New Jersey. Venute has been with the CIA since 1951, when he graduated from Georgetown University. He spent his first ten years under military cover, and, in July 1961, appeared as Third Secretary at the Mogadiscio, Somalia Embassy. He returned to Department of the Army cover from 1966 to 1967, and then reverted to diplomatic cover, as a political officer in the Lima, Peru Embassy. In 1972 he returned to Headquarters, and disappeared from State Department records. In July 1978 he resurfaced, listed in the Asuncion Diplomatic List as Attache. He is clearly the Chief of Station.

Portugal

A Lisbon, Portugal source confirms that as of November 1979, Edward J. Bash, Jr., a case officer, appeared posted to the Embassy there, in the economic section.

Senegal

Case officer Robert J. Hammond, Jr., whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 2*, has been transferred to the political section at the Dakar, Senegal Embassy, as of August 1979. Hammond served as political officer in Accra, Ghana from June 1975 until February 1978, when he was returned to Headquarters. After about a year and a half, apparently, he is back in Africa.

Switzerland

European specialist Rowland E. Roberts, Jr., appears to be the new Chief of Base in the extremely important post of Geneva, Switzerland. Roberts, born May 8, 1928 in Pennsylvania, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 1*, has been with the CIA since at least 1954, when he commenced military cover as a "plans officer" with the Department of the Army. After eight years in that role, he served five years as political officer in the Copenhagen, Denmark Embassy, returned to Headquarters for several years, and then served at the Antwerp, Belgium Consulate General as an economic-commercial officer. In 1975 he returned to Headquarters again, and as of October 1979 is found at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.

Togo

Gordon Joseph Hopman, born October 4, 1941 in Oregon, listed in *Dirty Work 2*, has just been transferred to the Lome, Togo Embassy where he is apparently Chief of

Station. Hopman served from 1971 to 1974 as a "program analyst" for the Department of the Army, before his first diplomatic posting, as political officer in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. In 1976 he was transferred to Kinshasa, Zaire, and, as of December 1979 he is found at the Lome Embassy.

Turkey

We have uncovered two case officers in Turkey, S. Phillips L. Amerman and Patrick N. Murphy. Amerman, born September 14, 1945 in Pennsylvania, was an administrative officer with the Department of the Air Force from 1969 to 1971. Then, after a year at the University of Istanbul, he appeared as a projects officer with the Department of State, and, in 1973, became a consular officer at the Istanbul, Turkey Consulate General. We are unclear whether he remained in Turkey all the intervening time, but as of October 1979 he appeared at the Ankara Embassy.



Murphy, born September 28, 1941 in West Virginia, is presented in State Department records as a computer manager for the Department of the Air Force from 1968 to 1970, when he received State Department language training. In August 1971 he appeared as a consular officer at the Istanbul Consulate General, and in 1973 was transferred to Ankara. He was back at Headquarters in 1976, posted to the Rome, Italy Embassy in 1977, and, as of August 1979, is found once more at the Istanbul Consulate General.

In the light of recent developments in Turkey, with massive repression of people in the streets which has been graphically shown in the American media, these case officers are doubtless busy working in close liaison with the Turkish secret police.

U.S.S.R.

The CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, U.S.S.R. appears to be Burton Lee Gerber, born July 19, 1933 in Illinois. Gerber has been with the Agency since 1955, when he began military cover as an "area analyst" with the Department of the Army, a position he held until 1965, with one year, 1956, supposedly as a 2nd Lieutenant in the Army. In July 1965 he commenced diplomatic cover, studying Bulgarian at the Foreign Service Institute, preparatory to his posting, in June 1966, as "political officer" in the Sofia, Bulgaria Embassy. He was at that time either Chief of Station for Bulgaria, or Deputy. In October 1968 he returned to Headquarters. No further foreign postings appear in State Department records until October 1976, when Gerber was found at the Belgrade, Yugoslavia Embassy.

apparently Chief of Station. As of November 1979, at least, our information indicates he was assigned to the Moscow Embassy, where he is Chief of Station.

United Arab Emirates

The new Chief of Station in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates is Thomas D. Hawbaker, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 2*. Hawbaker, born February 28, 1932 in Iowa, served in Jordan from 1964 to 1966 under cover of the Agency for International Development, in Vietnam from 1966 to 1969—as a "pacification advisor" for the Department of the Air Force—under State Department cover in Cairo from 1969 to 1973, and in Colombo, Sri Lanka, from 1973 until at least late 1975. There are no indications of his whereabouts from 1975 until 1979, when in November he appears posted to Abu Dhabi.


United Kingdom

Edward William Proctor, who replaced the inimitable Cord Meyer, Jr. as Chief of Station in London, United Kingdom, in late 1976, has very possibly retired, but in any event has left London and been replaced by Richard F. Stoltz, Jr. Stoltz, born November 27, 1925 in Ohio, has reached this high and prestigious CIA post after 30 years with the Agency. His career began under cover as a "political affairs officer" with the Department of the Army in 1950. In 1959 he switched to diplomatic cover as a political officer in the Frankfurt, Federal Republic of Germany Consulate General. (Observers have noted that the Frankfurt Base is, in fact, much larger and more important than the Bonn Station.) In 1960 Stoltz was transferred to Sofia, Bulgaria where he remained till 1962, when he returned to Headquarters, as an intelligence operations specialist. In 1964 he was posted to Moscow; in 1965 he returned to Langley; and in 1966 he began a three-year stint in Rome, again as a political officer. In 1969 he was back at Headquarters; and in 1973 he was sent to the Belgrade, Yugoslavia Embassy as Chief of Station. In late 1974 he returned home, and there are no entries in Department of State records until December 1979, when he surfaced on the London Diplomatic Lists as Political Attaché—and, in fact, Chief of Station.

The new telecommunications chief at the London Station is Thomas C. Shedd, born June 15, 1931 in Massachusetts. Shedd has served in the telecommunications specialty in Tokyo, Accra, and London—where records indicate he served from 1969 to 1972, prior to his current tour, which commenced at least as of October 1979. Shedd replaces James Smith in the position he held since mid-1975.

Yugoslavia

The new Chief of Station in Yugoslavia appears to be Peter Vroom Raudenbush, born August 13, 1935 in Minnesota. He was under cover as an "analyst" for the Department of the Army from 1962 to 1973, when he first appeared in State Department records, posted to Conakry, Guinea as a consular officer, but, in fact, Chief of Station. In 1975 he returned to Headquarters, and, as of September 1979 is found at the Belgrade Embassy.



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Sources and Methods

By Ken Lawrence

CIA ASSASSINATIONS

On March 6, 1972, CIA Director Richard Helms sent a memo to his deputy directors which read, in part:

It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA engages in assassination. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue. To underline it, I direct that no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of our personnel. . . .

A year later when "a high-level official" made just such a suggestion to his subordinates in Uganda, the Chief of Station in Kampala demanded he put it in writing. The suggestion to "get rid of this guy" (Idi Amin) was then quickly withdrawn with the statement, "Of course I was only kidding."

"That's how it can happen, I thought," recalled former CIA agent Jay Mullen (*Oregon Magazine*, June 1979). "How many operations have resulted from similar Thomas à Becket statements? And how many men who assumed they were told to act could not later document their instructions?"

Perhaps it was knowledge of this or similar incidents that prompted Helms's successor, William Colby, to give CBS

reporter Daniel Schorr a different date for the supposed abolition of the tactic:

Without confirming anything about the past, Colby nevertheless wanted me to know that assassination was not currently a method used by the CIA. It had been banned since 1973. . . . (*Clearing the Air*, page 146.)

Colby's own directive against CIA employment of assassination was issued on August 8, 1973. If reports in the Cuban press are accurate, Colby's order has received approximately the same respect as his predecessor's.

Public outrage at the revelation of CIA involvement in assassination plots riveted attention on the investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Church Committee) in 1975, after the Rockefeller Commission, the first body to gather evidence, had failed to release any information or recommendations on assassinations in its final report.

In response to vocal public concern, Senator Church and others issued militant-sounding statements that "murder" by the government is intolerable and must be outlawed. (continued on page 21)

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